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 Abstract 
 
Clinton and Bush Administrations’ Nuclear Non-proliferation Policies  
On North Korea: Challenges and Implications 
Of Systemic and Domestic Constraints 
 
Gunsik Kim 
 
This study compared and evaluated the conduct of US policies towards North Korea in 
order to address the North Korean nuclear threat under the Clinton (1993-2000) and the Bush 
(2001-2004) administrations. The capabilities of the two administrations to carry out their 
preferred policies toward the global threat were evaluated in view of the systemic and domestic 
constraints that they faced. Domestic constraints identified were the US Congress, American 
political culture and public opinion and bureaucratic problems. Systemic constraints were the 
lack of coordination and differences in policy frameworks of South Korea, Japan, China and 
Russia, and the difficulty of dealing with the Kim regime. These systemic and domestic 
constraints were deemed by this study as the primary factors in their inclination towards the 
middle ground in dealing with North Korea hence, becoming similar. 
 
Three major areas were examined: (1) Clinton and Bush administrations’ original policy 
position towards North Korea in terms of the use of bilateralism and multilateralism, carrots and 
sticks, and the inclusion/exclusion of the international regimes; (2) identification of the systemic 
and domestic constraints that affected the full implementation of the policies as originally 
proposed by the Clinton and Bush administrations; and (3) the extent to which Clinton and Bush 
had to adjust policies towards North Korea in terms of the use of bilateralism and 
multilateralism, carrots and sticks, and the inclusion/exclusion of the international regimes at the 
end of their term. 
 
Using a structured focused comparison, this study predicts that, due to the domestic and 
systemic factors, the Bush administration is inclined to use the carrot strategies, and the 
exclusion of the international regime as employed in the Clinton administration, but is likely to 
employ bi-multilateral approach.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Even a half a century after the Korean War, a dominant problem in United States foreign 
policy remains the question of relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  
(DPRK) and, in particular, that country’s movement toward a nuclear weapons program.  Since 
the 1990s, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons–and the missile technology to 
develop them–has posed an ongoing crisis for both the Clinton Administration (1993-2001) and, 
since then, the second George Bush Administration since 2001. Despite the seeming clarity of 
the threat, dealing with the North Korean regime has involved complex policy choices, ones 
centering around the pursuit of alternative negotiating frameworks, bilateral or multilateral 
diplomacy, the precise balance between coercion (sticks) and incentives (carrots), and the extent 
to which these policy choices are tied to international regimes such as the Non-Proliferation 
Treat (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The debates over such policy 
instruments have attracted much attention throughout the American policy community and 
academia (see Cha and Kang 2003; Finnegan 1999: 81; Haass 1995: 1-18; Klare 2000: 46-51; 
Litwak 2000; O’Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003; Pucket 1993; Shimbun 2000; Shirk 1997: 245-
270; Sigal 1998, 2000; The Aspen Strategy Group 1995; Wolfsthal 1993: 6-9).  
 The 1990s have, in fact, seen two distinct American policies designed to get the North 
Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program. During Clinton’s term, a relatively “moderate” 
policy was pursued in which the Agreed Framework between the American government and the 
North Korean government would provide North Korea incentives to abandon its nuclear 
program.1  And, in fact, the North Korean government also acceded to the international pressure 
                                                 
1 The Agreed Framework of 1994 was a bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea in which the 
latter agreed to "freeze" its nuclear program. The agreement outlined a 10-year program during which the United 
States, South Korea and Japan will construct two new proliferation-resistant, light-water-moderated nuclear reactors 
in the DPRK in exchange for the shutting down of all its existing nuclear facilities. In addition, the DPRK agrees to 
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of signing the NPT.  However, the record of North Korean behavior on the matters of nuclear 
weapons and missile technology was not entirely compliant. The country has continued to show 
its non-cooperation on the proliferation initiatives. Bush entered office in 2001 with a relatively 
hard line policy that was clearly more skeptical of North Korean behavior and sought to coerce 
the country into restraint. Then, barely ten years after the Agreed Framework, the North Korean 
Government announced on January 10, 2003 its withdrawal from the NPT.   
 North Korea’s dramatic withdrawal of the NPT set off security alarms throughout the 
world particularly in the countries in the Asia Pacific Region and among North Korea’s 
neighbors: Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China (Sigal 1998: 46). Consequently, the decision 
immensely affected the trade and business, political strategies and policies of countries and the 
economic and political activities of these countries. Its actions confirmed the hard line views of 
the Bush administration, which now feared possible domino effect scenarios, propelling states to 
create their own nuclear programs. North Korea’s refusal to enter into the NPT forged by 
countries all over the world only heightened the United States’ suspicion that it was embarking 
on nuclear proliferation. As a response to the North Korea’s conduct, the country was labeled by 
the Bush administration as a “rogue state”2 and ultimately part of the “axis of evil.”  From then, 
and up to the present, North Korea has been a target for security checks because of the potential 
threat it has brought to the region and to the world.  Yet the Bush administration, even in its role 
at the forefront of the non-proliferation regime, has confronted complex choices involving the 
attempt to employ several techniques and strategies to halt further development of North Korea’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
remain a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) full-scope safeguards. 
 
2 "Rogue" states refer to countries regarded as hostile to the US and its allies and suspected of developing weapons 
of mass destruction. Though the US State Department discourages use of this term, it is still used by some US 
officials in reference to NK, Libya, Syria, Iran and Iraq. 
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nuclear program (see e.g., Carlson 2003; Choi 2003; Fein 2003; Heginbotham 2003; Kerr 2003; 
Koh 2003; Lee and Feffer 2004; Niksch 2003). 
 In light of this pressing issue on the Korean peninsula, the purpose of this dissertation is 
to examine and evaluate the conduct of United States policies in addressing the North Korean 
nuclear threat under the Clinton (1993-2000) and Bush (2001-2004) administrations.  Three 
major areas are examined for both administrations: (1) original policy position towards North 
Korea upon each entry into office, (2) systemic and domestic constraints that affected the full 
implementation of the policies as originally proposed by the two administrations, and (3) how 
each administration adjusted its policies as a result of these systemic and domestic constraints.    
 Using the method of structured focused comparison, this study considered the divergent 
policy strategies of the Clinton and Bush administrations in terms of their choices on bilateralism 
vs. multilateralism, coercion vs. incentives, and the role of international regimes. But this 
dissertation also considered similarities between the administrations, i.e., the enduring domestic 
and systemic constraints that had common constraints on otherwise divergent policies. As such, 
this study shows that Clinton attempted to employ the international regime in the early part of his 
administration but ended up with the exclusion due to some major constraints; and Bush started 
and is likely to end with the exclusion of the international regime. This dissertation predicts that, 
while Clinton employed bilateral approach, the Bush administration would use bi-multilateral 
strategy toward the end of his second term in resolving the nuclear conflict. 
The Dimensions of Policy Choice in U.S. Foreign Policy towards North Korea 
 This dissertation is based on the conceptualization of strategic choices underlying the 
policy alternatives of hard line and moderate foreign policies in how the United States chooses to 
deal with the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Three policy dimensions are 
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conceptualized in this study: (1) multilateralism and bilateralism as a negotiating framework, (2) 
coercion (sticks) versus incentives (carrots) in the application of military, diplomatic and 
economic pressure, and (3) the extent to which international regimes are invoked.  
 In the study that follows, these will be used to describe the original policy designs of each 
administration upon entering offices and then, ultimately, examined again to assess how systemic 
and domestic pressures have constrained the ultimate implementation of administration policy 
preferences. Given their importance to this study, it is useful to begin by examining each 
dimension in some detail. 
Alternative Negotiating Frameworks: Bilateralism versus Multilateralism 
 This dimension of policy strategy concerns the diplomatic framework in which the 
United States, in the case of this dissertation, engages the North Korea government on its own 
bilaterally, or as one of a group of states acting in concert vis a vis the North Koreans.  Although 
multilateralism is usually considered to a more moderate policy strategy, in the case of United 
States-North Korea relations it is bilateralism that is associated with a more accommodating and 
flexible policy, because of the North Korean demand for direct relations with the United States 
(O’Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003: 220) for reasons of diplomacy and strategy.  In contrast, 
multilateralism, whereby the United States government acts in concert with China, Russia, Japan, 
and South Korea, is seen as a more hard line posture in which the United States withholds 
recognition and forms a coalition against whom the North Korean government must deal.     
 Policy analysts and scholars are sharply divided over the question of bilateralism or 
multilateralism in United States-North Korea relations. Certain scholars argue that bilateral talks 
might be the more effective solution in the North Korean crisis (Juster 2000: 51: Pilat 1994: 129; 
Sigal 2000: 3). On the other hand, some scholars such as Cha and Kang (2003: 161), Finnegan 
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(1999: 81), Haass (1995: 1), Litwak (2000: 198), O’Hanlon and Mochizuki (2003: 220), Puckett 
(1993: 120) Shirk (1997: 245), and Wolfsthal (1993: 6) cite the use of a multilateral approach to 
solve the North Korean crisis. The reasons for their choice of multilateral negotiations as the tool 
for the resolution of the nuclear problem may differ but the primary contention is the same.  
 On the one side, some scholars supported the sort of bilateralism employed by the 
Clinton administration in pressuring the North Koreans. They argue that it is more practical for 
the United States to employ a multilateral strategy because it can impose sanction together with 
other countries connected through trade with North Korea, thereby severing the economic 
sanction, distribute the cost of military expenditure with other countries and for the common 
security interest of the countries involved. On the other hand, some scholars advocate the use of 
multilateralism because of the prior failure of unilateralism and bilateral negotiations with NK. 
Thus, Puckett (1993: 120), and the Aspen Strategy Group (1995: 43) argued that the United 
States must demand a multilateral approach to the North Korean nuclear issue and more military 
expenditure to its allies. Multilateralism in the security realm builds on and encourages the 
network of multilateral economic relations that are developing in the region (Feffer, 2000a). 
 On the other side of the policy debate are scholars favoring multilateralism. Shirk (1997) 
reviews the failed attempts of unilateral negotiations with North Korean suggested that the 
United States Government should use a multilateral strategy because the bilateral strategy used 
by the Clinton Administration, in addition to its failure to stop the North Korean nuclear 
program, failed to induce North Korean regime as a normal international actor. Some observers 
contend that bilateralism should supplement multilateralism (Ferrer 2000b: 45).  Another 
argument is simply that developing domestic and international support for nonproliferation 
actions is simply not always possible (Pilat 1994: 275). It is suggested that the capability to act 
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alone, if needed, is essential. Therefore, a bilateral approach is what is needed in order to gain 
support both from the domestic and the international arena. As Sigal (1998, 2000) describes in 
his chapter on North Korea, policymakers have turned to engagement because both economic 
sanctions and military force appear unattractive.  Supporting bilateralism, Juster (2000: 51) took 
the case of Iraq as an example for the success of this approach. He suggested that it was the 
bilateral negotiations that the US had moderated Iraq’s behavior and constructed a positive 
bilateral relationship. Shirk (1997: 246) concurred this conclusion by asserting that maintaining a 
balance with North Korea must reaffirm its bilateral alliances and military presence in the region. 
Coercion versus Incentives in the Instruments of Statecraft 
The coercion “sticks” versus incentive “carrots” dimension refers how the instruments of 
statecraft–diplomatic, economic, or military–are employed to influence the North Korean 
government.  One strategy, which would be associated with a moderate strategy, is to provide 
incentives to induce the North Korean government to give up or curtail its nuclear program 
through, say promises of economic aid or diplomatic recognition.  In sharp contrast, a more hard 
line strategy of coercion involves essentially imposing penalties on the North Korean 
government to force it dismantle its nuclear program. Such “sticks” of statecraft would include 
diplomatic isolation, withholding economic aid, and/or ultimately the threat of military force. 
Note that these instruments, either coercive or through incentives, can be delivered on a bilateral 
or multilateral basis. 
 The use of coercion and incentives is not, however, mutually exclusive, and most of the 
literature points to a mix of the two strategies. While reward is used to reinforce and encourage a 
certain action, a sanction is used to punish, deter and discourage. In international relations, the 
reward and incentive strategies pertain to the choice of reward given in terms of economic favors 
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and foreign aid and the punishment which uses military, economic and diplomatic punishment, 
respectively (Cha and Kang 2003; Litwak 2000; Sigal 1998). The United States has at its 
disposal several means of statecraft as economic, military and diplomatic approaches which it 
has used to North Korea.  The use of multiple instruments of statecraft means the simultaneous 
use of the economic, military and diplomatic means of resolving the North Korean crisis instead 
of using only one, for instance, military to deter the country. Economic, diplomatic and military 
interventions play a critical role in sustaining the sort of engagement activities that might help 
prevent proliferation (Niksch 2001: 1-14). 
 In the case of the United States foreign policy towards North Korea, the Clinton and Bush 
administrations have used the reward and sanction strategy to deter and stop North Korea’s 
nuclear program. The Clinton Administration used mainly economic favors to provide incentives 
for the North Korean government (Sigal 1998).  In this approach, nuclear weapons become a 
bargaining chip that North Korea has to trade for certain political, and economic rewards, 
whether these rewards are diplomatic recognition or light-water reactors (Berry 1995). Cha and 
Kang (2003) had illustrated why a carrot strategy would serve best the purpose of the United 
States of effectively implementing a nuclear nonproliferation program in the country. Their 
perspectives view carrots as more worthwhile than sticks, and emphasize the responsibility that 
the world’s most powerful nation has in resolving crises through negotiation. 
 However, due to the perceived failure of the all-carrot strategy employed by the Clinton 
Administration, many analysts  argue that a coercive strategy better addresses the problem, 
although there are perceived dangers of using sticks in North Korea. Some nuclear proliferation 
analysts lean toward a strategy giving greater emphasis to a more hard line strategy in which 
coercion is the dominant form of statecraft (Litwak, 2000), especially on countries that are 
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considered as rogue states such as North Korea.  This does not preclude a mix of coercion and 
incentives, but suggests that it is the tone in which they are combined that makes all the 
difference (Mazarr, 1997). The promise of benefits for nonproliferation, and the threat to 
punishment for proliferation, must always be present in the United States policy. O’Hanlon and 
Mochizuki (2003) suggest that the use of both carrots and sticks is not contradictory. The outside 
world should not give Pyongyang substantial aid and other benefits simply to appease a 
dangerous leader or solve an immediate security crisis. But if North Korea is prepared to 
eliminate its nuclear weapons programs, transform the broader security situation on the 
peninsula, reform its economy, and even begin to change its own society, outside countries can 
and should be generous. 
 As of now, the Bush administration has used both economic and military instruments and 
coercive sanctions in dealing with the nuclear problem (Cha and Kang 2003). This is especially 
true when the United States punishes North Korea in light of its withdrawal from the NPT in 
2003. This study predicts that the stand-off between North Korea and Bush, and some other 
factors, will force the current administration to use incentives.  
The Involvement of International Regimes  
 International regimes provide a third element in any strategy, moderate or hard line, 
designed by a U.S. administration to contain the North Korea nuclear threat, and it has been 
significant instrument in policies of the Clinton and the Bush administrations. This can be a 
source of issues and constraints (Elich 2003). The Clinton and the Bush administrations, for 
instance, used the IAEA and the NPT in order to enforce inspections of undeclared nuclear sites 
in North Korea (Elich 2003). The IAEA took this posture due at the bequest of United States 
officials, who were keen on using these inspections to gather more intelligence on North Korea 
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and apply pressure to the regime there. The loyalty of IAEA was questioned by North Korea as it 
was alleged that it passed information on the United States. The IAEA was more preoccupied 
with maintaining their sanctity with certain countries like the United States through tough 
posturing rather than preventing proliferation in North Korea.  Although an international 
institution, the IAEA and NPT can serve the interests of hard liners in the United States 
Government, even if tied to the use of multilateral and coercive strategies.  
 The leaning of the IAEA and the NPT on the United States is evident in the ability of the 
Clinton and the Bush administrations to use their means of intelligence and sanctions. Thus, the 
withdrawal of the North Korea from the NPT stemmed from its substantiated belief that its very 
survival is at stake due to the Bush administration’s influence and threats (see e.g., Cha 2002; 
Diehl 2002; George W. Bush Administration Policy Toward North Korea 2004; LaMontagne 
2002; Sherman 2002). 
 This threat from North Korea has propelled a worldwide movement that seeks to curtail 
this massive security threat. The NPT is the most popular multilateral treaty with 187 member 
countries. Under the treaty, non-nuclear weapon member states pledge that they will not accept 
nuclear weapons or help to develop nuclear weapons from nuclear weapon states in order to gain 
negotiations to attain disarmament of nuclear weapon states. An important nuclear non-
proliferation treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban (CNTB), supplements the NPT. This 
supplementary treaty is signed by 149 nations including five nuclear weapon states. Moreover, 
for almost ten years, the NPT has been successful in preventing nuclear testing by the North 
Korean government. 
 Presumably, the international regime should have ended the nuclear problem in North 
Korea.  However, the NPT, while fostering ties among countries, was disregarded by the Kim 
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regime, and, as such, has served as means by which the North Korea government has signaled its 
hard line positions.  North Korea was one of the countries that had continued with its nuclear 
programs even after signing the treaty (Sigal 1998). Moreover, it violated the provisions of the 
NPT and the Agreed Framework of the Clinton Administration when North Korea removed the 
monitoring equipment the IAEA installed at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, expelled the IAEA 
inspectors resident there, and announced it would resume operations at such facilities as its five 
megawatt reactor at its spent fuel reprocessing plant. Eventually, on January 10 in 2003, the 
DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT, thus the expressions of concern, if not 
condemnation, from each of the major powers involved in the issue. 
Explaining U.S. Policy towards North Korea: Systemic and Domestic Constraints 
 This dissertation does not simply seek to describe United States policies towards North 
Korea.  It also seeks to explain those choices in terms of constraints that affect the extent to 
which preferred policies could be implemented across the tenure of an administration. Two sets 
of constraints have been widely considered to influence the US foreign policy towards North 
Korea since the end of the cold war (see Amini 2002; Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 226-254; 
Behrens 2000; Busch 2002; Cha and Kang 2003; Eberstadt 1996: 10; Juster 2000). The first set 
consists of constraints from the international system and, in particular, the power and position of 
other national actors involved in the Korea crisis. The other set of constraints consists of 
domestic political pressures throughout the American political system. The premise of this 
dissertation is that these constraints–at home and abroad–are factors not tied to a specific 
presidential administration.  Rather, as examined here, these factors pose constraints that cut 
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across successive administrations and, as such, are common to the Clinton and Bush 
administrations. 
International Systemic Constraints throughout Northeast Asia 
 That even great powers face constraints from other powers is, of course, a basic premise 
of the dominant perspectives, such as neo–realism (Mearshiemer 2001) in which the role of 
international structures defined by the distribution of power in an anarchic system. Thus, even 
the United States, a supposedly the dominant power in the post-cold war international order, 
faces significant constraints in implementing its policies towards North Korea (Cha and Kang 
2003; Eberstadt 1996: 12; Juster 2000; Haass 1995; Hayes 2003; Nye 2002).  Thus the United 
States is constrained by other powers in the Northeast Asian region: Russia, China, Japan, and 
South Korea.  In the latter two cases, it is a matter of having the support of key allies who are 
also very much the targets of North Korean actions. And, although not ally, China’s role is 
especially important because of its special influence over the North Korean regime as one of the 
few nations with sustained political and economic ties with the otherwise isolated regime. As 
such, US administrations have to take into account the policy preferences of these governments–
ones that might be at variance with the United States’ approaches to dealing with the North 
Korean program. Ultimately, the United States needs the help of the international regime in order 
to legitimize its actions and gain military support from countries within the Northeast Asian 
region. 
 In the case of the North Korean crisis, a second systemic constraint for the United States 
is the country’s regime under the leadership of the Kim. The attitude of the Kim regime has 
different perspective from that of the United States in terms of how negotiations should be made 
and how the implementation of the policies should be done. For one, the Kim regime has insisted 
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on a bilateral approach, whereas Bush has insisted on a multilateral approach with major 
countries such as Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. Moreover, the mutual distrust of the US 
leaders and the North Korean leaders hinders them to create an agreement that they can both 
abide with. Third, the United States is constrained by its military capabilities: the US military 
intelligence cannot have access on North Korea and thus, hinders them to create an estimation of 
the real power of the North Korean military. And while the US military is more powerful than 
North Korea’s military, the impending threat of a North Korean army that has nuclear weaponry 
hampers pre-emptive strikes. 
 The end of the cold war has complicated this environment. With the demise of the Soviet 
Union, North Korea has been left as perhaps the most potentially threatening and the most 
unstable actor on the world stage. The suspicion that North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons 
unsettles not only its neighbors but also the United States. In the longer term, the possibility that 
Pyongyang might use nuclear arms to blackmail the other East Asian neighbors is worrisome. 
The most important impact of a North Korean bomb ultimately might be to drive both South 
Korea and Japan to obtain their respective nuclear arsenals.  Thus the United States operates in 
an environment of great uncertainty in which it must attempt to adopt a strategy that can 
effectively address the problem of nuclear weapons of North Korea. 
Domestic Political Constraints within the United States 
 This dissertation also takes into consideration the role of domestic constraints within the 
American political system. As will be discussed later in this dissertation, domestic political 
constraints have been characterized in terms of the internal formulation of the policy options for 
the Clinton (see e.g., Berry 1995; Cronin 1994; Forsythe and Hendrickson 1996; Held and 
McGrew 1998; Jacobs 1997; Sigal 1998; Sokolski 1995) and Bush (see e.g., Bock 2002; Boese 
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2003; Cha 2004; Cossa 2001; Lindsay 2003; McFaul 2002 and Reiss (2004) administrations. 
Although contrary to the logic of systemic theory, domestic political factors condition responses 
to international pressures for several reasons, even in a crisis involving the threat of nuclear war. 
Domestic politics matters in three ways: (1) the need to resolve debates over the appropriate 
strategy on North Korea, (2) the appropriation or authorization of resources for carrying armed 
conflict or signing agreements, and (3) the ability to pursue a public policy toward North Korea 
that is a the forefront of mass politics in the United States., e.g., how to sell a policy in which the 
government makes concessions or risks war with an aggressive authoritarian regime.    
 Three imminent domestic constraints limit the power of the United States Government in 
solving the nuclear issue: the Congress of the United States, public opinion and domestic culture, 
and the bureaucratic and decision-making politics measured in terms of struggle between 
Defense and State departments and presidential limitation in policy decision. The US Congress, 
in particular, as part of the legislative branch of the government, is deemed a constraint because 
of its inherent power to direct and appropriate financial, military and formulate treatises (Burgin, 
1992: 217-242). Moreover, the partisanship in the Congress has proven to be a crucial 
determinant of the success of the United States’ policy on North Korea. In other words, the 
interplay between the two major political parties in the United States, the Republican and the 
Democrat, has molded the country’s foreign policies. As will be argued later in this dissertation, 
both the Clinton and the Bush administrations have encountered both support and opposition 
from the US Congress that led to the changes in their policy formulation and limitation in 
mustering the use of military, economic and diplomatic means. 
 The second domestic constraint is the public opinion regarding rogue states and 
proliferation. Public opinion either softens or hardens policy positions and implementation; and, 
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 14
in our case, the Clinton and Bush administrations operated/operates on the context of public 
opinion and the diplomatic culture of the American people. Being at the forefront of democracy, 
US policy makers contemplating the deployment of troops into a situation—whether unilaterally 
or multilaterally, or sanctioning or providing aid—should sensibly consider the value the public 
places in the venture, and then they may try to use whatever persuasive skills they possess to 
enhance this value. This means marketing foreign policies to the general public. 
 The third constraints include the bureaucratic and decision-making politics measured in 
terms of struggle between Defense and State departments and presidential limitation in policy 
decision, the conflict and limitations within the executive branch of the government create 
inconsistencies and lack of coordination that leads to the inadequacy of convergence of actions. 
Intelligence is a significant factor in foreign affairs than it is today. One of the major problems 
about intelligence bureaucracy and international relations is the deficiency in understanding 
historical context. Often, commentators attack and support the challenges facing intelligence 
communities without reflecting on the historical forces that have shaped these communities over 
the last centuries (Jackson and Siegel 2005). 
The Significance of Constraints on the U.S. Foreign Policy 
 The importance of these constraints, i.e., the mix of international and domestic pressures, 
is that they affect the implementation of any administration’s original policies. The argument is 
that both the Clinton and Bush administrations will face significant constraints that will diminish 
the differences in their original policy strategies. This dissertation will, for example, illustrate 
that Bush policy approach and implementation strategies towards the NK problem would be 
similar to that of Clinton’s policy stance and implementation strategies. Bush’s policy is likely to 
have a similar policy path which focuses on bilateral negotiations within the context of a 
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multilateral forum (e.g., the Six-party talks), a leaning towards economic rewards and the 
exclusion of the international regime. 
 While the two administrations started on different policy paths—Clinton favoring to use 
bilateral negotiations, rewards or incentives based mainly on economic favors and aids by 
predominantly using economic and diplomatic means and employing the aid of the NPT and 
IAEA in the negotiation and containment process (Niksch 2001), whereas Bush utilizing military 
and economics as the primary deterrent for the North Korean nuclear threat—this study expects 
that the latter administration would adopt a moderate approach in the end. 
 The findings of this dissertation have important policy implications. This dissertation’s 
investigation of the domestic and systemic constraints faced by both administrations beginning 
from the formulation policy frameworks, to the actual implementation of the policies and the 
changes that took place in the course of these administrations. This study shows that the 
domestic and systemic constraints are the main reasons for the inability of the United States to 
resolve the North Korean crisis. 
Research Questions, Methodology, and Case Selection 
 The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to assess the impact of domestic and systemic 
constraints on the ability of the United States to pursue an effective policy for containing the 
threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation.  It examines foreign policies of two United States 
presidencies–those of the Clinton and second Bush administration–with respect to three areas of 
policy choice: bilateralism vs. multilateralism, carrots vs. sticks, and the role of international 
regimes. Noting that, upon entering office, these two administrations proposed distinctly 
different policies towards North Korea, it then examines how domestic and systemic constraints 
influenced each administration in the implementation of their respective policies.  A key point of 
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the dissertation is that the two administrations faced similar constraints and, as a result, the 
differences in their policies ultimately narrowed over time. Thus, this study seeks to identify the 
domestic and systemic constraints in order that the present and the future US administrations can 
resolve the constraints before embarking on a policy approach. 
 A methodology of structured focused comparison, developed by George (1979: 42-68; 
see also Bennett and George 1997), was utilized in this study in order to illustrate and 
systematically compare the domestic and systemic constraints on the implementation of the 
Clinton and Bush administration policies. As originally articulated by George (1979), the use of 
structured focused comparison is actually the building block for theory development. It is a 
comparative study between two cases where the method is focused in that it deals with only 
certain aspects of the cases; that is, a selective theoretical focus guides the analysis of the cases. 
The method of doing so is structured in that the same general questions are asked of each case in 
order to guide data collection, thereby making possible systematic comparison and accumulation 
of the findings of the cases. For this study, the selective theoretical focus is the domestic and 
systemic constraints in the use of multilateralism and bilateralism, reward and sanction and the 
use of economic, military and diplomatic. 
 Structured focused comparison was applied in the three components of the research 
design. The first component, the identification of the initial policy of the Clinton and the Bush 
administrations, was compared through the initial policy position with respect to the preferred 
framework of negotiation, the mix of inducements versus coercion, and the role of international 
regimes. Second, the process of the approval of the proposed policy of Clinton and Bush was 
identified including the support or the opposition it received from the US Congress and public 
opinion. The problems in terms of the policies such as the appropriation for the North Korean 
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regime, the military support and the implementation support in terms of financial and military 
mandate were compared and contrasted between the two administrations. Finally, the final policy 
position of the Clinton and the Bush administrations, i.e., at the end of their terms, were 
compared with respect to the three originally policy dimensions: the preferred framework of 
negotiation, the mix of inducements versus coercion, and the role of international regimes 
 Following this methodology, the dissertation addresses the following specific questions 
for the two administrations: 
1. What are the initial policy positions of the Clinton and second Bush administrations to  
North Korean nuclear proliferation with respect to:  
  a. Negotiating Framework bilateralism versus multilateralism 
  b. Instruments of Statecraft: Inducements “carrots” versus Coercion “sticks”  
  c. International regimes particularly NPT and IAEA exclusion or inclusion 
2. What are the similarities and the constraints in the domestic level in the policy 
formulation, strategy and implementation of the Clinton and Bush Administration on 
North Korean nuclear threat in terms of: 
  a. U.S. Congress 
  b. American diplomatic culture and public opinion 
  c. Bureaucratic institutions and politics 
3. What are the similarities and constraints in the systemic level in the policy formulation, 
strategy and implementation of the Clinton and Bush Administration on North Korean 
nuclear threat in terms of: 
  a. Coordination with South Korea  
  b. Coordination with Japan 
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  c. Coordination with China 
  d. Coordination with Russia 
 The thesis of this dissertation is that the domestic and systemic constraints faced by the 
Bush and Clinton administration will lead to a greater similarity, in other words, convergence, of 
their policies with respect to the mix of bilateralism versus multilateralism, reward versus 
coercion, and the role of international regimes? 
 The data collection started chronologically. The history of the North Korean proliferation 
regime and the initial policies implemented by the United States’ past presidents were first 
outlined. Then, the Clinton policies and strategies from the initial policy stance of the Clinton 
administration, the changes in the policies, the preparation and the implementation of the August 
12, 1994 Agreed Framework were evaluated. The data collection consisted of official documents 
of the United States and North Korea, policy briefs, proceedings, journal articles and books. 
Similarly, the data collection on the Bush administration started chronologically— from Bush’s 
assumption to office and the formulation of policies, to the Axis of Evil speech, the withdrawal 
of North Korea on the NPT and the holding of the three rounds of the Six Party Talks (first 
round, August 27-29, 2003; second round, February 25-28, 2004; third round, June 23-26, 2004). 
 It is appropriate to close this chapter with some comment on the wider relevance of this 
study.  The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were chosen for the study 
because of the differences in their foreign policies and approaches to the North Korean nuclear 
problem. The approach taken by the current Bush administration rested on the relatively hard 
line perspective that rogue states and those who engaged in proliferating weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) must be dealt with in a firmer way such as the use of military strategy to stop 
their operations (Sigal 1998; T. H. Kim 1993: 3-7). On the other hand, the Clinton administration 
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favored the use of diplomatic approaches and negotiations with a leaning towards economic 
sanctions in resolving North Korea’s nuclear threat (Gordon 2003).  The two administrations 
offer theoretically examples of clearly different orientations to dealing with the issue of North 
Korea nuclear weapons while also facing similar levels of domestic and international constraints.  
 The other value of this study is, though, its policy relevance.  It was made with the 
primary purpose of identifying the domestic and systemic constraints in the policies and 
implementation of the Clinton and Bush administration on North Korea’s nuclear program from 
the perspective of a military officer from South Korea. The findings of the research is an attempt 
to provide a critical analysis for policy makers, military officials, government officials and the 
succeeding Presidents of the US, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. Moreover, the research 
sought to contribute to the literature on the policy formulation and implementation of policies on 
rogue states such as North Korea.  It also seeks to fill a gap in scholarly research from the point 
of view of South Koreans and from Asians on the issue of the foreign strategy employed by the 
United States on North Korea. The distinctiveness of the Asian culture may be a factor in the 
failure of the US government to provide an approach that can cease or cease the nuclear program 
of North Korea. Thus, instead of the usual Western scholars analyzing the issue of nuclear 
proliferation and the possible approaches to mitigate the North Korean nuclear problem, this 
study is an attempt to provide a Korean perspective of the problem and on the ways that it can be 
solved. The experiences of the researcher as a member of the military and being a Korean may 
provide insightful recommendations in resolving the problem of nuclear threat by North Korea. 
 The scope of this investigation is limited to only two administrations in the handling of 
the North Korean nuclear threat. The scope of the study covers the years 1990s up to the present. 
The analysis of this dissertation cannot be generalized to that of the other rogue states because of 
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the differences in the history of the regime of North Korea and its relationship with the United 
State. Moreover, this study is not an attempt to find the best policy and implementation strategy 
that will put a resolution to the North Korean nuclear problem but rather. It, however, sets a 
standard in finding the right policy by first identifying the constraints both systemic and 
domestic. This will guide policymakers and government officials in adopting a policy and 
implementation strategy that can finally put a closure to the North Korean problem and to other 
similar problems. Finally, this study did not cover the whole term of Bush and covered only the 
period until the first half of 2004. Further changes in the Bush policy approach and 
implementation strategy after that period are included but are not discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER II: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
Throughout the course of its attempts to produce nuclear weapons, North Korea has 
joined, violated, and withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a decision 
that has sparked international concern over nuclear proliferation, as well as regional concern 
about the possibilities of an imminent crisis. Today, North Korea remains isolated, near 
economic collapse, and faces yet another potentially devastating humanitarian crisis. As such, it 
is arguable that a resolution to the nuclear threat will only bring about genuine development in 
the country, and peace in the region. However, due to the historically obscure nature of the North 
Korean regime, the challenge of finding a speedy resolution to the crisis is aggravated. 
The North Korean nuclear crisis has been addressed by the United States using several 
strategies and policy options. Yet the problem persists, mainly due to the perceived domestic and 
systemic constraints that have impeded and hampered the process of resolving the North Korean 
threat in both the formulation of policy, as well as in the actual implementation of the policies of 
the Clinton and Bush administrations. This chapter illustrates the rationale, the nature and the 
role of North Korea’s nuclear program to its regime, and addresses the American foreign policy 
towards North Korea, with specific emphasis on the Clinton and Bush administrations. 
The first section of this chapter discusses the history of the North Korean Nuclear 
Program, and illustrates the rationale for cultivating a nuclear weapons program. The current 
North Korean nuclear crisis cannot be fully understood without reference to both the record of 
nuclear ambitions of North Korea and its current economic and security plight, two factors that, 
when fused together, offer an explanation of the current crisis based firmly on the desire of the 
North Korean regime to ensure its own survival. 
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The second section illustrates the nature of American foreign policy towards North Korea 
by providing an overview of Clinton and Bush administration policies and subsequent 
discussions on the Agreed Framework by Clinton and the Six-Country Talks by Bush. The U.S., 
as well as such countries such as South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia want long lasting peace 
in the region. The third section details the policy and implementation strategy of the Clinton 
administration, including the bilateral approach that utilized an incentive-based economic reward 
attained through diplomacy, as well as the exclusion of international regimes, such as the NPT 
and the IAEA during the latter part of negotiations. The last section evaluates the policies and 
implementation strategy of the Bush administration, from its initial policy stance of using 
multilateral, militant, and the exclusion of the international regime and the possibilities of Bush 
going through the same policy path of Clinton which rested on a bi-multilateral talk which uses 
economic and diplomatic means and the exclusion of the international regime. 
The North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
 
The current nuclear crisis in North Korea started from events that happened more than 
five decades ago, when, after the Second World War II, Japanese troops north of the 38th 
parallel that divides the Korean peninsula, surrendered to Soviet forces, while those at the south 
of the line surrendered to US forces (Galdi and Shuey 1988: 109).3 Despite declarations made at 
the 1943 Cairo and 1945 Potsdam Conferences, which envisioned a united and independent post-
war Korea, North Korea fell under Communist occupation.  
Following the failure of negotiations aimed at reunification in 1946 and 1947, free 
elections, under the aegis of the United Nations, were held in South Korea. While this resulted in 
a declaration by the UN General Assembly that the elected Government of the Republic of Korea 
                                                 
3 For the sources on the history of North-South Korean Conflict, see generally Kaufman (1999). See also Han and 
Levin (2002), specifically Chapter 2, and Chung (2003). 
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to be the official and lawful government in Korea (Pires 1994: 307), they also pushed North 
Korea to sever all political and economic ties to the South, and terminate electric power 
transmissions. Moreover, in September 1948, a rigged election resulted in the establishment of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the governing body of North Korea.   
Tensions between the two sides were exacerbated when, on June 25, 1950, North Korean 
military forces crossed the 38th parallel, and occupied almost all of South Korea. Three days 
later, the United States responded by deploying troops against the DPRK, and the United Nations 
Security Council called upon Member states to aid South Korea in repelling the armed attack and 
restoring peace and security in the region (Pires 1994: 308). By early July, U.N. forces were 
deployed under US General Douglas MacArthur. Despite initial successful advances after the 
famous Inchon landing in mid-September, the UN forces were pushed back by an influx of 
Chinese "volunteers" until the front lines stabilized along approximately the 38th parallel in the 
spring of 1951  (Galdi and Shuey 1988: 109). The combat ended with the signing of an armistice 
on July 27, 1953. 
Since 1953, the two Koreas have maintained an immensely hostile relationship. 
Numerous border provocations have culminated into open, though undeclared, conflict between 
1966 and 1969 and “the North Korean government has since sanctioned terrorist attacks on a 
variety of unlawful targets, including the President of South Korea, South Korean cabinet 
members, and the general civilian population of South Korea” (Newcomb 1994: 629). 
In 1985, North Korea confirmed its membership to the NPT and agreed to the following: 
to accept safeguards on all fissionable material; to provide a preliminary accounting of materials 
and facilities; to maintain a system for accounting and control of fissionable materials; and to 
provide annual reports of safeguarded materials inventory. Moreover, North Korea complied to 
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ad hoc, routine, and special inspections by the IAEA in order to ensure compliance with the 
terms of the IAEA/DPRK Safeguards Agreement (Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1968: Art. 2). 
However, North Korea’s acquiescence had been questionable from the outset (Newcomb 
1994: 629). The country took a defensive position when the IAEA insisted inspections. Thus the 
tension between the United States and North Korea resumed. The IAEA took this posture due at 
the bequest of US officials, who were keen on using these inspections to gather more intelligence 
on NK and apply pressure to the regime there. At this time, North Korea discovered that the 
IAEA inspectors were in fact passing intelligence about North Korean nuclear sites to United 
States officials in violation of their mandate (Elich 2003). 
Eventually, concerning the intrusive inspection by the Agency, the North Korean 
Minister of Atomic Energy announced the government's intent to withdraw from the NPT in 
1993. The Agency's Board of Governors determined that the North Korean actions were not in 
compliance with the NPT and reported these findings to the UN Security Council and the UN 
General Assembly. In an attempt to defuse the situation, Clinton decided to restart political 
discussions with North Korea (Newcomb, 1994: 603). 
North Korea's defiance of the NPT was further, and explicitly, exemplified by its testing 
of Scud4 missiles in May 1993 (Sigal 1999). This compelled the United States to pressure Israel 
to discontinue negotiations aimed at offering North Korea investment and recognition in return 
for canceling its missile sales in Middle East countries (Brower 1994: 376).  
The Clinton administration charged that plutonium extracted from North Korea's 
                                                 
4 Scud is not an acronym. It refers to the NATO reporting name for a Soviet army short-range liquid propellant 
surface-to-surface ballistic missile, the SS-1. North Korea had been producing the missiles in the early 1980s, but 
their inaccuracy during this period hindered their value to being effective only as weapons of terror aimed at large 
cities. 
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Yongbyon nuclear facility was being utilized in the development of nuclear weapons, and that as 
such, North Korea must be prevented from developing a nuclear bomb (Elich, 2003: 1). When 
formal talks between the United States and North Korea broke off in 1994, the United States 
began pressuring the UN Security Council to impose sanctions, a move considered in Pyongyang 
as an implicit declaration of war (Elich, 2003: 1). Despite warnings from the Security Council, 
North Korea removed 8000 spent fuel rods from a five megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, 
thus hiding potential evidence that would determine whether the country possessed sufficient raw 
materials to construct a nuclear bomb (Butler et al. 1994: 30). When Clinton persisted in 
attempting to impose international sanctions, North Korea openly tested Silkworm ship-to-ship 
missiles. According to former Defense Secretary William Perry, the United States was "within a 
day of imposing severe sanctions on North Korea…We were within a day of making major 
additions to our troop developments in Korea" (Koch 1999: 21). 
Tensions seemed to thaw with an agreement to allow the resumption of IAEA inspections 
at the Yongbyon plant, secured during a visit be Jimmy Carter (Sigal 1998), and then with 
official negotiations in1994 that ultimately led to the signing of the Agreed Framework. 
According to the terms of the agreement, North Korea would freeze its nuclear program in return 
for western assistance and capital to build light water reactors, which produce less of the 
plutonium that can be reprocessed to make bombs (Agreed Framework 1994). However, despite 
the cooperation of South Korea and the United States, North Korea continued to maintain a 
heavily armored conventional military force just north of the demilitarized zone, and despite the 
great expense to its country’s security and credibility, it continued to develop its military 
capabilities (US Department of State 1996). 
Situations became bleak once more when, on August 31, 1998, NK launched a three-
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stage Taepo Dong rocket over Japan in an unsuccessful attempt to put a satellite into orbit 
(Weinberger 1999: 42). It has been argued that the launch had a dual purpose: first, to provide a 
visual and public demonstration of the country's missile technology, and, second, to serve as a 
bargaining chip to win concessions from the United States. The Italian La Repubblica, for 
example, argued: “The North Korean government has stated very clearly that it will continue to 
produce and sell missiles up until the time the U.S. lifts its economic sanctions.... Therefore, 
arms production ... has become North Korea's most important diplomatic ... tool to try and obtain 
concessions from the U.S. and the other Asian countries without making any significant 
concessions of its own” (Beal 1998: 14). 
Some, however, defended DPRK. Egypt's Al Ahram, for example, argued: “But there is 
exaggeration in the reactions to it because the Far East and the whole world are full of missiles. 
This international situation gives the right to any country to develop its missiles to protect its 
security. For these objections to have credibility, the objecting countries should declare a binding 
program to destroy their own missiles under an international program of comprehensive 
disarmament, to be applied on all countries equally. The world will not accept being divided into 
countries that have the right to produce weapons of mass destruction and threaten the rest, while 
other countries are denied this right” (Beal 1998: 14). 
In response to North Korea’s aggressive moves, US warplanes conducted a mock 
exercise to simulate a long-range mission to drop nuclear bombs on North Korea (Kristensen 
2002:54-59). The American National Intelligence Estimate thought that North Korea also 
intended to test a new missile, the Taepo Dong 2, which was believed to possess sufficient range 
to strike Alaska and Hawaii with up to a 300-kilogram payload. The gravity of the situation was 
intensified by a US intelligence belief that this level of weaponry would have sufficient capacity 
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to deliver a nuclear payload, and Taepo Dong 2 could probably reach the rest of the United 
States, depending on the size of its payload (US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, April 
20, 1999). 
Nonetheless, North Korea continued to allow IAEA inspectors to visit various sites in 
their country in exchange of food aid, inspections that produced no evidence of nuclear activity 
(Cumings 2001). In 2000, Kim Jong-il and his counterpart from the South, Kim Dae-jung, held a 
summit in Pyongyang, aimed at continuing a process of détente between the two neighbors 
(Watts 2000). Yet while these countries were in the process of easing tensions between one 
another, relations between the United States and North Korea continued to deteriorate, reaching a 
new low after Bush accused Pyongyang of developing missiles and weapons of mass destruction, 
and singled out NK, along with Iraq and Iran, as belonging to an "axis of evil" (De Young 2002: 
A1). 
In October 2002, the United States issued a statement claiming that North Korea had 
admitted the existence of a secret program to develop nuclear weapons (The Guardian October 
17, 2002), using enriched uranium instead of the previous reprocessed plutonium method 
(Gittings 2002a). Though a clear violation of the 1994 accord, North Korea went further arguing 
that it would only abandon its nuclear program entirely if the United States would sign a non-
aggression treaty (Grittings, 2002b). In a joint response, in November, 2002, the United States 
and Japan suspended fuel oil shipments to North Korea (Grittings 2002b). The following month, 
North Korea rejected a call from the IAEA to open up its nuclear facilities (Jeffrey 2002a), and 
then proceeded to expel the inspectors, remove monitoring equipment, and then announced that 
it would reactivate the plutonium-based Yongbyon reactor (Jeffrey 2002b). Gregory Elich (2003) 
claimed that the IAEA itself indicated that it would prefer that North Korea abandon the NPT 
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rather than have to work with the regime there. This was also the claim of Nikhil Shah (2003), 
who cited Sigal (1998: 97), in his article, “North Korea and International Law.” It was perceived 
then that the IAEA was more preoccupied with maintaining their sanctity with certain countries, 
especially with the United States through a tough posturing, rather than preventing proliferation 
in North Korea (Sigal 1998, in Shah 2003). 
Motivations for the North Korean Nuclear Program 
 
Understanding why North Korea continues to build up nuclear weapons will help US 
policymakers to design and develop the most appropriate and effective approach and strategy in 
dealing with the nuclear crisis. The rationale for the North Korean nuclear program has been 
hotly debated. On one hand, it is argued that it serves as a defense for the regime. On the other 
hand, it is argued that the nuclear build up is for the accumulation of power and to threaten other 
countries.5 
What are the motives that drive the quest for nuclear weapons? Fear and the quest for 
power and prestige have been the major causes for the proliferation of nuclear arms (Bailey 
1993). For one, many leaders are highly motivated to develop nuclear weapons because they 
symbolize power and offer a means of wielding significant influence in the international arena 
(Wessels 1995: 56). Nuclear weapons are perceived to be a potent source of military and political 
power, and, with the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, cautious 
regional rivals seek to obtain nuclear weapons to achieve regional dominance. Alternately, 
                                                 
5 Saunders’ (2000) Internet article, “Assessing North Korea's Nuclear Intentions” argues that North Korean leaders 
have strong incentives to conceal their true intentions in order to maximize their bargaining power and to minimize 
international reactions to their nuclear weapons program. See also  Park (2000) for the North Korean motivation for 
proliferation. Park explains Pyongyang’s policy behavior by examining the policy goals, strategies, and tactics that 
the DPRK has employed in the post-cold war years. The following sources attempt to give some background in 
North Korea’s motivation for proliferation: Bermudez (2001), Downs (1999), Friedman (2003), Litwak and Reiss 
(1994), North Korea's Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Program (2002), North Korea's Nuclear Arsenal: Motivation, 
Doctrine and Possible Employment (1996), Power (2003), Roy (1996-1997), Sigal (1998), and Taylor (1994). 
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nuclear weapons serve as equalizers in situations in which the leaders of one nation feel 
militarily inferior to a regional adversary. Nuclear weapons also effectively bestow significant 
power on subnational groups struggling for independence, as well as on terrorist groups and 
nuclear blackmailers (Wessels 1995: 48). 
Furthermore, nuclear weapons are viewed as a source of economic control. In cases such 
as Ukraine and North Korea, nuclear weapons serve as a bargaining chip to gain control of 
desperately needed hard currency and economic assistance from other countries, especially the 
US. At the same time, nuclear weapons mean technological prowess and elite status of the 
declared nuclear weapons states. Others, mostly developing nations, even perceive a correlation 
between the declared possession of nuclear weapons and a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council (Thakur 1993: 7). 
Nuclear programs also serve as a powerful instrument in the intense struggle for identity 
and nationalism in ethnic conflicts that have erupted around the world (Tajfel and Turner 1979: 
33). As status competition is a major motivation in the search for identity, the development of 
nuclear weapons provides a powerful means of increasing the status of one's group. In this 
regard, it is perhaps possible to empathize with North Korea, who has been overshadowed by its 
adversaries (especially the U.S.), its relatively powerful neighbors (Russia, Japan and China), as 
well as by an economically more prosperous South Korea (Wessels 1995). 
Arguably, the dominant motivating factor in developing a nuclear program is security. As 
illustrated by the United States-Soviet Union confrontation during the Cold War, mutual fears 
induce strong enemy images of an adversary that is monolithically aggressive, diabolical, and 
untrustworthy (Silverstein 1989: 903). With the adversaries holding equally negative images of 
the other (Bronfenbrenner 1961: 45), the ability for each side to misperceive the enemy's intent 
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becomes more pervasive (Silverstein 1992: 905). Moreover, while the leaders of each nation may 
seek weapons for defensive purposes, they will tend to perceive the adversary's weapons as being 
primarily offensive in character, thus presenting the problem of drawing a tight distinction 
between defensive and offensive weapons, or to advocate the proliferation of defensive 
weaponry (Wessels 1995). Moreover, these reciprocal perceptual biases provide dangerous 
contributions to arms races, and a cruel spiral process of hostile interaction (M. Deutsch, 1983). 
In sum, the regional instabilities and security fears invite enemy imaging, misperceptions, and 
malignant spiral processes that contribute to the quest for nuclear weapons (Wessels 1995). 
Economic Situation 
It is arguable that through the maintenance and cultivation of a nuclear program, North 
Korea is attempting to achieve a broader goal of unifying North and South Korea. Not only has 
this assertion taken form through economic and military actions, it was explicitly stated during 
the regime’s creation in 1948, that the primary national goal was not merely state survival and 
the protection of sovereignty, but victorious unification – or unification through victory of 
Communism – over the rival regime in the South (Ambrosius 2003).Both sides in the Korean 
War wanted more than a continuing division of the peninsula, but neither attained its goal. Kim 
Il-sung and Syngman Rhee each wanted to unite the country under his own leadership 
(Ambrosius 2003). 
It must be emphasized that the economic superiority of South Korea came about only 
after THE EARLY 1980S. Indeed, throughout the first three decades of the Cold War, the two 
regimes faced off as relative equals, each buttressed by security guarantees from their great-
power patrons. Moreover, from the early 1960s to the 1970s, North Korean gross national 
product (GNP) per capita, as well as its conventional military capabilities, rivaled, if not 
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surpassed, that of its southern counterpart (Eberstadt 1996). This relative equality enabled each 
regime to nurture its own particular vision of political unification, which essentially meant 
domination of one over the other for each side. 
However, for North Korea, the goal of overthrowing South Korea became unrealistic 
because of the insurmountable gap of economic developments between the two countries, and, 
most especially, the outbreak of the Cold War led to the disintegration of the USSR and China as 
patrons. The nearly twenty-fold gap in the gross domestic products of the two countries and the 
per capita income difference amounting to 11:1 shows the economic gap of the two countries 
(Noland 2001). This has also shifted the paradigm of the North Korean government’s core 
principle—from the goal of communization to self-dependency as the ultimate revolutionary 
goal. 
Immediate survival for a political regime depends upon its capacity to maintain a 
functioning economy (Noland 2001). In the North Korean case, the state has been experiencing 
food crisis for more than a decade, and estimates show that a famine in the late 1990s alone 
resulted in the deaths of almost a million people (Noland 2003). North Korea’s failure to provide 
even the most basic conditions for human existence has caused an increase in the black market 
economy, the spread of foreign (particularly US) currency, a surge in migration flows across the 
Chinese border, widespread electricity shortages, and inadequate infrastructure undermining 
modernization attempts. 
Despite humanitarian and development assistance which has ameliorated the situation, 
the country is once again on the verge of another famine (Noland 2003). While conditions have 
improved somewhat since the peak of the crisis in 1996-97, chronic food shortages remain, and 
are likely to continue (Global Security April 22, 2004). Alarmingly, the United Nations World 
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Food Program (UNWFP) predicts another severe humanitarian crisis, with famine conditions in 
the coming years. Moreover, with the expenditure preferences of the regime, the North Korean 
economy is not producing enough output to sustain its population; and population maintenance 
has become increasingly aid-dependent. Yet, the exposé of a nuclear weapons program based on 
highly enriched uranium in October 2002, followed by North Korea's subsequent withdrawal 
from the NPT, have put continued international assistance in doubt (Noland 2001). 
North Korea desperately needs the economic and diplomatic rewards from the United 
States, South Korea, China and Japan. According to available data (mostly from the late 1990s), 
North Korea’s major trading partners include China, Japan, and South Korea. Russia, a major 
trading partner before the collapse of the Soviet Union, was of declining importance a decade 
ago, and now accounts for less than three percent of North Korea’s total merchandise trade 
which is about the same as Germany. China is by far North Korea’s most important economic 
partner, allowing it to run large trade deficits (Noland 2000, 2003). Substantial economic 
disruption could increase the risk of either a North Korean military response, or internal 
economic collapse, both of which would be detrimental to regional stability (Noland 2003: 2). 
The volume of potential economic leverage is limited because of North Korea’s self-
imposed isolation. Still, if China, Japan, and South Korea successfully cooperate, the sanctions 
would cover more than 50 percent of North Korea’s reported trade flows, well above the average 
in past successful cases (36 percent in difficult cases) (Noland, 2003). The façade of North 
Korea’s relative autarky is that its trade is not large enough to be of much economic importance 
to its partners. Concerns about these potential costs were major factors dictating a cautious 
strategy in the earlier crisis and remain an impediment to gaining the co-operation of key 
partners (Elliot 1997). 
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Although North Korea may find a vital security interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, 
they argue that the regime has an even more convincing interest in securing outside help for its 
failing economy. Indeed, it is in this argument that the United States and South Korea maintain 
their long-term bargaining edge, and thus Pyongyang ultimately would have no choice but to 
trade its nuclear option to secure its economic future. However, if the economic imperative were 
more significant than the security imperative, one would expect North Korea to have given some 
indication of the economic and political price it would demand in exchange for agreeing to 
intrusive inspections.  In fact, from the summer to the fall of 1994 in shaping the Agreed 
Framework in Geneva, North Korea showed that it was willing to cooperate with the United 
States. The DPRK was even keen on accepting intrusive inspections in exchange for massive 
economic aid and political concessions from the United States in 1994 and in the fall of 2000.  
Moreover, while evidence strongly suggests that North Korea is firm in its stand to 
continue with its nuclear weapons program, it does not explain how the country will cope with 
its faltering economy. Indeed, North Korea's problem is not simply coping with its extant 
economic crisis but the prospect of dealing with a much more serious crisis if UN sanctions are 
imposed as well. 
Security Threats 
In order to preserve a regime, it must be able to defend itself. As part of its revolutionary 
ideological heritage, North Korea claims that its security is threatened, confronted by the 
increasing superiority of the US military as evidenced by the Gulf War and the Afghanistan 
conflict and by the future overwhelming superiority of US Forces emboldened by a successful 
Iraq conflict and rapidly building advanced National Missile Defense (NMD) technology 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2003). Specifically, North Korea justifies its nuclear program as: 
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(1) providing a countervailing deterrent against US nuclear threats, which continue to exist in the 
form of the nuclear umbrella6 held over South Korea; (2) countering the possibility of a future 
South Korean bomb (indeed, South Korea’s involvement in nuclear activities in the 1970s 
provided an early incentive for the North's bomb program); (3) deterring South Korea’s 
overwhelming conventional military superiority; (4) compensating for the loss of its nuclear ally, 
Russia; and (5) ensuring that the North Korean regime is taken seriously as a major player in the 
region, even though its economy may be in crisis (Mack 1994). 
Indeed, there are different schools of thought on the motivations behind North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program. On the one hand, those who believe North Korea is a revisionist state 
argue that the nuclear motivations constitute a serious external threat. Evidence for these claims 
includes North Korea’s initiation of the Korean War, acts of terrorism, forward-deployed 
military forces, a constitution whereby the DPRK is the sole legitimate government for all of 
Korea, and Korean Workers’ Party bylaws calling for a completion of the revolution in South 
Korea. Many analysts further argue that Pyongyang’s record of exporting ballistic missiles 
indicates that North Korea would also be willing to sell nuclear materials, technology, or 
complete nuclear weapons (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2004). 
On the other hand, a second argument finds that North Korea’s nuclear motivations are 
naturally defensive, and designed to deter external threats to the state. Evidence supporting this 
claim includes the July 4 North-South Joint Communiqué of 1972; the Agreement on 
Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea 
of 1991; the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1991; the 
summit meeting of 2000; the Agreed Framework with the US; and reunification proposals that 
                                                 
6 “Nuclear umbrella” is a polite way of saying that, under certain circumstances, the US would use nuclear weapons 
against NK. 
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would recognize “two systems” for North and South Korea.  
The DPRK doubtlessly appreciates that with its weakened economy, its ability to 
continue the high levels of military expenditure is decreasing daily, and the economic goal shift 
from communization to self-dependency has led to the debate on the real intentions of their 
nuclear weapons, and bears direct correlation to deterrence.  
In the discussion of security threats as a motivation for nuclear proliferation, it is 
important to consider the general strategic uses of nuclear weapons: offensive, defensive, and 
deterrent (Jung 1996).7 The offensive use of nuclear weapon does not provide an attractive 
option for North Korea, as it opens the possibility of the country to severely exacerbate tensions 
with South Korea or Japan, thus forcing regional instability, or the United States, thus creating 
scenarios that are not viable. Defensively, the use of nuclear weapons is far less enticing, as 
utilization would thus mean application against an advancing adversary, in order to repel it back 
to its pre-offensive position. Moreover, nuclear defense strategies are limited in development, for 
the obvious reason that a nuclear defense means using nuclear weapons within, or near, one’s 
own territory. 
Amid the offense/defense debate, the DPRK perceives the nuclear deterrent as essential 
to its defense (Cha 2002: 79-92). However, rather than using a deterrence method to stabilize the 
balance of power, as is done by the United States, North Korea relies on a rationale of existential 
deterrence, which, as Cha (2002) describes, implies that the mere existence of nuclear forces 
provides an irreducible risk that an armed conflict might escalate into a nuclear war. This 
persistent fear of escalation is thus factored into political calculations, and states, as a result, tend 
                                                 
7 For some information pertaining to the strategic use of nuclear weapons, see generally Mulley (1962). See also 
Ertman (1993), Young-Hui (1993), Mack (1993). And “A Nuclear North Korea: The Choices Are Narrowing” 
(1994). 
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to be much more cautious and prudent than they otherwise might be. Security for the proliferator 
is therefore achieved not through assured second-strike capability, but by creating first-strike 
uncertainty. Indeed, deterrence and security derive from having just enough capabilities to raise 
uncertainty in the mind of the opponent so that it cannot neutralize with a first strike (Karl 2001: 
1002-1022). 
According to theorists, existential deterrent doctrines, or the capacity to deter threats to 
the state's survival, are most likely among proliferating states that are small, limited in resources, 
and with proximate adversaries (Cha 2002). The DPRK's well-documented economic difficulties 
in the 1990s impose severe resource constraints on closing gaps with rival competitors through 
modernization and a buildup of conventional forces. The self-help imperatives of anarchy also 
render reliance on allies for security an unattractive proposition or an unfeasible one. Nuclear 
weapons, therefore, offer the most efficient means by which to optimize security needs, 
abandonment fears, and resource constraints. However, as long as anarchy defines the 
international condition, superpower protectors could treat alliance security as a private rather 
than a collective good (Lee 2002: 119). 
It can also be argued that nuclear weapons are more fungible than conventional forces, in 
that they remain relevant security assets in most cases, regardless of wholesale changes in future 
adversaries or contingencies.  Indeed, programs that are developed under a veil of secrecy are 
often done out of existential deterrence, in that increased opacity often generates worst-case 
assessments that tend to err on the side of caution hence increasing first-strike uncertainty. 
Moreover, nuclear arsenals that are small, inaccurate, and countervalue-oriented, are usually 
indicative of a doctrine not based in nuclear conflict or second-strike capabilities. 
In assessing possible reasons for the adoption of an existential deterrent policy by the 
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DPRK, it is possible to cite a number of reasons. Most notably, and of primary concern, one can 
look to the issues directly related to South Korea, considering first the downfall of the Soviet 
Union, which served as the DPRK’s chief Cold War patron against its rival in the South. Second, 
as a result of its opening a market economy, China sought diplomatic normalization with South 
Korea in 1992, disavowing its “as close as lips to teeth” security relationship with the North in 
the process (Cha 2002). Finally, as a final blow, Russia normalized relations with Seoul in 
September 1990, and declared that it would not honor Soviet cold war security guarantees to 
DPRK defense. 
 Thus, the period from 1989-1992, in which Gorbachev implemented GLASNOST and 
Perestroika, North Korea was left alone as a rogue state by its major allies. The political, 
economic, and military imbalance between the North and South provided the DPRK an impetus 
to produce nuclear weapons, for survival and for security. Moreover, the intensification of the 
DPRK’s nuclear program provided the only alternative to guarantee North Korea’s own style of 
socialism, and indeed, to ensure the continuation of Kim Il Sung’s dynasty (Suh and Lee 1998). 
Another issue has been the recurring failure of American and South Korean analysts in 
accurately perceiving and assessing Pyongyang’s behavior. In late 1993, for example, there was 
an outbreak of media reports of a military buildup in North Korea, tests of new ballistic missiles, 
a tripling in frequency of fighter training exercises, and the movement of heavy artillery and 
multiple-rocket launchers closer to the Demilitarized Zone. Unnamed US officials speculated 
that the buildup was being undertaken because NK was planning an invasion of the South.  
Moreover, the possibility that the North’s actions were defensive in nature was not considered 
(Mack 1994: 26). 
While there is no evidence to date suggesting that the United States and South Korea 
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have aggressive designs against North Korea, it is possible to understand the rhetoric as being 
intended to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, or to warn it of the costly 
consequences of military adventurism. Yet, these misperceptions were detrimental to existing 
tensions, as, from Pyongyang’s perspective, much of the American and South Korean 
reactionary rhetoric was viewed as threatening, fuelling both North Korea’s paranoia, and its 
determination to continue developing a nuclear program at all costs. 
Although the nuclear proliferation motivations discussed above—political, technological, 
military and economic powers; struggle for identity, status competition, and security fears—have 
been described separately, they are interrelated in various ways, depending on the social and 
political context under which they are being examined. Indeed, these pressures in obtaining 
nuclear weapons are a result of strategic, foreign policy, and internal political and economic 
factors; and situational variables determine which motives will be active in a particular context 
and which specific courses of action will be chosen (Wessels 1995). 
Due to the highly secretive nature of the DPRK, it is difficult to discern with precise 
accuracy its motivation for nuclear proliferation. As shown earlier in this section, the North 
Korean case exemplifies the very high levels of threat and risk associated with nuclear 
proliferation, and it also raises difficult questions about the most effective means of halting 
continued proliferation. Although North Korea may see nuclear weapons primarily as a means of 
deterring attack by the United States and South Korea (Mack 1994), it is possible that the state 
also sees nuclear weapons as a means of achieving greater regional power or as a bargaining chip 
for extracting concessions from the United States. Whatever the case, the intense desire of the 
DPRK to obtain and develop nuclear weapons heightens security fears and encourages the 
perception that North Korea needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from known and hostile 
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adversaries. 
Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong II  
 
 There appears to be some consensus among North Korea experts that the primary agents 
in understanding the intentions behind the nuclear program are the leadership roles of Kim Il 
Sung and Kim Jong II.8 Initiatives and ideas with regard to the program belonged to the two 
Kim’s, and were disseminated sparingly among a small circle of advisers; moreover, these views 
were never recorded in any of both Kim's military writings. In spite of this, there is no denying 
that the DPRK’s late leader, Kim II Sung, from very early on, appreciated the awesome 
destructiveness and deterrent value of the weapon, particularly as a young guerrilla fighter who 
witnessed the United States subdue the Japanese with a mere two of these weapons (Mansourov 
1995). The same can be said of Kim Jong-Il, who, upon being educated in Russia, entered the 
Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) instead of joining the military service, and was reportedly being 
groomed from an early age to succeed his father, Kim Il-sung (Oh and Hassig 2000). Indeed, the 
“cult of Kim Jong-Il” is relentlessly promoted throughout the country as a benevolent father 
figure, but the picture outsiders have is an enigmatic, ruthless, and powerful tyrant (International 
Crisis Group, 2003: 2). 
 In an attempt to explain the logic of Kim, Mansourov (1995) presupposes that Kim Il 
Sung granted top priority to deterrence when assessing the use of nuclear arms in the overall 
military doctrine of the DPRK. The policy implications of an existential deterrent interpretation 
of DPRK strategic doctrine favor arguments for engagement. The logic of this policy by two 
Kims would be that a security dilemma operates with regard to DPRK weaponization. Although 
                                                 
8 See Suh and Lee (1998) for a comprehensive discussion of the influence of the Kims on North Korean foreign 
policies. Suh and Lee describe Kim Jong Il, "the great leader," and an “enigmatic man”, while Kim Il Sung is 
described as the supreme leader.   
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provocative by violating nonproliferation norms and couched in aggressive rhetoric, this 
weaponization is largely defensively intended. Moreover, the nuclear program is best ended by 
the guarantee of regime survival, not by pressure (Suh and Lee 1998). 
It is thus of little surprise that the relationship between North Korea and the surrounding 
East Asian community can be characterized as fraught with anxiety. It is no exaggeration to 
acknowledge that North Korea possesses the capability to not only to upset stability on the 
Korean Peninsula, but also to destabilize the entire Asia-Pacific area. Indeed, an armed North 
Korea with nuclear capabilities would begin a dangerous process of nuclear proliferation and 
trigger a regional arms race, while at the same time wholly undermine the considerable stability 
and unprecedented prosperity that the Northeast Asian region has become accustomed to for 
decades. Moreover, this would undoubtedly have a dramatic impact upon the world economy 
and international relations more broadly, especially the unstable position in which it would place 
China, Japan, Russia, and the United States (Haass 1995). 
Overview of US Policies and Politics on North Korea 
 Obviously, the discovery that the DPRK has active nuclear weapons program in violation 
of both its 1994 agreement with the United States, as well as its signature on the NPT, has 
become a major problem for the United States and its regional allies, South Korea and Japan. 
North Korea's announcement on January 10, 2003 of its intention to withdraw from the NPT will 
have serious implications for international arms control. The nuclear crisis on the Korean 
peninsula also raises questions about the United States commitment to the NPT. 
In pursuing the objectives of deterring rogue states, the United States has relied largely 
on policies that isolate or punish the offending rogue states (O’Sullivan 2000: 56). Punitive tools, 
such as the use of military force, covert action, and the strengthening of a regime's neighbors or 
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rivals, have sporadically played important roles in America's quest to marginalize or replace 
rogue regimes. 
Thus, as North Korea’s nuclear activities increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the US intelligence community devoted growing attention to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons 
potential. This judgment was reaffirmed in all unclassified intelligence assessments throughout 
the latter half of the 1990s, up to intelligence reporting in mid-2001. Although the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment was widely interpreted as evidence that North Korea had 
one or two nuclear weapons in its possession, neither the intelligence community, nor any senior 
US official offered a definitive statement to this effect during the remainder of the 1990s. 
However, the intelligence community assessment shifted noticeably in December 2001, when an 
unclassified version of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) asserted that the Intelligence 
Community judged in the mid-1990s that NK had definitely produced one, and possibly two, 
nuclear weapons (National Intelligence Council, 2003). 
In addition, the US intelligence community concluded, in the summer of 2002, that North 
Korea had undertaken a covert uranium-enrichment program, most likely initiated in the late 
1990s (CIA Report to the US Congress 2002). According to the CIA, activities associated with 
this program surfaced definitively during 2001, and included extensive purchases of materials for 
construction of a gas-centrifuge enrichment facility. Though the CIA contended in November 
2002 that the facility was at least three years from becoming operational, intelligence analysts 
believed that a completed facility could ultimately produce sufficient fissile material for two or 
more nuclear weapons per year (Warrick 2002: A1). In the CIA’s judgment, an enrichment 
facility would provide the North an alternative source of fissile material to substitute for the 
plutonium reprocessing activities that had become frozen under the Agreed Framework. 
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Moreover, the November 2002 intelligence estimate did not preclude the possibility of 
Pyongyang’s reactivating its plutonium separation program. 
More than six months after the revelation that North Korea had undertaken a covert 
uranium-enrichment program, the first steps towards a negotiated solution began to take place in 
the form of trilateral talks between the United States, the DPRK, and China. Held in Beijing on 
April 23-25, 2003, the talks overcame strong opposition from the United States, who favored 
multilateral talks, as well as equally strong opposition from the DPRK, who favored bilateral 
talks. The compromise solution, while a significant achievement in itself, did not confirm a 
secure path to a negotiated resolution of the crisis. 
Traditionally, when the use of carrots proves to be ineffective, the United States attempts 
to apply sticks, through the denial of financial aid, economic assistance, military cooperation, 
and technology access (Amini 2002: 8). However, the application of these sanctions incurs its 
own risk, as they endanger political relations and are frequently viewed as being controversial. 
Indeed, for example, one can look to the sanctions that were leveled against India and Pakistan, 
but failed to prevent those countries from deploying nuclear weapons. Moreover, the sanctions 
were lifted in the aftermath of the September 11 attack to support anti-terrorism action in 
Afghanistan (Shaikh 2002: 29-48). 
 Critics of the Clinton Administration claimed that the DPRK successfully manipulated 
the United States into easing long-standing restrictions, without providing the United States 
sufficient gains or guarantees in return (Weinberger 1999: 42). Others considered this a 
successful example of the application of economic pressure by the US (Koch 1999: 21), in that 
sanctions, while not terribly effective in the traditional sense, provided the United States with an 
additional bargaining chip to deal with the unpredictable and dangerous DPRK. It is further 
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argued that this leverage has allowed the United States to continue a policy of containment and 
appeasement, thus keeping the crisis on the Korean peninsula from erupting into a large-scale 
conflict. 
The Six-power Talks has been the Bush administration’s alternative to the Agreed 
Framework. As of June 2004, the six parties (North Korea, the United States, South Korea, 
Japan, China, and Russia), had conducted three rounds of meetings. In each meeting, it is 
observed that the talks centered on the United States and North Korea. Thus, while it was 
considered a multilateral, it turned out to be a bi-multilateral negotiation, especially as North 
Korea has rejected any format but direct bilateral talks with the United States. While there is 
little doubt that this position is due to fears of being ganged up on, it is also important to consider 
that the North Korean assessment finds that it is the United States that has the real power to make 
or break any agreement about the Korean peninsula. The agreement to hold six party talks 
provides a significant benchmark for each of the countries that has an interest in the nuclear 
problem, and their ability to gather and hold serious discussions is essential for any peaceful and 
diplomatic solution to North Korea’s nuclear development problem. 
US Congress Constraints 
The division of powers between the President and the Congress in making foreign 
policies is one of the most widely debated issues in the constitutional law of US foreign policy 
(Smith 1998: 36).9 Many scholars have debated this issue from a legal perspective, arguing 
                                                 
9 Smith’s article, “Congress, the President, and the Use of Military Force: Cooperation or Conflict in the Post-Cold 
War Era?,” focuses on the behavior of the President and the Congress regarding the shaping of foreign policies. 
Specifically, Smith tackles the issue on the use of force in addressing international problems such as the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. According to Smith, The debates on the proper role of military forces in the American foreign 
policy seem to have intensified the belligerent attitude on the part of Congress (37). See also Dahl (1964). Dahl 
offers a comprehensive discussion of the role of the Congress in the making of American foreign policy. In the 
book, “Congress and Foreign Policy,” Dahl describes a pattern of policy-making by examining obstacles on the road 
to reason and reducing these obstacles, the relationship between party responsibility and foreign policy, and the 
problem of agreement. 
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whether it is the president or the Congress that possesses the ultimate right to control the use of 
American force (Eagleton 1974; Reveley 1981; Wormuth and Firmage 1989). The limitation is 
that the conflict of the US Congress and the US President presents little opportunity to gain 
knowledge about the factors that might encourage cooperation or conflict during real decision-
making situations (Hagan and Hermann 2001). Nevertheless, studying the conflict becomes 
especially important in making foreign policy. 
Since the Vietnam War, the US Congress has shown itself to be a more assertive actor in 
foreign policy (Katzman 1990; Forsythe and Hendrickson 1996) although it has never 
successfully used the War Powers Resolution (WPR) to prevent a military action (Burgin 1992: 
217). In order to be credible, threats, like promises, must be ratified via domestic processes, and 
to the extent that Congress influences – whether tacitly or explicitly – the ratification process, 
and thus the international bargaining power of the president. 
 Since presidents tend to dominate decision making over the use of force, the North 
Korean attention should also focus on the response of the Congress (Lian and Oneal 1993: 277-
300). This is because the Congress largely influences the general public in relation to their 
attitudes toward the president’s actions. The Congress has the potential to divide the nation. For 
example, in his recent study of congressional responses to military intervention between 1973 
and 1990, James Meernik found that a divided government is the most important predictor of a 
congressional response to the use or threat of force (Meernik 1995: 377-392). 
 Thus, it can be surmised that Congressional votes on questionable cases of military 
intervention—those that are not precipitated by a direct attack on US territory or allies—are 
somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, they are clearly viewed as votes of conscience by members 
of Congress and other insiders. It is apparently quite inappropriate to use logrolling tactics or to 
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rely on the party whip to impose discipline when members decide to support or oppose the 
president's use of military force. Superficially, the question of risking American lives is 
considered a grave, highly personal matter, one not subject to the usual legislative battles or 
bargains over policy (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 49 nos. 1 and 2: 7, 66). 
 The success of Executive-Legislative relations in military and policy-making decisions 
on North Korea is crucial in the success of the United States to resolve the North Korean crisis. 
In the past twenty years, the United States has moved from something of an imperial presidency 
to more of an imperial Congress (Schlesinger 1973; Jones and Marini 1988), and finally to a 
rough stalemate between the two institutions today a situation in which each side depends on the 
other when committing the United States to a major military operation such as the case of North 
Korea). Ideally, the president provides energy and expediency in ordering forces overseas, acts 
as the highest level of the chain of command when forces are actually engaged, and serves as the 
focal point for the US interests on the world stage, while Congress serves as a forum for the 
intensive deliberation and debate that necessarily accompany important questions of national 
policy and provides the political support to US forces when they are sent in harm's way. This 
division of labor had become a major point of contention during periods of divided government 
such as in the policy of the United States on North Korea. 
The American Political Culture and the Public 
 
It can be argued that the political culture of Americans can best be characterized by their 
democratic traditions (Almond 1960; Jentleson 1992). 10  In a democracy, policy makers 
contemplating the deployment of troops into a situation that is already hostile, or might become 
                                                 
10 For a discussion on the role of public opinion in the shaping of US foreign policies, see Cook, Manza, and Page 
(2002) and Wittkopf (1990). According to Chambers and Goidel (2004: 31), although the public is supportive of an 
activist foreign policy, public opinion after the Cold War era has discouraged presidents from devising a broad, 
architectural foreign policy. 
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so, should sensibly evaluate three considerations insofar as they desire support for the action 
from the public. First, they must consider the value the public places in the venture, and they 
may try to use whatever persuasive skills they possess to enhance this value—that is, to sell the 
project to the public. Second, they must consider the likely and realistic costs of the venture, 
particularly in American battle deaths. And third, they must evaluate the potential for the 
political opposition to exploit the situation, should battle deaths surpass those considered 
tolerable by the public (Hagan 1993; Jentleson 1992; Larson 1996; 1999: 624-627). 
 Following the Second World War, most Americans were uninformed and uninterested 
about international issues; their views were disproportionately shaped by domestic conditions 
rather than by adherence to coherent world-views (Hagan 1993; Hagan 2004; Kelleher, 1994: 
26). Similar to people in other democratic countries at the time, Americans were generally slow 
to relate to foreign affairs and were generally noninterventionist. However, since the end of the 
Cold War, American public attitudes toward many countries have changed, and the American 
public has become increasingly well-informed about global issues, is interested in current 
international events, and is more opinionated than before with regard to major foreign and 
defense policy questions. In addition, the American public now considers moral and ethical 
issues when evaluating foreign policy choices, and is more pragmatic in showing support or 
opposition for overseas initiatives, including the use of force (Kelleher 1994). 
 To illustrate, in a September 1996 poll conducted by Program on International Policy 
Attitudes (PIPA) of the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland, 
68% rejected the argument that "we should go our own way in international matters not worrying 
too much about whether other countries agree with us or not." Moreover, about 60% range 
rejected the statement that "the US should mind its own business internationally and let other 
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countries get along as best they can on their own." In a 1994 poll by the Times Mirror, 90% 
agreed that "It's best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs.” In a June 1996 
PIPA survey, 59% agreed that “The end of the Cold War has unleashed new problems so that the 
world is still a dangerous place. Also, the US economy has become more interdependent with the 
world economy. Thus it is important for the United States to maintain vigorous diplomatic 
efforts."11 
When evaluating foreign policy decisions, a major factor that influences the American 
public's attitude toward the use of force is whether the military action is unilateral or multilateral 
in nature. Public opinion surveys indicate that the American public is more likely to advocate the 
use of military involvement when the United States is acting as part of a coalition, rather than 
when the United States is acting independently. Americans have often been somewhat more 
supportive when the country acts as part of UN-sanctioned initiatives. A 1992 Gallup Poll found 
that 87 percent of those surveyed agreed that the United States "should commit its troops only as 
part of a United Nations operation," while 73 percent felt that the United Statess should commit 
"only with other allies" (Kelleher 1994: 26). Finally, in addition to strong opposition towards 
providing foreign military aid overseas, the American public often refuses to support military 
assistance even to traditional allies, but instead, highly advocate humanitarian aid as the top 
international initiative. Americans consistently support nonmilitary international involvement, 
even though they continue to express reservations about a blanket intervention policy (Kelleher 
1994: 26). 
                                                 
11 See the online article by Steven Kull (1997), entitled, “Americans Have Not Turned Isolationist.”  Retrieved from 
http://www.policyattitudes.org/noisoloped.html. 
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American Bureaucratic Politics 
 Institutional factors, such as the US bureaucracy, have also provided limitations to US 
foreign policy. If the power debate between the executive and legislature can be considered as 
one hindrance, the bureaucratic nature of the US politics is also one factor (Hagan 1993).12 As 
the US Bureaucracy is likened to the US legal system (American Bar Association 1994), the 
national interest in issues such as truth or guilt/innocence in court is expected to emerge out of a 
clash of interests. As such, eliminating vested interests in the bureaucracy can be detrimental to 
sound policy making (American Bar Association 1994). Moreover, important national security or 
nonproliferation interests might be overlooked if there are no offices, agencies, or departments 
vested with the responsibility for such issues, and can be depended on to escalate those issues to 
higher levels of government, including the President himself, for decision (Hagan and Henman 
2001). 
 Of the two premier foreign policy institutions, the State Department is primarily 
concerned with developing smooth relations with other countries, while the Defense Department 
is interested in maintaining alliance relationships and a defensive industrial base, including lower 
unit prices for its weapons systems through mass production resulting from exports. As a result, 
there is no single or specific institution that is primarily concerned with nonproliferation, or that 
can bring to the attention to the National Security Council (NSC) issues other agencies might 
                                                 
12 Going beyond current academic preoccupation with the constraints imposed by bureaucratic politics, Francis 
Rourke (1972) examines the basic structure of power within which the US so largely shapes foreign policy. The 
classic on the subject of bureaucratic politics and US foreign policy is the work of Graham Allison. See specifically 
Allison’s article on the Cuban Missile crisis (Allison 1969). For a detailed discussion of the impact of bureaucratic 
politics on US foreign policy on the North Korean nuclear crisis, see Sigal’s (1998) book, Disarming Strangers: 
Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. According to Sigal, the complexity of addressing the crisis is built into the 
bureaucracy by statutes that govern the Executive Branch. In the Clinton Administration, the tasks involved in 
nonproliferation effort were divided among the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs in the State Department, and the office for nuclear security and counterproliferation in the 
Department of Defense (230).  
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prefer to ignore for various bureaucratic reasons--and perhaps seek a Presidential decision if the 
issue is important enough (Weiss 1998; Karp 1996). 
 Yet another problem that has arisen following the end of the Cold War is that 
nonproliferation and arms control have failed to really become part of the centerpiece of national 
security strategy (Renmack and Shuey 1997). Instead, there has been a growing emphasis on 
counter-proliferation in the Defense Department, including the use of military forces to deter, 
combat, or defend against proliferation, as well as a recently renewed emphasis on anti-missile 
defenses following the North Korean test of a Taepo Dong missile. 
International Regime: The NPT and IAEA 
 
The backbone of the nonproliferation regime is the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(Bunn1994: 52-60), itself the result of a concerted global recognition of the potential dangers of 
nuclear power. Under the NPT, states possessing nuclear weapons agreed not to transfer those 
weapons to non-nuclear states; in turn, non-nuclear states agreed not to receive, manufacture, or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Violators of the NPT are subject to economic sanctions 
(Litman 2003: 32). Thus, from its creation in 1968, the NPT has divided states into the nuclear 
"haves" and "have-nots" (Wessels 1995: 48). The current version of the NPT prohibits the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, and contains provisions designed to limit their political role. 
Moreover, the NPT includes no-first-use pledges, and specific bans on the use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear states. 
To an extent not generally appreciated, the United States and the international regime of 
nonproliferation policies have had a fairly tight relation to NK (Sokolski 2001: 39-56, 2003). 
Under this interpretation of the NPT, adherence to the treaty required only minimal enforcement 
or monitoring. The key protection against proliferation, after all, was the willingness of nations 
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to forswear exercising their natural right to acquire nuclear weapons in a legally binding treaty, 
meaning that the nonproliferation secured by the treaty was potentially quite fragile (Solski 2001, 
2003). 
However, from the mid-1990s, the NPT and its mutually assured destruction (MAD) -
inspired interpretation began to falter (Solski 2003). First, whatever limited utility MAD thinking 
may have had to describe or channel the Cold War competition between the Soviet and United 
States-led alliances, it was a tolerable view only so long as the two superpowers actively kept 
nations under their influence from acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. Indeed, during the 
Cold War, to a large extent, this worked. Second, following the end of the Cold War several NPT 
members exploited the generous nuclear compensation that a MAD-inspired view of the NPT 
required (Albright, Berjkout and Walker 1997: 290). North Korea, which became a member of 
the NPT in 1985, managed to secure all the nuclear assistance it needed in order to generate and 
separate plutonium for bombs, and launch a covert uranium enrichment program. 
Third, although it only allowed the IAEA to inspect its facilities in 1992, Pyongyang was 
able to remain a member of the NPT even after it was found in violation of its safeguards 
agreement in 1993 and, indeed, even after it first claimed it had already withdrawn in early 2003 
(Albright, Berjkout and Walker 1997: 65-67).  Lastly, after the Cold War, enforcement of the 
NPT was tested and found wanting (Hibbs 2003). North Korea’s ability to evade the NPT 
requirement that it allow inspections of its facilities 18 months after signing, with no effective 
repercussions when their violations were discovered by the U.N. in 1993, underscores the 
wanting nature of the NPT following the end of the Cold War. 
 Evidently, the incentives which once led Iraq to renounce nuclear weapons and adhere to 
the NPT did not suffice to make it respect the obligations under the treaty. The incentives 
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provided to North Korea to close its declared nuclear power program, including the reprocessing 
plant, have consisted not in threatening sticks, but in two remarkable carrots. Namely, (1) 
assistance in the procurement and construction of two light water reactors, and (2) deliveries of 
oil. Although this arrangement, and the agreed framework that formalized it, have been criticized 
by some as an unacceptable reward for North Korea’s violation of its safeguards agreement, the 
unorthodox approach has been blessed by the Security Council, and the IAEA was requested to 
monitor the freezing of the declared nuclear program.  
Although it was generally agreed that the NPT had succeeded in establishing a norm 
against nuclear proliferation (Bunn 1994), many of its shortcomings are becoming more and 
more visible. The first problem is ascribed to its discriminatory nature—dividing the world into 
nuclear weapons haves and have-nots—which has triggered charges of a double standard and has 
generated strong feelings of anger, resentment, and paternalism, particularly among developing 
nations, which have refused to sign the NPT (Aaronson 1992). A second problem is the failure of 
the nuclear weapons states to live up to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on 
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" 
(Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 1990: 100). In addition, nuclear weapons states 
have allowed global nuclear arsenals to grow to over 50,000 weapons by the mid-1980s (Sivard, 
1991: 18). 
Non-nuclear states have also charged that the failure of the nuclear powers to endorse 
CTBT is a matter of bad faith (Bunn 1994), and pointing towards a double standard of non-
nuclear weapons states being asked to live up to the NPT provisions when nuclear weapons 
states have not held to their end (Wessels 1995). Finally, the fact that some known nuclear 
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weapons states remain outside the NPT invites negative and paranoid perceptions – that a refusal 
to sign the NPT indicates an intention to build a nuclear arsenal. Yet, while this can increase 
tensions, it also helps to encourage leaders to believe that their national interests are best served 
by building a credible nuclear deterrent (Wessels 1995). 
As dictated by the NPT, each member state is required to accept the IAEA safeguards 
system, which is designed to prevent cheating and clandestine production of nuclear materials. 
The overarching goal for the architects of the IAEA safeguards was to create a confidence 
through verification system by which governments did not misuse declared nuclear installations 
to divert fissionable material from peaceful to military purposes. As such, the IAEA has been an 
important component as an international regime in gathering intelligence on North Korea. First, 
the North Korean case demonstrates the value of modern techniques in chemical analysis, which 
have allowed the IAEA to conclude that North Korea had pursued more than the one 
reprocessing campaign, which it had declared, and that it must have produced more plutonium 
than it had originally stated. Moreover, the findings of the IAEA had been instrumental in 
showing a clear violation of the safeguards agreement under the NPT, though was inconclusive 
as to whether the non-declared nuclear material had been diverted for military purposes. 
 In rapid succession from December 2002 to January 2003, North Korea announced its 
intention to restart its long idle nuclear reactors, began to access materials and equipment that 
had been sealed and tagged by the IAEA to prevent their use, dismantled IAEA surveillance 
cameras at its nuclear facilities, and expelled IAEA inspectors from the country. On January 10, 
2003, as the Bush administration was mired in fruitless diplomacy over Iraq at the UN, North 
Korea declared its official withdrawal from the NPT, and hence its rejection of the commitment 
to remain non-nuclear. In late January 2003, it was reported that Pyongyang had begun to move 
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 53
its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods out of storage facilities formerly safeguarded by the IAEA, 
raising concerns that it was about to begin reprocessing in order to extract the plutonium 
necessary for making nuclear weapons (Miller 2003: 83-84). 
An essential part for the success of the nonproliferation regime is the confidence in the 
IAEA restraints, as perceptions of noncompliance, particularly of clandestine cheating, evoke 
strong security fears. The Iraqi case, for example, shook this confidence by showing that despite 
the IAEA safeguards, covert programs could advance far through the use of materials that had 
passed undetected through the extant safeguards system (Leventhal 1992: 167-180), and left little 
doubt that a determined proliferator could cheat successfully, even under full-scope IAEA 
safeguards (Scheinman 1992: 37-50). Moreover, this only reinforced serious doubts about the 
effectiveness of the system, and stimulated fears that other nations might develop covert nuclear 
programs (J. Deutsch 1992: 120-134). These fears were particularly heightened when inspections 
in, 1993, provided evidence that North Korea was developing a clandestine nuclear program. 
Overall, despite the initiatives by the international community towards strengthening the 
safeguards and verification system, it is unrealistic to expect the system to be flawless (Bailey 
1993). Moreover, even if cheating is detected, it is unclear how the international community will 
stop it. China, for example, had reservations about imposing sanctions on North Korea. With this 
case, thorny issues remain over how to insure compliance with IAEA safeguards. 
International Systemic Relations 
 United States policies on North Korea are also influenced by the position of other actors 
in the East Asia international system.13 North Korea, and countries such as the United States, 
South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China, have different concerns for reducing tensions and for 
                                                 
13 For an explanation of international systems theory, see Byers (1999), Doyle and Ikenberry (1997), Kowert, 
Kubálková, and Onuf (1998), and Mearsheimer (1990, 2001). 
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establishing a peaceful regime on the Korean peninsula. South Korea wants to resolve the issue 
of separated family and inter-Korean economic cooperation first, while a resolution of the 
DPRK’s nuclear programs comes only as a second priority. The DPRK wants otherwise: it wants 
to resolve arms control first, then the transformation of the truce agreement into a peace regime, 
and finally, the DPRK hopes to resolve the inter-Korean economic cooperation and the separated 
family issue, excluding the discussion on nuclear and missile issues. Some observers, however, 
believe that North Korea could change its priorities because they desperately need foreign 
economic support. 
 On the other hand, while the Bush Administration and the Japanese Government 
concentrate on resolving the North Korea’s nuclear development programs, they are sidetracking 
the communist country’s calls for the withdrawal of US troops (Bosworth 2000: 54). Moreover, 
the Chinese Government is pushing towards a stable Korean peninsula without American or 
Japanese interventions; instead it advocates the autonomous efforts of the North and the South, a 
perspective that has brought alarm to the Bush Administration. For one, if autonomous efforts 
are carried out, there is a high possibility that the negotiating power of the United States might be 
weakened: the North might junk United States-led intervention in favor of that of South Korea 
due to its large-scale economic support to the North. However, the Bush Administration remains 
confident that the DPRK will need the support of Washington in obtaining foreign debt from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which are largely controlled by the United 
States. 
 If South Korea rushes the withdrawal of American troops in the South, US foreign policy 
on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia would be seriously damaged. As a result, the 
United States-South Korea cooperation could be destroyed. While the United States fears that the 
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Chinese Government’s proposal of autonomous initiatives on the North and the South, it is 
confident about South Korea's diplomatic ability in dealing with the North Korean issues 
successfully. It is the U.S. belief that in the end, the United States-South Korean cooperation will 
continue despite the complicated and delicate situation. 
 Another relevant issue that affects broader international relations is the national missile 
defense (NMD) system developed by the United States, and pushed by the Bush administration, 
and strongly opposed by China and Russia. Despite North Korean promises to end its missile 
program, the circumstances surrounding the Korean peninsula seem to have become further 
complicated, in that the US is arguing the necessity of the NMD system against the threat of 
missile attack from North Korea. Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Pyongyang in 2000 
was largely suspected as a plan to cooperate with Pyongyang against the NMD system.  
Therefore, the NMD system has become a hot issue which could cause conflicts between the US 
and China, or Russia, and may also have an impact on the inter-Korean issues. 
Clinton and Bush Administrations’ Non-Proliferation Policy 
 
 The similarities between the domestic constraints consisting of the US Congress, the 
American political culture and public opinion and bureaucratic politics and the systemic 
constraints such as the lack of cooperation/policy differences with South Korea, Japan, China 
and Russia and the nature of the two Kim regimes, have led to a convergence of Clinton and 
Bush administrations policies. Moreover, these constraints can be measured in the policy 
approach of bilateralism versus multilateralism, carrots versus sticks, and the use economic, 
military and diplomatic means and the utilization of the international regime such as the NPT 
and IAEA. 
Early in his first term, President Clinton grappled with the North’s renegade nuclear 
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weapons program. After many months of tedious negotiations with the North, the first-ever US-
North Korea political agreement, the Agreed Framework, was signed in October 1994, offering 
benefits to the North that included improved trade and political ties with Washington, a $50 
million-per-year fuel and oil supply, and construction of two light-water nuclear reactors valued 
at about $5 billion. Together with a consortium of about a dozen nations, the United States began 
raising funds to support this process, with South Korea pledging to pick up most of the tab.  In 
return, North Korea agreed to “freeze” its current nuclear program, preventing it from processing 
any more weapons-grade plutonium than it already possessed. 
When Bush assumed office in January 2001, he quickly and deliberately distanced his 
administration from the engagement policy with North Korea that the Clinton administration had 
employed (Feffer 2002: 2-5; Cha 2002), and, instead froze talks with Pyongyang. However, the 
effectiveness of this hard-line approach began to wane as the DPKR continued to disregard the 
United States threat to impose sanctions on them. Thus, the Bush administration slowly started to 
open its communications door with North Korea, and resume talks and diplomatic negotiations. 
This gradual step back towards the Clinton administration’s policy of engagement however, was 
rudely interrupted when the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, and Bush’s 
statement during a State of the Union address shortly after in which he labeled North Korea as 
part of a three-country axis of evil. 
The 9/11 episode propelled the Bush administration to pressure North Korea so that the 
diplomatic negotiations would resume. While North Korea insisted on bilateral talks, much like 
those they maintained with the Clinton administration, Bush was pushing for a multilateral 
negotiation that included major regional players such as South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China.  
It is argued that the Clinton administration could have resolved the North Korean nuclear 
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threat, had it not been for domestic constraints during the national election noting especially the 
Florida fiasco, that ultimately halted negotiations between the two leaders (Ferrer 2002: 2). Upon 
assuming the presidency, Bush ordered a full review of the Clinton administration’s policy on 
North Korea, and then halted the policy of engagement, and ultimately damned the Sunshine 
Policy (Ferrer, 2002: 3), suggesting that North Korea had violated its agreements with the United 
States. The former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy rested on the 
engagement premises where South Korea would maintain economic relations with North Korea. 
 Though the hard line policy of the Bush administration forced North Korea to pull away 
from the negotiation table, North Korea continued to maintain a moratorium on missile launches 
that it had declared in 1999, and continued to abide by the Agreed Framework. 
Clinton Policy and Implementation Strategies 
 
The Clinton administration advocated for a policy of engagement using a bilateral type of 
negotiation, carrots using economic incentives through economic and diplomatic means and the 
exclusion of the international regime though it has utilized the international regime in the first 
part of the regime. The policy of engagement implemented by the Clinton administration resulted 
to the success of getting the Agreed Framework.14 
At the onset, the Clinton administration inherited a rigid policy from the first Bush 
administration, which rested on the premise that North Korea would not be allowed to produce 
any nuclear weapons. According to Sigal (1998), by publicly stating that his aim was to deny 
North Korea even one nuclear warhead, Clinton defined the problem in a way that resisted 
solution. Moreover, in an attempt to deter the North Korean nuclear proliferation, the Clinton 
                                                 
14 The following general sources were used in this study to construct Clinton Foreign policy: Berry (1995), 
Bosworth (1995), Cronin (1994), Feffer (2002), Hagan (2004), Juster (2000), Kim (1998), Koch (1999), Litwak 
(2000), Mearsheimer (1990), Miller (2003), Pilat (1994), Sanger (1993, 1994), Sigal (1998, 2000), Sokolski (1995), 
Suh and Lee (1998), and Williamson (1999). 
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Administration began applying the economic sanction strategy, in an attempt to destabilize and 
manipulate the current regime, a strategy that had been predominant in United States policy 
orientation towards North Korea. However, these sanctions proved to be largely ineffective in 
stopping the DPRK from developing an advanced rocketry program and the potential for nuclear 
weapons. In August 1998, the DPRK tested a rocket over Japan, alarming neighboring nations 
and the United States (Weinberger 1999: 42), and precipitating policy concerns in South Korea, 
China, Japan and Russia. South Korea in particular adapted the Sunshine Policy in its relations 
with North Korea. Following discussions between representatives from the two adversarial 
nations, a compromise was reached, in which North Korea promised to suspend testing of its 
missile program in return for a promise by the United States to relax its embargo against the 
DPRK (Koch 1999: 21). 
The implementation of the Agreed Framework rested mainly on the principle that North 
Korea would comply with the agreement. While critics of the Clinton Administration's 
concessions claim that the DPRK manipulated the United States into easing long-standing 
restrictions without sufficient gains or guarantees in return (Weinberger 1999: 42), while others 
considered it a successful example of the application of economic pressure by the United States 
(Koch 1999: 21). The Agreed Framework was the only signed agreement that sought resolution 
of the North Korean-United States problem, and can arguably be viewed as one of the greatest 
achievements of the Clinton Administration, as it worked to calm the nuclear threat from the 
DPRK for some time. According to Suh and Lee (1998), Olsen (1996) and Sigal (1998, 2000), 
the Agreed Framework was a triumph on the policy and security term after years of negotiation 
with North Korea. In signing the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to shut down its 
nuclear reactors, freeze its nuclear activities, and put its nuclear assets under IAEA inspection 
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(Miller 2003: 83-84). In return, North Korea received a pledge that a consortium of outside 
powers would provide the country large shipments of oil. 
Though plagued with problems including implementation delays and mutual 
recriminations, the Agreed Framework succeeded in freezing North Korea's plutonium program 
for nearly 10 years (Miller 2003; Sigal1998, 2000; Olsen 1996; Suh and Lee 1998), and, at the 
very least, established communication and engagement between the powers. The Agreed 
Framework had several objectives covered, including: (1) the United States would endeavor to 
replace North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with safer and more powerful Light 
Water Reactors (LWR), which are also more proliferation-resistant; (2) the working towards 
normalization of relations between the two countries; and (3) the agreement renewed North 
Korean dedication to the NPT a stable environment on the Korean peninsula (Suh and Lee, 
1998). Finally, through the formation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), contact has been secured and cooperation enhanced between the 
participating members of the global community and North Korea. 
However, despite the optimism showed by some scholars on the end of the nuclear threat 
in North Korea, the problems and constraints that ultimately led to the breakdown and failure of 
the Framework were visible (Sigal 1998, 2000). One major implication of the abruptness of 
actions from the collapse of the Agreed Framework is the absence of alternative arrangements to 
constrain North Korea’s nuclear weapons potential. The absence of a viable policy alternative is 
one of the major constraints that the Bush administration faces. 
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Bush Policy and Implementation Strategy 
As previously stated, the Bush Administration’s policy toward North Korea has been a 
clear deviation from that of the Clinton administration.15 This deviation however was only true in 
the early period of the Bush administration, and became especially apparent after the September 
11 attacks. The Bush administration has instead employed a multilateral approach, using a 
sanction-based strategy through military and economic means and the exclusion of the 
international regime. Thus, the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the North 
Korea that were formalized by the October 1994 Agreed Framework were changed to 
multilateral negotiations under the Bush Administration, and the Agreed Framework was 
replaced by the Six-Country Talks. Moreover, in the Six-Party Talks, the Bush administration 
insisted that the DPRK dismantle its nuclear weapons program prior to negotiations or the 
resumption of high-level exchanges between the two countries. 
Moreover, following the September 11 attacks, an eminent preoccupation among policy 
makers in the Bush administration has been the war in Iraq and its fight against terrorism. Yet, 
Pyongyang has managed to keep the North Korean nuclear issue active through the dismantling 
of the Agreed Framework and the withdrawal of the DRPK from the NPT, thus severing all 
nuclear inspection arrangements with the IAEA. These developments point to the renewal in 
coming months of an acerbic debate that took place at the end of the Clinton administration over 
the merits of engaging or containing the DPRK. Although the Bush administration's initial 
review of North Korean policy in June 2001 recommended unconditional engagement with 
                                                 
15 The following sources were used in this study to construct the Bush Foreign Policy on the North Korean nuclear 
crisis: Carlson (2003), Cha (2002), Choi (2003), Diehl (2002), Fein (2003), George W. Bush Administration Policy 
Toward North Korea (2004), Heginbotham (2003), Kerr (2003), Koh (2003), Koppel and Labbot (2001), 
LaMontagne (2002), Lee and Feffer (2004), Niksch (2003), Pollack (2001), Sherman (2002), Perry (2001), Conachy 
(2001), Gross (2001, 2001). 
 
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 61
Pyongyang on a broad range of issues including its suspected nuclear weapons program, ballistic 
missile production and export, and its conventional force posture on the peninsula, this position 
is far from a conclusive, given the well-known skepticism of North Korean intentions, as 
expressed in the Bush's axis of evil speech as well as other statements by administration officials. 
 A pertinent source of systemic constraint in the current administration is Bush’s “axis of 
evil” speech (Cha 2002). The label is a result of the threat that these three countries pose on the 
United States and its allies. Observers, however, argue that the axis of evil speech created an 
imminent military action against North Korea (Cha, 2002: 82).  However, White House officials 
had intimated a harder-line policy toward North Korea, much at odds with the Sunshine Policy of 
South Korea. Thus, the conflict involving the respective policies of South Korea and the United 
States places a critical constraint on the possibilities of negotiating a multilateral strategy, 
considering that the US government requires the cooperation of countries such as South Korea in 
the resolution of the North Korean crisis. Moreover, this disagreement has presented conflicts 
among the US and its allies in determining the most appropriate strategy for dealing with North 
Korea. 
Critics assert that the stick strategy by Bush will not work. Instead, carrots, in the form of 
normalized political relations, economic aid and investment, and mutual tension reduction is the 
best option in reducing North Korea's insecurity, and offers a path towards reform for ending the 
proliferation threat and other belligerent DPRK behavior (Cha and Kang, 2003: 20).   However, 
skeptics of an engagement policy do not believe that the regime's revisionist intentions will 
change, and argue that the offer of economic and diplomatic carrots only strengthens the 
hardliners in Pyongyang, exemplifies Western weakness (in DPRK eyes), and ultimately 
strengthens a regime bent on overturning the status quo on the peninsula. As Douglas Paal (2001: 
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305) claims, engagement policy amounts to "conditional appeasement" and will not produce 
observable change for the better in the DPRK.  
 The very existence of a vigorous policy debate between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, 
indicates a fundamental absence of agreement on the nature of the threat posed by the DPRK. 
The Bush Administration, after the termination of the Agreed Framework, began working on a 
multilateral approach of negotiation with North Korea, and started to conduct six-country talks. 
Though originally opting for the continuation of bi-lateral talks, North Korea was left with no 
choice but join in the six-country talks. Indeed, this hard line policy approach by the Bush 
administration has been predicted by observers to continue (The Washington Times December 
11, 2003; Erickson 2003; Associated Press 2004; BBC News 2004). For instance, regardless of 
the timing of the security guarantee, the United States will continue to put the screws to 
Pyongyang (The Washington Times December 11, 2003), and the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), which is designed to identify and seize materials related to non-conventional 
weapons, is targeted directly at North Korea's exports and is in full force, according to several 
administration officials. 
The language in the statement of principles - only opposed by China - is vague on the 
specifics of a security guarantee, and is, in part, a reflection of the infighting within the 
administration on that very issue (The Washington Times December 11, 2003). The hard line 
option that has been included in the list of possible recommendations stipulates that the security 
guarantees will only follow "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantling" of the nuclear 
program. But as long as the DPRK maintains even one civilian nuclear reactor - or refuses to 
grant complete, unfettered access to inspectors - such an exacting standard will probably not be 
achieved. 
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China has been the host of the four rounds of the six-country talks. The initial reports and 
news on these multilateral talks were bleak. Modest expectations are almost a given when it 
comes to untangling the North Korean nuclear crisis. But even judged by these underwhelming 
standards, the multilateral talks in Beijing were less than successful insofar as the first few 
rounds of the talks were concerned (Erickson, 2003: 1). So far, diplomats from the United States, 
North Korea, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan left the six-sided bargaining table—custom 
built for the talks—offering few signs of progress. The North was miffed partly because the 
Unite States has continued to demand that North Korea give up its nukes as a prelude to further 
negotiations, without a reciprocal nonaggression treaty (Erickson 2003: 1). 
Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World 
In summary, this chapter has suggested that the only guarantee against the threat of 
nuclear war is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The nuclear dilemma discussed in 
this chapter is this: the nuclear-weapons states will not give up their nuclear capability without 
first being convinced that their strategic dominance will not be challenged. But the threshold 
nuclear weapons states will not give up their nuclear option without seeing proof of a timetabled 
move towards a nuclear-free world. To achieve a nuclear-free world goals—deeper reductions in 
the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapons states, further constraints on the deployment of their 
nuclear weapons on the territories of other states, the entry into force of the CTBT, and the 
negotiation of a ban on missile test flights and on the production of fissile materials—must be 
satisfied. 
In the following chapter, the Clinton Administration’s policy towards North Korea, and 
how domestic and systemic factors affected his initial policy of bilateralism, carrot approach and 
inclusion of the international regime are presented. 
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CHAPTER III: SYSTEMIC AND DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS IN CLINTON POLICY ON NORTH 
KOREA 
 
 The previous chapter has shown the highly secretive nature of the North Korean regime, 
and the difficulty involved in discerning with accuracy its motivations for nuclear proliferation. 
More importantly, it also raises difficult questions about the most effective means of stopping 
nuclear proliferation. Although the DPRK has attempted to justify its development of nuclear 
weapons as a means to deter a possible attack by the United States and South Korea, it is highly 
possible that the state also seeks to achieve greater regional power. However, despite attempts by 
various world leaders to resolve the nuclear threat, the DPRK has since demanded bilateral 
negotiations with the United States because it needs to “establish a new, adequate-to-the-new-
international-situation relation between the North and the United States” (Bezlova 2001: 1). 
Also, Pyongyang views Washington as its counterpart in negotiating the stalemate on the Korean 
peninsula. As such, North Korea's desire to improve relations with the United States and the 
significance of Washington's success in curtailing Pyongyang's production and dissemination of  
WMD are some of the major motivations for bilateral talks (Han 2002: 104-105). 
The Clinton Administration, concerned by the alarming North Korean nuclear threat, had 
placed it as one of the priorities of its foreign policy, and, from the outset, employed a bilateral 
approach in diplomatic negotiations, used economic incentives or carrots, and included the 
international regime. However, the domestic and systemic constraints that the administration 
faced – starting from the policy formulation until the implementation process – necessitated a 
change in the strategy and approach. In the end, although the Clinton administration maintained 
bilateral negotiations and the use of economic rewards, it used diplomatic and military measures 
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and excluded the international regime.16 
To a great extent, the increased engagement during this period was in response to North 
Korean actions, which triggered international concern over the growing nuclear and missile 
programs. Fearing that North Korea’s actions would irreparably damage the international 
nonproliferation regime, the Clinton Administration engaged in intensive negotiations with 
North Korea, which eventually yielded the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, the promise and 
the prospects of a resolution to the North Korean nuclear threat had already been seriously 
impeded by the domestic and systemic constraints. Indeed, the policy approach and strategies of 
the United States toward North Korea are dictated by the domestic and congressional concerns 
(Hagan, 2004). 
Policy alternatives that are addressed and considered during debates in Congress (Sigal, 
1998, 2000) are indicative of the diverging views among American policy makers. Regarding the 
North Korean nuclear crisis, these issues include the use of a multilateral or bilateral approach, 
economic sanctions, carrot versus stick strategy, and financial constraints and economic aid that 
the US bestows on North Korea. As such, this chapter illustrates the domestic and systemic 
constraints that the Clinton administration has struggled against, and argues that, because of 
these limitations and constraints the expectations on the Agreed Framework were not achieved, 
thus forcing the Clinton Administration to shift its policies and strategies. 
The first section of this chapter illustrates the policy and strategy of the Clinton 
administration at the start of its term, and evaluates their rationale. The second section presents 
the systemic and domestic constraints that the initial policy and strategy of the Clinton 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that a US policy of engagement toward NK did not originate with the Clinton administration. 
Both the Reagan and the Bush, Sr. administrations made limited efforts prior to Clinton taking office. The Clinton 
administration, however, was chosen for this study because it marked a significant expansion over the efforts of 
previous administrations in the level of US engagement with the DPRK.  
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administration faced, such as the opposition from Congress, the lack of military power, and the 
public attitude of the United States towards North Korea. Moreover, the systemic constraints that 
will be addressed include the inability of the United States to form a solid coalition among its 
allies such as the four regional countries involved in six-party talks, as well as the role and 
attitudes of the Kim regime. The third section of the Chapter provides a discussion on the Agreed 
Framework, the problems that the United States encountered in the policy formulation including 
opposition and limitations, and the domestic and systemic constraints. This is followed by a 
section that evaluates the domestic and systemic constraints in implementing the Agreed 
Framework, as well as the framework’s failure in resolving the North Korean crisis. Finally, the 
fifth section provides a synthesis of the chapter. 
Framework for Analysis 
  
This chapter takes a critical approach in evaluating the domestic and systemic constraints 
on the Clinton administration policy in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis. The 
analysis shall start with the policy formulation at the start of the Clinton administration, and the 
domestic and systemic problems they faced from the outset. The figure below (Fig. 1) shows the 
framework and analysis for this chapter, and suggests that the Clinton administration was 
besieged by both domestic and systemic constraints from the moment the administration started 
to formulate its policies and implementation strategies. Moreover, even from the decision to 
choose its policy instruments such as bilateralism, carrots, long-term plan and the use of political 
and economic constraints, the administration was hounded by domestic and systemic constraints. 
Similarly, the Agreed Framework was besieged by the same constraints. It thus follow that, in 
order for the United States to effectively resolve the North Korean nuclear threat, the domestic 
and systemic barriers must be minimized, if not entirely removed. The contribution of this study 
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rests in the identification of the domestic and systemic constraints in the policy formulation and 
implementation process of the United States policy on North Korea. 
Figure 1. Framework for Analysis (Clinton Administration)  
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Clinton’s Initial Policy on North Korea17 
 
 Clinton formally revealed his nonproliferation policy in a speech at the UN in New York, 
on September 27, 1993, affirming the top priority of nonproliferation in American foreign and 
national security policy.18  The policy initially included negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), strengthening the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), creating 
specially tailored non-proliferation strategies for problem states (North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq), 
negotiating an international ban on the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for 
nuclear explosive purposes, and reforming US export controls in order to remove impediments 
for US exporters of high-tech goods (US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 1995). 
Specifically, Clinton’s policy was geared towards North Korea’s nuclear program, and 
involved several factors (Cronin, 1994: 5).  Foremost of which was a consideration of the 
American domestic sphere (Hagan 2004), which includes a US Congress that would be ratifying 
and supplying the much needed financial and legislative back up of his policy, American public 
opinion because of the principle of accountability inherent in democratic institutions, and the 
bureaucracy, including the role of the State Department and the Defense Department in the 
implementation of its policies. Within the systemic sphere, Clinton had to take into account the 
existing international regime related to Nuclear Proliferation, such as the NPT, to which North 
Korea was a member, and the IAEA, as well as the differing foreign policies of major regional 
                                                 
17 See the articles of Anthony (2000a, 200b), Cronin (1994), Destler (1998), Finnegan (1999), Juster (2000), Pilat 
(1994), and Wolfsthal (1993), and the books by Hagan (2004) Halberstam (2001), Rubinstein et al. (2000), Scott 
(1998), Sigal (1998).  
18 In his speech, Clinton states, “If we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy 
can feel secure. If we do not strengthen the capacity to resolve conflict among and within nations, those conflicts 
will smother the birth of free institutions, threaten the development of entire regions, and continue to take innocent 
lives…One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...I have 
made nonproliferation one of our nation's highest priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of all 
of our relationships with the world's nations and institutions. We seek to build a world of increasing pressures for 
nonproliferation, but increasingly open trade and technology for those states that live by accepted international 
rules.” 
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players, such as South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea. 
 When Clinton assumed office in 1992, North Korea’s nuclear arms development had 
already become the focus of intense international concern. Clinton’s initial policy position was to 
freeze the nuclear weapon production of the DPRK, a posture that ultimately created a stand-off 
between the two countries until 1994. It was only in 1994 when bilateral talks opened between 
North Korea and the United States, between former US President Jimmy Carter and envoy 
Robert Galucci, and the DPRK. The Clinton administration’s goal was to stop and prohibit North 
Korea to produce any nuclear weapons (Cronin 1994; Sigal 1998). From this premise, he devised 
his initial policy on North Korea that leaned on cooperation: proposing the use of diplomatic 
means of negotiation that took the form of bilateralism, the use of economic rewards evidenced 
in favorable trade conditions and foreign aids, and the inclusion of the international regime such 
as the utilization of the NPT and the IAEA (Wolfsthal 1993: 6-9; Finnegan 1999: 81-109; Pilat 
1994: 275-290; Juster, 2000: 51-69). 
 Indeed, the Clinton Administration, from the very beginning, had emphasized the use of 
unilateral or bilateral talks with North Korea. Moreover, it used economic rewards, and sought 
the help of the NPT and the IAEA in its actions towards the DPRK. The three variables listed 
below—Clinton’s bilateral approach, economic rewards and the use of economic and diplomatic 
means, and the international regime—are the initial policy strategy that was used by the Clinton 
Administration in dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. These variables in turn were 
hounded by domestic and systemic constraints that greatly influenced the initial strategy and 
approach of the Clinton Administration.
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Table 1: The Road to the Agreed Framework 
Date Nuclear Standoff 
 
May 1992 
IAEA initiates series of inspections to verify North Korea's inventory of 
nuclear materials. The agency soon discovers plutonium production 
discrepancies.  
 
March 11, 1993 
North Korea withdrew from the NPT in a harsh rebuff of Western demands 
to open suspected nuclear weapons development sites for inspection. It later 
suspended its withdrawal. 
 
June 11, 1993 
North Korea suspends its withdrawal from the NPT one day before it would 
have taken effect, but asserts IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities are 
no longer feasible.  
 
July 10, 1993 
Clinton traveled to South Korea, where in a speech to the National 
Assembly he denounced communist North Korea for raising the specter of 
"nuclear annihilation." 
 
May 30, 1994 
The UN Security Council warned North Korea to stop refueling a nuclear 
reactor and allow U.N. monitors to perform full inspections. 
 
 
June 2, 1994 
Clinton decides to pursue sanctions against the North after receiving IAEA 
assessments. North Korea prompted the measure by declaring it would never 
allow IAEA inspection of two undeclared nuclear waste sites that would 
determine past levels of plutonium production.  
June 11, 1994 The US, South Korea and Japan agreed to seek punitive steps against North 
Korea over its nuclear program. 
June 13, 1994 North Korea withdraws from the IAEA.  
 
June 16, 1994 
Jimmy Carter, on a private visit to North Korea, reported the nation's leaders 
were eager to resume talks with the US on resolving disputes about 
Pyongyang's nuclear program and improving relations.  
 
June 18, 1994 
The presidents of North Korea and South Korea agreed to hold a historic 
summit. Plans were disrupted by the death of North Korean leader Kim Il 
Sung on July 8. 
 
October 21, 1994 
The US and North Korea signed an agreement requiring the communist 
nation to halt its nuclear program and agree to inspections. 
Source: Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project: North Korea Nuclear and Missile Timeline, 
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/koreatimeline.htm. 
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Clinton’s Bilateral Strategy 
Initially, the Clinton Administration’s demand that North Korea freeze its nuclear 
weapons production facilities merited an erring from the Kim Il Sung regime, and it was only in 
1994 when the doors for bilateral negotiations opened. On June 15, 1994, Jimmy Carter 
successfully negotiated a deal with the DPRK, wherein Pyongyang finally confirmed its 
willingness to freeze its nuclear weapons program and resume high level talks with the United 
States. However, Clinton’s bilateral approach indicates a direct diplomatic negotiation with 
North Korea, with the exclusion of countries such as South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. 
Before higher-level talks had proceeded, Kim Il Sung died and was replaced by his son Kim 
Jong Il. Despite the change in the leadership of the North Korean regime, bilateral negotiations 
between Washington and Pyongyang resumed, and on August 13, 1994, preliminary agreement 
between the two countries was signed. Finally, following two additional months of bilateral talks 
between the United States and North Korea, the Agreed Framework was signed on October 21, 
1994. Calling for movement toward a full normalization of political and economic relations, the 
accord also served as a jumping point for further United States-North Korean dialogue on 
Pyongyang’s development and export of ballistic missiles.19 
Clinton’s bilateralism was comprised of high-level talks that discussed the issues and 
concerns between the two countries, ranging from nuclear program issues, economics, politics 
and military use (Pilat 1994: 275-290; Sigal 2000; Juster 2000: 51-69; Mearsheimer 1990: 5-56). 
Through bilateralism, scholars, using Iraq as a case example for the success of bilateralism, 
suggested that it is the bilateral negotiations that the US has moderated rogue states’ behavior 
and construct a positive bilateral relationship (Juster 2000: 51-69). Shirk (1997: 245-270) 
                                                 
19 See Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp. 
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supported this conclusion by asserting that maintaining a balance with the DPRK necessitates the 
US’ reaffirmation of its bilateral alliances and military presence in the region. 
 In support of bilateralism, scholars assert that although multilateral efforts, in terms of 
developing domestic and international support for nonproliferation actions and in reducing costs, 
are desirable in principle, they are not always possible (Pilat 1994: 275-290). This suggests that 
if needed, the capability to act alone is essential, and, therefore, a bilateral approach is ideal in 
order to gain support both from the domestic and the international arena. Moreover, 
policymakers turn to bilateral engagement when both economic sanctions and military force 
appear unattractive (Sigal 1998, 2000). The United States had campaigned ardently to secure 
backing from North Korea’s neighbors for the imposition of multilateral sanctions, but had 
achieved only limited success. 
Economic Rewards and the Use of Economic and Diplomatic Means 
The initial policy of the Clinton Administration had been grounded on the engagement 
policy, by which the administration worked on economic rewards for North Korean concessions, 
and bargained bilaterally through diplomatic means. The Agreed Framework contained 
provisions for economic support and favorable trade provisions for the DPRK. In turn, the state 
shall freeze its production of nuclear weapons. Theoretically, the bilateral relations between the 
two countries would gradually improve, and the bilateral negotiations resulting from the Agreed 
Framework characterized a landmark in Clinton’s legacy. 
The key reward offered by the Clinton administration consisted of a commitment by the 
United States and its allies to ship fuel oil to North Korea, and to build proliferation resistant 
light-water reactors in the country so as to offset the power generation losses the North suffered 
by relinquishing its supposedly peaceful nuclear power program. Moreover, the United States 
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and North Korea would reduce trade barriers and work towards the opening of liaison offices in 
each other’s capitals. The assumptive gains of Clinton’s carrots or rewards-based approach was 
that North Korea would be willing to conform to the Agreed Framework and any further 
negotiations that they might enter into with the US. For North Korea, nuclear weapons provided 
their principal bargaining chip, and were its key reciprocal tool for gaining certain political and 
economic rewards, whether these rewards are diplomatic recognition or light-water reactors. 
However, some scholars, favor the use of sticks as opposed to the use of carrots in negotiating 
with the DPRK (Berry 1995: 17). Indeed, the Clinton Administration’s tendency to use economic 
rewards has generated debates among scholars. 
In concurrence with Clinton’s economic rewards strategy, Cha and Kang (2003) have 
illustrated why a carrot strategy serves as the best option for the United States to effectively 
implement a nuclear nonproliferation program. Their perspective views carrots as more 
worthwhile than sticks, and emphasizes the responsibility that the world’s most powerful nation 
has in resolving conflicts through negotiations. Indeed, while those in Seoul favoring 
engagement agree that recent DPRK behavior represents tactical changes for the purpose of the 
regime’s survival, they believe that such behavior in fact reflects a fundamental change in 
Pyongyang’s intentions with further concessions by the North awaiting larger carrots from the 
West. 
Moreover, the Clinton Administration had planned to use sticks strategy if carrots did not 
work. According to Robert Gallucci, the United States had planned to move ahead with efforts to 
have the UN adopt economic sanctions, despite warnings of the potential dangers involved with 
implementing a proactive stick strategy (Berry 1995: 17). Clinton had hoped that in refusing to 
offer a comprehensive deal to North Korea, the Chinese would see this offer as a reasonable 
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effort to resolve this dispute and not veto a potential subsequent sanction resolution in the 
Security Council (Berry 1995: 18). After evaluating the stand of US officials on the use of an 
economic ‘reward and sanction’ strategy, the North Korean case suggests a balance between the 
two strategies, and the tone in which they are combined that makes all difference (Mazarr 1995: 
208-209).  The promise of benefits for nonproliferation, and the threat of punishment otherwise, 
must always be present in US policy. 
 There are some scholars who surmise that the use of economic rewards and sanctions are 
indeed complimentary. For instance, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki (2003) suggest that the use of 
both rewards and sanctions is not contradictory, and, as such, the outside world should not give 
Pyongyang substantial aid and other benefits simply to appease a dangerous leader or solve an 
immediate security crisis. However, if the DPRK is prepared to eliminate its nuclear weapons 
programs, transform the broader security situation on the peninsula, reform its economy, and 
begin the long process of changing its own society, outside countries can and should be generous 
in providing economic aid. Doing so would not be weakness; it would be a promising way to 
truly solve an important security problem by changing the fundamental nature of the adversary. 
If NK did not verifiably cooperate with this effort, the United States and its partners could then 
get tougher and use sticks (O’Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003: 43). In addition, O’Hanlon and 
Mochizuki (2003) called for a combination of “steaks and sledgehammers”, rather than the more 
traditional carrots and sticks (43). It is the stick strategy that a proposal of nuclear non-
proliferation the DPRK cannot refuse. Indeed, US interests in the preservation of peace and 
stability will be best served by engagement, but engagement as a stabilizing factor, the balancing 
wheel (McLean, 1999). It can be argued here that in a messy and unstable world, the main idea 
seems to be to use both rewards and sanctions, to cajole as well as to encourage, in holding the 
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sum of things together. 
Yet, the inherent limitations of the economic reward strategy do not bear sole 
responsibility for the failure of Clinton administration’s attempts at freezing North Korea’s 
nuclear productions. For instance, Litwak (2000) has criticized the inconsistencies of the 
administration in its implementation of carrot and stick strategy. While the administration 
advocated the implementation of all carrot and no stick in its North Korea policy, it 
simultaneously condemned European countries in their own carrot strategies. As such, he 
proposes that the best option between stick and carrot is still the combination of the two (Litwak, 
2000), though the more dominant strategy, he argues, should be the stick, especially on countries 
that are considered as rogue states such as the DPRK. 
The International Regime: NPT and IAEA 
 
 The Clinton administration was a strong supporter of the international nonproliferation 
regime, which is made up of treaties, international organizations, multilateral and bilateral 
agreements, and unilateral actions, each intended to prevent further proliferation (CRS Issue 
Brief 91141; CRS Issue Brief 92056). The major components of the international regime include 
(1) NPT, which has 180 member states, commits non-nuclear weapons members not to acquire 
or make them, and allows for international inspections of all nuclear activities, and (2) the IAEA, 
which was established in Vienna in 1957, and verifies the peaceful use of nuclear materials; and 
(3) other actors such as international export control regimes (CRS Issue Brief 4054). 
The NPT and the IAEA have played very crucial roles in the detection of nuclear 
weapons, and, more specifically, in attempting to contain North Korea’s nuclear program. Yet, 
while the international regime to which they belong represents one of the more significant 
sources of measure in enforcing the policies of the Clinton administration, it can also be a source 
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of constraints. For instance, the Clinton administration used the IAEA and the NPT to inspect 
undeclared nuclear sites in North Korea, though it had not demanded such inspections for any 
other country.20 The IAEA took this posture at the bequest of US officials, who were keen on 
using these inspections to gather more intelligence on North Korea’s activities, and apply 
pressure to the regime there. However, the loyalty of IAEA came under question by the 
international community when it was alleged that it passed all its intelligence information 
directly to the US. Indeed, it even seemed to some that the IAEA was more concerned with 
maintaining its sanctity with certain countries like the US through tough posturing, rather than 
preventing proliferation in the DPRK (Sigal 1998: 40). 
 The inclusion of the international regime thus became part of the Clinton 
Administration’s battle plan to gain the support of the international community. The 
administration closely coordinated its military intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear program 
with the IAEA, and also utilized the legitimacy of the NPT in mustering cooperation from 
countries and in demanding that North Korea freeze its nuclear production. Indeed, while the 
inclusion of the NPT and IAEA downgrades criticism from European countries and from South 
Korea, Japan, China and Russia, Washington remained intent on using the IAEA to rein in the 
North's nuclear program without having to concede anything in return. Pyongyang was equally 
determined to exploit its unique status, partly in and partly out of the NPT, to wrest a deal out of 
Washington. 
 Following the start of the bilateral talks began in 1994, Clinton abandoned the NPT and 
the IAEA, a result of North Korea’s refusal to allow the international regime to further inspect its 
nuclear facilities. The exclusion of the international regime was made before the successful 
                                                 
20 See Elich’s (2003) article, “Targeting North Korea” at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI212A.html. 
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agreement between Washington and Pyongyang, and the Clinton administration based its 
decision on the view that without the intelligence that can be provided by the IAEA and the NPT, 
the US would no longer benefit from the international regime. Moreover, the crime-and-
punishment approach taken by the IAEA did not suit the administration’s policy of engagement. 
Another reason why the United States abandoned the IAEA was because of the 
deteriorating relationship between the IAEA and North Korea, which had started during the first 
few months of the Clinton Administration (Berry 1995: 8). At the time, several nuclear weapons 
experts speculated that the DPRK’s decision bar IAEA inspectors was mainly predicated on its 
shock at the sophistication of IAEA inspections, and the belief that access to the additional sites 
would reveal more conclusively that North Korea was facilitating a nuclear weapons program. 
This in turn led the Clinton administration to take the threat very seriously, and, understanding 
the long-term implications of a North Korean withdrawal from the NPT on the international non-
proliferation regime, Clinton started to deviate from the international regime framework and 
instead started to negotiate on its own (Berry 1995:9). Moreover, while the NPT had proved to 
be moderately successful in mitigating the nuclear regime, it ultimately failed to curtail the North 
Korean nuclear threat, particularly after North Korea violated the NPT provisions when it 
removed monitoring equipment the IAEA had installed, expelled inspectors, and announced its 
intention to resume operations. Thus, the Clinton Administration proceeded with the bilateral 
talks leaving behind the NPT and the IAEA.  
The Effects of Domestic and Systemic Constraints on Clinton Policy 
Some observers surmise that Clinton’s policy failed because of its refusal to consider the 
use of military force in its approach toward North Korea (Feffer 2002:2). This is one reason why 
Bush, who prefers the use of a more hard-line sticks, i.e., military and sanctions approach, 
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deviated from his predecessor’s policy. However, some other scholars, such as Sigal (1998, 
2000) and Cha (2002), contend that the standoff between North Korea and the United States 
under Clinton was simply a product of America’s unwillingness to cooperate with strangers—in 
this case, North Korea. Due to the internally conflicting nature of American politics, Clinton’s 
policy from 1993-2000 can be characterized as a shift from the inclusion of the IAEA and NPT 
to its exclusion (Sigal 1998).  
As has been consistently argued in the first two chapters of this dissertation, the 
resolution of the North Korean nuclear program has been met with constraints that come 
primarily from two sources: domestic and systemic (Amini 2002; Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 
226-254; Busch 2002:62; Eberstadt 1996:12; Juster 2000:51-69). Indeed, the shifting strategy 
policy of the Clinton Administration was largely a product of the domestic constraints it had 
encountered from the US Congress, American culture and public opinion and bureaucratic 
politics. Moreover, the inability of the Clinton administration to gain the full support of South 
Korea, China, Japan and Russia, in terms of policy frameworks and in implementing the 
strategies of the Clinton administration, had greatly affected the initial policy stance of the US on 
North Korea. Needless to say, these four countries are instrumental in implementing the policy 
inclination of Clinton whether it be military or diplomatic and economic rewards or sanctions. 
Domestic Constraints21 
 
 This study has identified three key domestic constraints that shaped Clinton’s policy on 
the North Korean nuclear program: (1) the US Congress, (2) American culture and public 
                                                 
21 The following list of sources were largely used in examining the domestic constraints in the Clinton 
Administration’s foreign policy on North Korea: Berry (1995), Bunn (1994), Cha (2002), Cronin (1994), CRS Issue 
Brief 91141 and CRS Report 95853, Dewar (1994), Lake (1994), Sagan and Waltz (1995), Sanger (1994), Schafer 
and Crichlow (2002), Sigal (1998), Sokolski (1995), US Senate Committee on Government Affairs (1994, 1995), 
US Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs (1995), US General Accounting Office (1994, 1995), 
Wessels (1995), and Zogby (1994). 
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opinion, and (3) the bureaucratic government. The table below summarizes these constraints. 
Table 2. Domestic Constraints (Clinton Administration) 
Variables Constraints 
 
 
US Congress 
• The process of policy-making was fragmented 
• The US Congress limited Clinton’s power 
• The US Congress limited US funds in dealing with the 
North Korean nuclear threat 
• The US Congress seemed to reject internationalism 
• The US congress were divided between carrots and sticks 
strategies, and bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
 
Public Opinion 
• Fragmented perspectives on rogue states and how to deal 
with them 
• Some Americans advocated diplomatic approach rather 
than military force (ensure the safety and protect the lives 
of every American) 
• Some Americans pushed for a policy of force and 
coercion rather than diplomacy 
• Preference to strengthen America’s defense, instead of 
spending money for foreign aid and diplomacy 
• Abandonment of the NPT and IAEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bureaucracy 
 
• Disagreements and the lack of cooperation between the 
Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce; 
the ACDA; the intelligence community; and the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
• Reluctance of senior officials to take charge in dealing 
with North Korea 
• Defense budget cut 
• Instead of redefining ends and means, top officials tried to 
avoid tough choices 
• The CIA lacked good sources of political intelligence on 
North Korea 
• The nuclear diplomacy employed by the Clinton 
administration was but a series of ad hoc improvisations 
without any organizing concept 
The US Congress 
The internal formulation of the policy options for the Clinton administration, the debate 
on the appropriate strategy on North Korea, the appropriation for the said endeavor and the re-
assessing of the goals and the benefits of the US government in resolving the North Korean 
nuclear threat took the forefront of the domestic debate. 
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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy that was adopted by the Clinton Administration had 
been shaped by previous legislations made by the US Congress (Sokolski 1995; US Senate 
Committee on Government Affairs 1994, 1995; US Department of State, Bureau of Political 
Military Affairs 1995; US General Accounting Office 1994, 1995). It then follows that the 
American Congress, with its power to legislate and direct American foreign policy, can be 
viewed as one of the foremost drivers of the administration’s policy on the DPRK. To illustrate, 
the US Congress passed The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), which evolved into the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act of 1989 (NNPA), provided the framework for the Clinton Administration. 
The NNPA required the cutoff of US nuclear cooperation with states that violate nuclear 
cooperation agreements with the US or non-nuclear weapons states that test nuclear weapons.  
Moreover, the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act requires the US to cut off economic and 
military aid to countries that supply or receive unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing 
technology (the Glenn-Symington amendments, Sections 669 and 670), and the 1994 Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act, requires sanctions against countries that have willfully aided or 
abetted the acquisition of nuclear weapons or unsafe guarded nuclear weapons materials. 
Sanctions include the denial of loans or credit from international financial institutions (US 
General Accounting Office 1994).  
Aside from the Congressional legislation that significantly limited the powers of Clinton 
administration to create a policy approach and strategy to resolve the North Korean problem, 
another key issue for Congress was the implementation of the agreement, and the extent of the 
US contribution (US Senate Committee on Government Affairs 1994, 1995, U.S. Department of 
State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs 1995; US General Accounting Office 1994, 1995). 
Some lawmakers opposed the use of US funds, but most were apparently not opposed so much 
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as to block implementation of the agreement. (See CRS Issue Brief 91141 and CRS Report 
95853), and it is without question that the US Congress has always regarded the North Korean 
nuclear threat as a serious US foreign and security policy concern (Cronin 1994; Dewar 1994: 
A1;  US Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 1994, 1995, U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Political Military Affairs, 1995). Though the debate between the administration and 
Congress regarding the North Korean policy resulted in the critiquing of the administration’s 
management of American foreign policy (Dewar 1994: A10), questions as to the appropriate 
policy and implementation strategy began to gain its momentum again when North Korea, in 
March of 1993, shook the Clinton administration by announcing its intention to withdraw from 
the NPT (Cronin 1994). The threat that emanated from this announcement played a very 
significant role in the strategy and approach the administration adopted in its policy formulation 
towards North Korea.22 
The Clinton Administration worked with an independent, centralized, partisan and 
homogenous Congress. This led into constant struggle between the White House and Congress. 
Clinton Administration never seemed to win its way with Congress. Even during those 
circumstances when it was able to get Congress’ support, Clinton had to exert considerable effort 
to gain this support.  
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger declared in October 1999 that the 
internationalist consensus that has prevailed in the United States for over five decades is being 
                                                 
22 Although foreign policy and national security come mainly within the turf of the president, the process of policy 
making was fragmented between many institutions including Congress. This fragmentation arose from the 
institutional separation of powers, which the American constitution prescribes. A reading of the Constitution will 
reveal that Congress possesses extensive foreign policy powers. For example, although the president has authority to 
conduct war and diplomacy, the authority to engage in war and commit the nation to significant foreign 
undertakings is possessed by Congress. Similarly, while the President is the commander-in-chief and responsible for 
negotiating and engaging to treaties, there still is the need of the consent by Congress before those treaties are 
adopted as laws.  
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challenged by a new isolationism heard and felt particularly in the Congress.23 However, many 
scholars feel that calling Congress isolationist is somewhat excessive. Congress, according to 
them, does not completely reject internationalism. They however reject Clinton’s liberal, 
globalist brand of internationalism or what conservative thinkers, such as William Kristol and 
Robert Kagan, called the global buddy system. Like the general public, the Congress holds an 
opinion that Clinton’s enlargement and engagement results in international entanglements, which 
limits American defense and economic policy options.24  
Within the executive, there existed fragmentation. The growing complexity of the 
modern American political environment has witnessed an institutional expansion of the 
executive branch that has left it with a plethora of various departments, each having to co-exist 
with one another (Schafer and Crichlow 2000:559-571, 2002:45-68). As such, decision-making 
becomes complicated by differing perspectives, a problem that has been further exacerbated by 
personal rivalries and ambitions of key players (Crichlow 2002:45). Thus, even if the conflict 
between the Congress and the President may be ended, the President would still have to confront 
an internal bureaucratic struggle within the executive. A further complication was brought about 
by interest group politics. Various interest groups with different interests lobby for the support of 
Congress, government departments and agencies. They use lobbyists, media and civic groups to 
pressure Congress and government agencies, resulting in a multiplicity of issues the 
administration has to confront, and thus taking away time and resources from foreign policy 
programs. The difficulty in obtaining Congressional support ultimately pushed the Clinton 
                                                 
23 See the complete text of Berger’s speech entitled “American Power: Hegemony, Isolationism or Engagement” at 
http://www.cfr.org/pub3600/samuel_r_berger/american_power_hegemony_isolationism_or_engagement.php. 
 
24 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2000. “Allies Do not See a Missile Threat.” 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=494 (May 29, 2005). 
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administration to adopt a strategy of going public. The President first approached the public to 
lobby sufficient support in order to push Congress to support his programs. This made the 
success and failure of Clinton’s programs and prospects dependent on public opinion, though the 
struggle between fragmented agencies often results in an incoherent and inconsistent policy 
agenda. 
The success of getting domestic and public support is vital to a policy and strategy choice 
of a president. The complexity of the institutional and bureaucratic system of the US, the 
separation of powers, and the system of checks and balances requires at least minimal support 
from the local system, or at least from the Congress. Typically, the foreign policy will have to 
obtain funding from Congress Appropriations Committee, face public opinion and seek the 
advice and support of advisers and other key governmental players, and indeed, a lack in support 
may impede and harm the implementation of his programs. Thus, the inability of the Clinton 
Administration to get this support may be considered as one of its biggest policy failure. In terms 
of Clinton’s policy to employ a carrots strategy in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis, 
the US Congress made an attempt to influence Clinton’s decision. In November 1994, the 
Republican Party captured both chambers of the US Congress for the first time in 40 years. The 
Party established a “Contract with America” campaign platform in the House that was critical of 
Clinton’s handling of foreign policy, and, in doing so, they singled out the DPRK for special 
concern. When reports of an alleged secret DPRK nuclear weapons site at Kumchang-ni, and 
Pyongyang’s launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong I ballistic missile, in August 1998, emerged, 
the US Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act 1998 requiring the Clinton 
administration to appoint a North Korea Policy Coordinator who would be responsible for 
conducting “a full and complete interagency review of US policy towards North Korea”, and 
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 84
“provide policy direction for negotiations with North Korea related to nuclear weapons, ballistic 
missiles, and other security related issues” (section 582e). In December 1993 Clinton selected 
retired Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman to replace Les Aspin as secretary of defense but he refused 
the offer. Clinton then appointed William J. Perry, deputy secretary of defense under Aspin, for 
the position. 
The resulting report emphasized that it was imperative for the United States to focus on a 
policy aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long-range missile-related activities. 
Although some legislators viewed the provision of economic rewards as inherently giving in to 
North Korean blackmail, the US Congress, through Perry’s report, seemed to advocate a carrots 
strategy. The report recommended a two-path strategy: the complete cessation and the 
containment of threats. The first path would involve the termination of the DPRK’s nuclear 
weapons and long-range ballistic missile programs, in conjunction with the US initiative to 
reduce pressures on the DPRK that the latter perceived as threatening. As the DPRK moved to 
eliminate these programs, South Korea and Japan also promised they would normalize relations 
with the DPRK, relax sanctions, and take other positive steps toward cooperation. Should the 
DPRK not accept this first path, the Perry report briefly mentioned that a second path would 
have the United States, in coordination with its allies, contain the threat (Albright and O’Neill 
2000). Up to the end, the Clinton Administration employed carrots approach in addressing the 
North Korean nuclear threat. 
American Public Opinion 
American political, which tends to fluctuate over time, is also one of the domestic 
constraints, especially as the policies and the strategies of the US are largely affected by public 
opinion. Political participation thus plays an important role in policy making (Jacobs 1997), and 
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the changes in American public opinion often lead to an inconsistency with US foreign policies 
on other rogue countries such as NK, Iran and Iraq (Cha 2002, Sigal 1998). Moreover, the 
differing perspectives within the US on rogue states have led to inconsistent policy formulation 
and implementation. 
According to the Arab American Institute, in the first half of 1994, American polls 
showed that public approval of Clinton's performance in office was a very low 40%; and while 
the public's perception of his work on some foreign policy issues was positive, Clinton's overall 
foreign policy rating was a dismal 34%. In general, there was little US public support for any 
military involvement in the developing world. This was true in the case of Haiti, only 38% 
percent of Americans felt that vital US interests are at stake, and only 45% supported the use of 
force to restore democracy in that country, Bosnia only 31% felt the US has a vital stake, and 
Rwanda only 18% see vital US interests at stake and only 28% favor the introduction of US 
ground troops. However, despite these figures, in the case of the North Korean nuclear threat, the 
American public was in favor of using US troops.25 In a poll by the Pew Research Center for the 
People & the Press released on April 8, 1999, only 29% of the American public said that 
countering the threat of militarism in North Korea should be a top priority. The nuclear issue 
ranked below concerns about US-China relations and managing trade and economic disputes 
with Japan. 
The Clinton administration remained deeply reluctant to utilize any sort of military force, 
and the potential retaliatory options of North Korea were too horrifying to even consider. 
Beyond the obvious threat of nuclear proliferation, the administration also had to consider the 
                                                 
25 In the article, “The Search for Foreign Policy,” James Zogby of Washington Watch discusses the need of the 
Clinton Administration to show off a success to at least one area of foreign policy. Available online at 
http://www.aaiusa.org/wwatch_archives/080194.htm 
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threats of regional instability, terrorism, and international crimes. Moreover, the foreign policy 
establishment feared that direct confrontation with North Korea would not be easy, since it 
would most likely fail to gain the support of regional allies such as Japan, China, Russia and 
South Korea (Zogby 1994). 
Considering the complexity and interdependence of countries in the new global setting, 
nuclear threat does not just affect a country in isolation. Its evils and drawbacks are felt and 
experienced by other countries. Thus, the central thrust of the Clinton strategy was diplomatic 
negotiation, in order to create cooperative security measures around the globe. The United States 
conducted activities such as combined training and exercises, sharing intelligence, systems of 
cooperative research and development programs, and multilateral peace operations, each 
intended to support democracy and prevent conflicts before a need for military intervention 
arises. However, some Americans were tired of promoting international security on moral 
grounds, such as in the form of aid and diplomacy. Moreover, many considered the external 
world as corrupt, and deserving of a harsh policy of force and coercion rather than a more 
peaceful one of diplomacy. 
Still, for other Americans, there were numerous threats to US security, such as the 
possibility of Russia losing control of its nuclear weapons, a rise in nuclear proliferation by 
rogue states, and a potential conflict with China. Because of these fears, Americans preferred to 
strengthen its defense by developing new security mechanisms, such as ballistic defense systems, 
instead of spending their money on foreign aid and diplomacy. Indeed, due to fragmented public 
opinion, the mutual mistrust between the US and North Korea hindered a diplomatic resolution 
of the case (Sigal 1998). 
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Although the NPT was viewed as successful in establishing a norm against nuclear 
proliferation (Bunn 1994), it faced significant problems as to why the Clinton administration 
dismissed the role of the international regime in resolving the North Korean nuclear threats. 
First, the public regarded it as discriminatory because it divided the world into those who had 
nuclear weapons and those who had not. Likewise, the labeling of rogue states elicited debates 
among the public, resulting to fragmented public opinion. The second problem is a perceived 
failure of reciprocity that encouraged leaders of non-nuclear weapons states to question why they 
should hold to their end of the agreement when nuclear weapons states had not held to their end. 
Third, there was a perceived inconsistency of the international norm (Wessels 1995: 50), in that 
the intention of the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT, and the removal of the IAEA, disproved 
the importance of these entities to the Clinton administration. With this, as well as the associated 
public dimension doubting the effectiveness of the role of the NPT and the IAEA, the Clinton 
administration proceeded on its own in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem. 
Bureaucratic Constraints 
The limitations connected in the policy-making process is further complicated by the 
implementation constraints of disagreements and the lack of cooperation and coordination 
between various executive agencies, such as the Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and 
Commerce; the ACDA; the intelligence community; and the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) – which are all involved in the formulation and implementation of 
nonproliferation policy. Each department had their own role in the implementation of the policies 
of Clinton, and, as such, the coordination and cooperation of each department was needed in 
order for the implementation process to be efficient. For instance, the National Security Council 
is the hub of nonproliferation policy, while the State Department, in consultation with the Energy 
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Department and ACDA, negotiates U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation and represents U.S. 
nonproliferation interests with other states and international organizations such as the IAEA (US 
Department of State, 1995), and the Department of Defense is responsible for 
counterproliferation strategy and policy (US Department of Defense 1996). 
The Department of Energy provides expertise in nuclear weapons to support 
nonproliferation policy and diplomacy, largely through its national laboratories. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission licenses nuclear exports subject to concurrence by the Department of 
State. The Department of Commerce oversees licensing of dual-use exports, as mandated by 
Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, which requires controls on "all export 
items, other than those licensed by the NRC, which could be, if used for purposes other than 
those for which the export is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes." The CIA 
has a Nonproliferation Center that coordinates intelligence aspects of nonproliferation policy. 
The ACDA is responsible for nonproliferation diplomacy such as extending the NPT and 
negotiating certain agreements (US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 1994). 
However, the strategy of engagement and enlargement resulted to a restructuring and 
retrenchment of military capabilities in all agencies of the government. Despite the objections by 
military officers, defense contractors and other key players, defense budget cuts were 
implemented, partly due the decline in its value as a percentage of GNP, in dollar terms, and to 
the shift in the national security perspective. All these budget cuts were developed under 
Secretary Les Aspin’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 
According to Held and McGrew (1998), these reviews aimed at ensuring that the United States 
retain its military dominance and its strategic edge in the on-going military technological 
revolution brought about by the information age (219-242). In addition to the budget cuts, 
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military force levels were reduced and re-deployed, and procurement programs cut. 
Bureaucratic problems had been evident at the start of the Clinton administration. For 
some top officials, the policy approach was seen as a sure loser in dealing with North Korea, yet, 
rather than attempt to redefine ends and means, they avoided tough choices (Sigal 1998). For 
instance, nuclear diplomacy was the subject of only three Principals' Committee meetings in all 
of 1993, and many observed what seemed to be a gaping void at the top levels of the bureaucracy 
(Sigal 1998; Cronin 1994; Berry 1995). Thus, with no one at the top in charge, American 
diplomatic strategy can be characterized as one of drift, punctuated by spasms of zigzagging. 
State Department officials, for instance, commented that the lack of regard to the field troops 
reflected a problem in the implementation strategy of Clinton’s policy. Thus, taken together, 
these problems made the Clinton policy of look like a series of ad hoc improvisations without 
any organizing concept (Cronin 1994). 
This was illustrated by the reluctance of then National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to 
put together a diplomatic deal that North Korea might find acceptable (Sigal 1998). Indeed, Lake 
saw himself more as a ‘policy broker’ than a ‘policy entrepreneur’ in this case. Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, who was acutely sensitive to hawkish pressures, also steered clear of 
seizing the diplomatic initiative. The conflicts within the bureaucracy during the beginning of the 
Clinton administration shows that there had been a problem in the coordination among the 
implementing arm of the North Korean policy. Indeed, the reluctance of senior officials to take 
charge of effectively dealing with the North Korean crisis, or even to promote deal-making in 
public, was perhaps the most telling evidence of the politics of the problem. The organizational 
interests, the main motive in bureaucratic politics explanations, also predisposed most 
government agencies against a deal with North Korea (Sagan and Waltz 1995: 37; Lake 1994: 
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46), though the armed services were a partial but critically important exception. 
The above conflict continued on Clinton’s second term. The State Department had an 
interest in maintaining good relations by cooperating with other governments. Yet cooperation 
with North Korea was not a concern of the State Department, since the US did not have relations 
with the DPRK (Sigal 1998). Instead, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs was mainly 
concerned about maintaining good relations with ally South Korea. The State Department also 
had an interest in negotiating with other governments. That interest led it to insist on conducting 
negotiations on behalf of the United States. It did not necessarily incline the department to favor 
negotiations, especially when officials believed that talks would be fruitless, or worse, when they 
felt the other side would take advantage of talks to pursue its nuclear ambitions (Lake 1994: 46).  
To nonproliferation specialists in the State Department and especially in ACDA, 
preventing proliferation was seen as synonymous with preserving and protecting the prerogatives 
of the IAEA. Nonproliferation specialists in the Pentagon, however, defined their interests 
differently. They were preoccupied with preventing NK from producing any more plutonium or 
diverting what it had to weapons production, and their difference in outlook led them to take 
opposing stands at interagency meetings (Sanger 1994: A9; Sagan and Waltz 1995: 37). The CIA 
lacked good sources of political intelligence on North Korea. The CIA did not have agents in 
Pyongyang with access to top political authorities or affiliates of its nuclear program. Nor did it 
have extensive intelligence liaison with South Korea, which could have biased its assessments 
(Sagan and Waltz 1995: 37). Nor did it place much confidence in other human intelligence 
sources. Less explicably, analysts were also discouraged from talking to North Korean diplomats 
and visitors, or to academics who studied North Korea. All of this made the CIA especially 
dependent on national technical means. 
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The diagram below provides a simplification of the domestic constraints that effected 
Clinton’s policy towards North Korea. 
Figure 2. Impact of Domestic Constraints on Clinton’s Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure indicates that, of the original strategies employed by the administration, only 
the policy of the inclusion of the international regime was changed. Note that this is not to say 
that other domestic constraints that have been taken under consideration did not impact Clinton’s 
policies; it only shows that the Clinton administration was generally unmoved by these factors 
despite their crucial roles. It can be surmised that the Clinton administration did not resolve the 
North Korean nuclear threat because it resisted the influential domestic factors. 
Systemic Constraints on U.S. Foreign Policy  
Systemic constraints in the Clinton administration consisted largely of one factor: the 
lack of cooperation and consistency between the US and its partners such as South Korea, China, 
Japan and Russia. The differences have been in the policy orientation of each of the countries, 
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their program for action, and the inability of the countries to cooperate. Table 2 summarizes the 
systemic constraints faced by the Clinton administration.26 
Table 3. Systemic Constraints (Clinton Administration) 
Variables Constraints 
 
 
 
 
Inconsistencies between US and 
other foreign policies on NK  
 
• The US failed to get the full confidence of South Korea, 
Japan, China and Russia 
• The South Korean government called on the Clinton 
administration to avoid unilateral concessions to North 
Korea 
• In the face of a hardening US attitude, South Korea 
appeared to seek a softer line 
• Although the Japanese government fully shared American 
concerns, it was reluctant to go along with the US threats 
to impose economic sanctions on North Korea 
• Japan strongly preferred an approach emphasizing 
diplomacy 
• China opposed the introduction of harsh measures against 
the DPRK in order to preserve its self-interest on North 
Korea 
• In dealing with North Korea's nuclear intransigence, 
Russia preferred to prevent any unilateral American move 
 
Differing US and NK 
philosophies regarding nuclear 
programs 
• US viewed North Korean nuclear program as a bargaining 
chip  
• North Korea viewed its nuclear program as a means to 
defend itself from foreign adversaries 
While each of these actors broadly shared United States concerns and goals, each 
preferred different variants of a low-key approach, for various reasons. Indeed, policy options of 
the Clinton Administration were limited because economic, political and military approaches 
were severely hindered by the failure of cooperation between each of the actors.  
Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia 
A major difficulty facing the Clinton Administration had been its inability to build 
sufficient domestic and international confidence necessary for implementing their initiatives. The 
                                                 
26 The following sources were used to construct the table on the systemic constraints of the Clinton Administration: 
Cronin (1994), Fisher (1994), Jones (1993), Khalilzad, Davis and Shulsky (1993), Kim (1998), Kucia (2003), Lukin 
(2003), Oh and Hassid (2000), Sanger (1993, 1994), Telenko (2003), and Wheeler (2003). 
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refusal to support American efforts to isolate North Korea had been very embarrassing to the 
Clinton administration, and raised questions about its ability to play a leadership role in 
international affairs. Failures such as this had led some to suggest that Clinton has turned former 
President Theodore Roosevelt's maxim of speaking softly but carrying a big stick around to 
talking tough and carrying no stick at all (Zogby 1994). The political stakes attributed to the 
failure of diplomacy in reining-in Pyongyang's nuclear program could raise or intensify several 
sensitive defense issues between the US and other countries, especially Japan and South Korea, 
and, moreover, could potentially jeopardize US global nonproliferation objectives. In a report to 
the US Congress in 1994, it was found that one of the factors contributing to the outcome of US 
policy on North Korea was the inability of the administration to forge cooperation between the 
United States and other countries (Cronin, 1994). 
The Clinton Administration’s policy of engagement and containment started to look 
vulnerable, as evidenced by the reluctance of the Japanese government to cooperate with the US 
(Kim 1998: 116-135). Instead, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) started to 
contemplate whether to renew its support of the NPT after it expired in 1995 (Jones 1993: 4). 
This was aggravated by the pronouncements of then Foreign Minister Kabun Muto that Japan 
was also entertaining thoughts of building its own nuclear program if necessary (Washington 
Post July 29, 1993: A18; Japan Times Weekly International January 31-February 6, 1994: 5). 
This pronouncement, together with Japan’s indecision, made it quite clear that the United States 
had yet to gain the full confidence and cooperation of one of its key allies, in its quest to resolve 
the North Korean nuclear threat (Kim 1998: 116-135). A diplomatic failure could also potentially 
affect negotiations on other issues, such as the future powers of the IAEA, and the means of 
ensuring compliance when individual signatory nations violate their obligations under the treaty. 
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While the South Korean government had preferred a policy of diplomatic engagement 
rather than the use of force, this position contained several inconsistencies. The South Korean 
government, under President Kim Young Sam, had several important but conflicting concerns 
about the US and the international response to the North Korean nuclear program (Cronin 1994).  
For instance, President Kim warned publicly in June 1993—a period of active US consultation 
regarding possible initiatives on North Korea— that the Clinton Administration should avoid 
unilateral concessions to the North. Ironically, in the face of a hardening US attitude, South 
Korea appeared to seek a softer line (Sanger 1994: A8). In early and mid-February of 1994, in 
the midst of a dispute between Pyongyang and the IAEA over the scope of a one-time inspection 
of its declared nuclear facilities, the Kim government sought to quell calls for economic 
sanctions. After the DPRK agreed, on February 15, to the IAEA's terms for a one-time 
inspection, Seoul indicated its reluctance about the deployment of US Patriot missiles. President 
Kim and his cabinet also associated themselves with a softer line during high-level visits to 
Japan and China in late March, emphasizing the need for continued diplomacy rather than 
sanctions or other pressures. 
In mid-April the same year, in an apparent effort to induce North Korea to allow the 
IAEA to complete an inspection of its reprocessing facility, the Kim government reversed course 
over the contentious issue of whether envoys needed to be exchanged between the North and 
South as a precondition for further high-level talks between Washington and Pyongyang (Smith 
1994a: A13; Smith 1994b: A22). The shift in South Korean policy toward the DPRK was 
frustrating to American negotiators and officials, though while there were many instances of 
these policy swings, in general, when the Clinton administration had taken a tougher position, 
the South Koreans simply urged caution and vice versa. 
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In the United States-Japan case, the Japanese government fully shared American 
concerns about a nuclear-armed North Korea, but was reluctant to go along with American 
threats of imposing economic sanctions on the North (Kim 1998: 116-135). Instead, while Japan 
sought to maintain solidarity with the United States on the issue, it strongly preferred an 
approach emphasizing patient diplomacy. Japan's cautious stance, and similar reluctance about 
confrontation on the part of South Korea, had been major factors in the Clinton administration 
policy shifts on the issue of seeking UN sanctions (Sanger 1993: 6). Many analysts judged that 
Japan would have little choice but to support economic sanctions or other measures regardless of 
the politics of the issue, and it was reported that Japan and the United States already discussed 
and came to agreement on the role that Japan would play, including, by implication, a cutoff of 
remittances from ethnic Koreans (FBIS, 1994: 7-8). Nonetheless, a move to impose sanctions 
under the guise of UN Security Council authority probably would have provoked a political 
crisis, and any effort to impose sanctions outside the UN framework, or involve Japanese Self-
Defense Forces could have created a more serious crisis. 
Some observers believed that, while the Clinton Administration lacked good short-term 
options to rein in North Korea's nuclear program, the long-term outlook appeared to be more 
optimistic, because of the regime's impending implosion (Sanger, 1993: 6). Indeed, according to 
some press analysis, the option of waiting out North Korea may have been the real 
administration strategy (Cronin, 1994). The expectation of collapse was also said to be one 
reason for South Korean and Japanese "timidity” (Khalilzad, Davis and Shulsky 1993: 3; Sanger 
1993: 6). This option of waiting out conformed most closely to the preferred course of China and 
to a number of Japanese political leaders. 
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China's support was arguably been even more important than Japan's, but it had 
contradictions with the Clinton Administration’s policy. Although China did not want nuclear 
weapons on the Korean peninsula, it also had opposed the introduction of harsh measures against 
the DPRK. This policy was partly explained by the argument that China had historically opposed 
actions which could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of other states. From a 
strategic point of view, Chinese officials understood that the DPRK risked military confrontation 
on the peninsula, and could prompt South Korea, Japan and possibly even Taiwan to develop 
nuclear weapons—greatly complicating China's security and diverting attention and resources 
away from Beijing's top priority – economic modernization. Beijing appeared to be in a 
dilemma, however, as to what to do about it. China’s reluctance to apply sharp economic and 
political pressure on North Korea was largely because, apart from any remaining sense of 
socialist solidarity, Beijing would be highly disturbed by the prospect of a military conflict in a 
neighboring area. Beijing also felt a need to keep communication lines with North Korea open, 
which they viewed as being critical to maintaining Chinese influence on the peninsula and 
helping to preserve peace there. Beijing therefore wanted to avoid sanctions that would require 
cutting off Chinese supplies of food, oil and other goods. Beijing also wanted to preserve its 
special channels of communication with the North Korean Army and Party—elements of power 
likely to be pivotal in determining the leadership succession in Pyongyang following the death of 
Kim Il Sung. 
Russia, on the other hand, believed that North Korea was not capable of producing 
nuclear weapons, and was suspicious that the state was using its nuclear program as a bargaining 
chip (Lukin, 2003: 1).  By joining its voice with the US condemnation of North Korea's nuclear 
weapons program, Russia made a mid-course correction of its policy toward the Korean 
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peninsula that was designed to preserve its influence. Russian scholar Alexander Lukin (2003: 1) 
posited four reasons why Moscow was in a good position to help bring about a peaceful 
settlement with North Korea. First, he argues that Russia's permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council put it in a position to influence international action on North Korean WMD. Second, 
Russia had provided the DPRK with its most effective conventional weapons. Third, Russia's 
proximity to the peninsula like China’s legitimized its concern over a US war in the region, and 
Moscow or Beijing could block a war if they thought it was too threatening to their own security. 
Finally, all sides believed that a gradual, peaceful unification of the peninsula was essential to 
the prospects of an economically viable Korean state. Based on their common interests, Lukin 
(2003: 1) argued that North Korea should accept a multilateral framework for negotiations that 
included Russia, and that in doing so would begin a successful push toward peace and 
nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula. 
In dealing with North Korea's nuclear intransigence, Russia would prefer to prevent any 
unilateral American move and so found itself on the side of South Korea, Japan and China. 
Korea was an important field in Russia's international strategy, both before and during the Soviet 
period. In the first half of the 1990s, a relative loss of interest towards the Far East and in Asia in 
general—caused by the one-sided pro-Western orientation of the Kremlin—gradually gave way 
to a more balanced approach, a change that naturally influenced Moscow's Korea policy, and its 
resulting pragmatic policy towards both Koreas can be attributed to several general factors 
(Kucia 2003). First, few in the Kremlin doubted that the North Korean regime was historically 
doomed. Though they understood that it might take five, ten or fifteen years, they believed it 
would disappear sooner or later from the world political map, and a new and united Korea would 
emerge as Russia's neighbor. South Korea, a country much more populous and developed than 
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the DPRK, would surely be its core. 
North Korea's insistence on dealing only with Washington on the issue seemed 
unreasonable to Moscow, since they believed that any American security guarantees made to 
Pyongyang could hardly be of great value. It was widely recognized that China, and to a lesser 
extent Russia, were the countries which could press the DPRK to fulfill any agreement reached 
with the United States. But China and Russia were also the only countries that could give 
Pyongyang formidable security guarantees against the United States, as through the shared 
border with North Korea, Russia and China could effectively prevent a US military action in 
North Korea if they thought it was unreasonable and too dangerous. 
To summarize, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia were all opposed for the reasons 
listed above to Clinton’s bilateral approach, and instead argued that it was in the best interest of 
all if the administration adopted multilateral negotiations.  Moreover, these powers did not 
support American plans for imposing economic sanctions on the DPRK, but rather argued that 
economic rewards would provide a more effective strategy in resolving the North Korean nuclear 
threat, and advocated diplomacy to preserve their own interests in the region. Finally, it can be 
said that the Clinton Administration might have dismissed the help of the NPT and the IAEA 
because of the pressures from each of these countries. 
The Kim Regime 
The DPRK is the most secretive, xenophobic and militaristic country in the world, and 
because its actions are often shrouded in mystery, much ambiguity surrounds North Korea’s 
intentions and capabilities, including important details concerning its nuclear weapons program 
(International Crisis Group 2003). Indeed, this may be the reason why most outsiders associate 
uncertainty with the DPRK. The DPRK’s official ideology is “Juche,” which translates to a 
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“combination of national self-reliance and Korean nationalism” (Oh and Hassig 2000: 15). To 
the few visitors allowed into the country, the DPRK seems like an Orwellian society that time 
forgot (International Crisis Group 2003). 
The role of Kim Il Sung in the North Korean stance of US policy—in addition to the 
significant loss of economic, military and international political support from China and Russia, 
as well as the normalization of diplomatic relations between Seoul and China, and the rapidly 
growing trade and investment ties between China and South Korea—is the most important factor 
in the stance of NK on US policies. These developments appear to have led to two broad 
responses by the secretive, Stalinist regime of President Kim Il Sung, who had headed the state 
since 1948. The first was been a cautious effort to imitate some aspects of China's economic 
reforms, in order to shore up declining living standards, check any tendencies towards popular or 
elite discontent, and increase hard currency earnings. The second response—the main focus of 
the current confrontation—appears to be the continued and accelerated development of North 
Korea's nuclear programs and its development of ballistic missile capabilities. 
Wendy Sherman, a former State Department counselor and adviser to Clinton and then-
secretary of state Madeleine Albright, told the US Institute for Peace that the Clinton 
administration concluded that the Kim regime was not about to collapse.  According to the US 
House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare (TFTUW), 
leadership in North Korea would consistently refuse to give up nuclear weapons, no matter how 
many agreements it might enter into with the US. One defector, Kang Myong-To, stated that 
North Korea's nuclear development was not intended as a bargaining chip, but a means to 
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preserve Kim Jong-Il's regime,27 Yossef Bodansky, the TFTUW director, has commented that 
"Nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance policy of the ruling elite" in the DPRK.28 According 
to General Leon J. LaPorte, Commander of American Forces in Korea, Kim Jong-il is firmly in 
control of power, and that, “He [Kim Jong-Il] is the ultimate decision-maker who controls the 
state security apparatus and occupies all key party, military and government leadership 
positions…Kim’s overriding goal is regime survival” (International Crisis Group 2003: 2). 
For some time the stated long term strategy of the Clinton Administration was to 
negotiate a comprehensive settlement of Korean peninsula issues, in which North Korea's 
acceptance of inspections would be matched by new political, economic and security overtures 
on the part of the US. The agreement between the two countries dictated that the United States 
would not use force in resolving the nuclear situation, and that it would not meddle with the 
internal situation in North Korea (Cronin 1994). North Korea, in turn, would allow the IAEA to 
conduct a one-time inspection of Pyongyang's seven declared sites to replace film and batteries 
in cameras, and to reestablish the continuity of the inspections regime. The primary reason for 
the breakdown of the negotiation can be traced to the differing interpretations of the two 
countries on the agreement (Fisher 1994: 4-5), where, for instance, North Korea alleged that the 
IAEA went beyond what has been agreed with the United States (Sanger 1994: A8). 
Indeed, the success of Clinton’s policy of engagement towards North Korea was largely 
undermined by North Korea’s concern for its own survival, in that it feared the possibility of a 
German-style absorption by South Korea, as well as the possibility of US aggression. Thus, 
                                                 
27 Telenko, Trent. 2003. “North Korea: Clinton Knew…And ‘Kicked the Can Anyway.’” 
http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/north_korea_clinton_knewand_kicked_the_can_anyway-print.php (May 29, 
2005). 
 
28 Wheeler, Scott L. 2003. “Clinton Ignored Kim Jong-il's Nukes.” 
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=342934 (July 3, 2004). 
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despite economic constraints, it chose to develop and have the appearance of developing nuclear 
weapons. While North Korea recognized the need for reform in order to survive, it feared that 
opening up its borders would cause internal instability and weaken its own political position. 
Being unable to compete through only conventional weapons, North Korea focused on 
developing weapons of mass destruction to gain upper hand. As a result, the country was able to 
threaten South Korea, China and other neighbor states, and, moreover, force the United States to 
provide economic concessions. 
With regards to the approach employed by the Clinton Administration, the DPRK had 
favored bilateral negotiations. Through a succession of bilateral talks, the United States and 
North Korea entered into the Agreed Framework, which provided economic rewards to North 
Korea if it were to freeze all its nuclear activities. As the negotiations were going positively 
between the United States and North Korea, the administration continued to engage in bilateral 
talks and employ diplomacy through economic support. In relation to the international regime, 
when the Kim regime was beginning to lose confidence and trust with the NPT and the IAEA, 
and eventually withdrew from the NPT, the Clinton Administration used this situation to exclude 
the international regime from its policy. The diagram below is an oversimplification of systemic 
constraints faced by the Clinton Administration in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem, 
and their impact on the implementation of Clinton’s policy. 
Figure 3. Impact of Systemic Constraints on Clinton’s Policy  
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As can be gleaned from Figure 2 (Impact of Domestic Constraints on Clinton’s Policy), 
Figure 3 shows that only the Clinton Administration’s policy on the inclusion of the international 
regime was changed. Note that this does not mean that these systemic had no impact on 
Clinton’s policies. The Clinton Administration was firm on its stand, despite the impacts of these 
variables. 
Synthesis 
The Clinton Administration entered office in January 1993 almost completely unprepared 
for dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis. Clinton had been elected on a platform 
emphasizing the domestic economy, but he inherited a diplomatic strategy that would determine 
the success of his administration’s foreign policies. In an attempt to resolve the crisis, the Clinton 
Administration preferred a tough bilateral inspection regime, but had failed. A second, 
alternative strategy, the use of diplomacy and economic rewards instead of military force and 
economic sanctions had generated debates, as the approach was perceived by many as appeasing 
the Kim regime. The third choice, the IAEA, had succeeded in uncovering evidence of DPRK 
cheating, but was unable to force the state to come clean about its nuclear activities, thus the 
abandonment by the Clinton Administration of the international regime. Table 4 below outlines 
the shift of Clinton’s policy on North Korea. 
 In its foreign policy towards North Korea, the United States failed to consider the regime 
characteristics of North Korea, as well as the power relations in the region. Clinton’s policies 
often seemed to take the form of experimentation, shifting only when they failed to attain support 
from regional powers. As both the extent to which Kim Jong Il has consolidated power, and 
military check on his authority remained in question, the Clinton Administration was only able to 
guess about the ability of Kim Jong II to influence the North Korean reaction to US policy, 
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whether diplomatic or military. It also failed to give careful consideration to the primary 
objective and motivation of North Korea in developing nuclear weapons, which is regime 
security.  
Table 4. Clinton’s North Korean Nuclear Policy 
Variables Beginning End 
Type of Negotiation Bilateral Bilateral 
Sanctions/Rewards 
(Statecrafts) Carrot (Economic, Diplomatic) Carrot (Economic, Diplomatic) 
Role of International Regime Major Minor 
North Korea’s leverage in negotiation did not come from its negotiation tactics or from 
the danger posed by its economic programs and economic situations, but rather, it mainly derives 
from its geopolitical conditions. It successfully used uncertainty, ambiguity and unpredictability 
and traditional blackmail as its key strategy. On the one hand, the United States should have seen 
that the current economic condition of North Korea would deter it from going to war, and risk 
faster self-destruction. The United States, instead of threatening military and economic sanctions, 
should have initiated a cooperative relationship from the very start, and should have considered 
the North Korean desire for political and regime stability.  North Korea issued similar threats of 
war and used brinkmanship tactics to get what it wanted, the Agreed Framework of 1994. The 
United States needs to be more sensitive to the security concerns and economic motivations of 
North Korea. The administration should have understood that North Korea would accept change 
only if it could guarantee security for the regime, and it should inquire as to the reason for North 
Korea’s apprehension towards a United States-led attack.  Also, the Clinton administration 
should have understood Pyongyang’s doubts as to the stability of the regime if it decided to 
initiate reform and open up the country.   
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 In relation to the internal characteristics of the target state, the United States should have 
determined the conditions of which there are two that would make target states seek engagement 
to the United States. The first condition arises in a state of economic crisis that threatens a ruling 
regime. In the case of Pyongyang, Kim II Sung’s decision to initiate a limited opening to the 
West was based on North Korea’s worsening economic problem. The gravity of the situation in 
North Korea, the economic contractions and the food and energy shortages, made it realized its 
need for normalized diplomatic relations with other countries, especially the United States, for its 
regime’s survival. These economic hardships allowed other countries to engage North Korea in 
diplomatic relations with the hope that North Korea would eventually open up and initiate 
democratic reforms. Aside from economic crisis, national security concerns, which provide the 
second condition, could also induce a diplomatically isolated state to seek engagement. To 
ensure security, countries are often willing to work with each other to deter possible threats of 
aggression. The narrow containment policy towards Iraq, for example, was not aimed solely to 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein or to the collapse of his regime. As for the case of North 
Korea, the United States has been able to create a small coalition of countries with the shared 
policy objective of ending the North Korean threat. 
 It should be observed that both conditions, security and economic constraints, are 
worsened by the isolation of North Korea. However, the United States learned that it cannot 
always push isolation by the use of economic and military sanctions and closing up on the 
country. In the case of North Korea, instead of isolating the country and further exacerbating its 
internal economic and security conditions, the Clinton Administration found the utility of taking 
advantage of Pyongyang’s current problems through engagement. However, the Clinton 
Administration’s failure to achieve a consensus among the other major powers which is relevant 
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to create a successful multilateral relation only weakened the probability of success for its 
policies. The credibility and effectiveness of international economic rewards and sanctions 
depend on the willingness of states to effectively impose them, though each country’s choice of 
imposing economic sanctions depends on the country alone. While the United States can make 
attempts to pressure them, it obviously cannot use force because it will defeat the purpose of 
diplomatic cooperation. Indeed, a key problem lies with the fact that Asian governments tend to 
adopt a different policy choice from the Unite States. When Clinton adopted an aggressive 
approach, other countries, especially China, disapproved for fear of initiating a major conflict. 
On the other hand, when the administration decided to pursue a diplomatic stance, it received 
criticism from South Korea for lacking the firmness necessary to curtail North Korean efforts for 
nuclear weapons development. 
The signing of the bilateral agreement, the Agreed Framework, between North Korea and 
the United States induced cooperation among major powers. However, in doing so, it left out 
China and Russia, two of the central regional actors. Under the agreement, the leadership for the 
Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the organization responsible for funding the 
oil supplies and construction of reactors for North Korea, is American, while Japan, South Korea 
and other countries agreed to provide most of the funds. China and Russia were only invited as 
ordinary members because they did not contribute funds, an action putting them in an 
embarrassing situation, thus they declined the invitation. It should be noted that after the event, 
China expressed willingness to support the Agreed Framework, though Russia, on the other 
hand, expressed disappointment for the exclusion. The other major criticism of the Clinton 
Administration was over its failure to gain support from its own domestic institutions. As noted 
above, the administration was in a constant struggle with Congress over the issue. It received 
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consistent criticism from the public and local institutions, whose interests were different from 
Clinton’s policy priorities. Moreover, these domestic institutions and the public held Clinton 
responsible for the weakening of the US defense by cutting defense spending. For them, priority 
should be given to the strengthening of US defense instead of giving away foreign aid and 
engaging to diplomatic relations, and thus leaving the Unite States vulnerable to external 
aggression. Finally, Clinton’s choice of bilateral diplomacy towards North Korea was widely 
criticized as a show of weakness by the administration. 
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CHAPTER IV: SYSTEMIC AND DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS IN SECOND BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
POLICY ON NORTH KOREA 
 
From the beginning of the Bush administration, it has shown its deviation from the 
Clinton administration’s North Korean policy: Bush adopted a conservative internationalist 
approach, as opposed to the liberal internationalist approach of Clinton.  Bush demanded that 
North Korea destroy its nuclear weapons as a precondition to resuming talks with Pyongyang.  
Bush used a multilateral approach without ruling out economic and military sanctions and 
employed a hard line approach to North Korea.29  The main components of Bush’s policy 
include: (1) terminating the Agreed Framework; (2) no negotiations with North Korea until it 
dismantles its nuclear program; (3) assembling an international coalition to apply economic 
pressure on North Korea; (4) planning for future economic sanctions and military interdiction 
against North Korea; and (5) warning North Korea not to reprocess nuclear weapons-grade 
plutonium, and asserting that "all options are open," including military options (Niksch 2003: ii).  
As the previous chapter examined how domestic and systemic constraints affected 
Clinton’s North Korean policy, this chapter shall illustrate the domestic and systemic constraints 
that the Bush Administration has struggled against. As with the Clinton policy, it can be argued 
that because of these limitations and constraints, a similar policy approach will be adopted by the 
Bush Administration. The illustration below will be used as a framework for analysis on this 
chapter.  
                                                 
29 The following sources were used in this study to construct the Bush Foreign Policy on the North Korean nuclear 
crisis: Carlson (2003), Cha (2002), Choi (2003), Diehl (2002), Fein (2003), George W. Bush Administration Policy 
Toward North Korea (2004), Heginbotham (2003), Kerr (2003), Koh (2003), Koppel and Labbot (2001), 
LaMontagne (2002), Lee and Feffer (2004), Niksch (2003), Pollack (2001), Sherman (2002), Perry (2001), Conachy 
(2001), Gross (2001, 2001). 
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Figure 4. Framework for Analysis (Bush Administration) 
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domestic constraints that challenged the initial policy and strategy formation of the Bush 
administration. Specifically, domestic constraints such as the opposition in the Congress, the lack 
of military power and the attitude of the United States on North Korea will be evaluated. 
Moreover, the systemic constraints, which include the problem of the United States to form a 
solid cooperation among its allies such as South Korea and Japan, and China and Russia, are 
assessed. Finally the role and attitudes of the Kim Jong-Il regime will be analyzed.  
Figure 4 shows that the Bush Administration was besieged by both domestic and 
systemic constraints from the moment it started to formulate its policies and implementation 
strategies. Clearly, the rationale behind the previous administration’s foreign policies was 
rejected by the current administration. Moreover, even from the decision to choose its policy 
instruments such as multilateralism, sticks, use of military, the administration was hounded by 
domestic and systemic constraints. 
Bush Administration’s Initial Policy on North Korea30  
The Bush administration set up a new foundation for its relationship with North Korea. 
When George W. Bush took office in January 2001, the hard line position toward North Korea 
has been expected (Il-whan 2002: 3-20) given the administration’s highly skeptical view of prior 
US policy initiatives toward Pyongyang (Pollack 2001: 6; Sherman 2002).31 Bush issued a 
statement on June 6, 2001, outlining the United States’ new policy objectives over North Korea's 
                                                 
30 The researcher found an abundance of literature about the Bush Administration’s initial foreign policy on North 
Korea. Some of the important articles and books include: Adkins (2003), Bunn (2003), Carlson (2003), Conachy 
(2001, 2004), Diehl (2002), East Asia Review (Autumn 2002), Fein (2003), Heginbotham (2003), Kerr (2003), 
Koppel and King (2002), Koppel and Labbot (2001), Lea (2001), Lee (2003), Faiola and Cody (2004), Hoagland 
(2003), Hwang (2002), Kucia (2003), Kurtz (2003), LaMontagne (2002, Lew (2004), Niksch (2001), Perry (2001), 
Pickett (2004), Pickett and Purnell (2004), Pollack (2001), Scheinman (2000), Sherman (2002), and Sokolski 
(2002). 
  
31 It should be noted that at the time, some Washington observers believed that the new administration was simply 
trying to create some distance from Clinton’s legacy of successes in US-NK relations before launching its own 
policy of engagement (Lee 2003).   
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nuclear and missile program and its conventional forces. Bush stated that if North Korea took 
positive actions in response to his policy, the United States "will expand our efforts to help the 
North Korean people, ease sanctions and take other political steps" (Niksch 2001: 1). The Bush 
Administration's policy sought to curtail even the conventional elements of North Korean 
military power, and to secure absolute US hegemony in Northeast Asia.  
In March 2001, the Bush administration publicly cast doubt on the Sunshine Policy, 
insisting on the necessity of a policy review before further Unite States-North Korea negotiations 
could take place. Furthermore, Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly referred to the 
Pyongyang regime as “untrustworthy” and branded Kim Jong II a “dictator,” thus angering the 
North Korean regime (Lea 2001). Consequently, the US-NK relations that had progressed 
rapidly toward the end of the Clinton administration ended in a standoff (Adkins 2003; Bunn 
2003; Conachy 2004; Il-whan 2002; Kerr 2003; Faiola and Cody 2004: A14; Hoagland 2003: 
B7; Hwang 2002; Kurtz 2003; Lew 2004; Pickett 2004; Scheinman 2000).     
While still in the government, advocates of the Agreed Framework sensed early on that 
Bush did not show any positive incentives to cooperate or acquiesce (Sokolski 2002). The Bush 
Administration began to stress American global leadership and national interests, and its foreign 
policy was largely molded on the Republicans’ traditional diplomatic and security policy 
ideology of American internationalism, which includes the possible use of force. Indeed, this 
hard line approach was expressed on January 26, 2001, when Powell met with Japanese 
Secretary of State Yohei Kono for talks, and commented that the US policy toward North Korea 
would be based on “raw reality” (Il-whan 2002: 3-20). The Bush administration, after some 
preliminary steps which included an internal policy review, visit to Seoul by Undersecretary 
Richard L. Armitage, and coordination through the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group 
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(TCOG) among South Korea, the US, and Japan, released its policy outline toward North Korea 
in a presidential statement (Il-whan 2002) on June 6, 2001. This proposed three agenda priorities, 
including: (1) stepped-up efforts by NK to implement the Geneva Agreed Framework, (2) 
verifiable deterrence and an export ban on missiles, and (3) the gradual elimination of 
conventional weapons (Statement of the President, June 6, 2001). In addition, the statement 
announced that if the DPRK reacted positively, the US would provide economic assistance, and 
propose a comprehensive package to improve bilateral relations (Kerr 2003).On June 13, 2001, 
working-level talks took place in New York between Jack Pritchard, the United States special 
envoy for Korea Peace Talks, and Ri Hyong-chul, the North Korean ambassador to the UN. In 
this talk, Ri strongly criticized the hostile US policy, and demanded compensation for lost 
electricity, 50% material compensation for losses suffered due to halted missile exports, and the 
withdrawal of US forces stationed in South Korea (Lea 2001).  The North Korean ministry 
announced that the three-point agenda put forth by the Bush Administration was unilateral and 
hostile in nature, and argued that it was nothing but a plot to disarm NK (Lea 2001).   
The Bush Administration’s decision to adopt a policy of strict reciprocity has had a 
negative impact on prospects for Unite States –North Korea talks.  Furthermore, the strong 
rhetoric and hard-line foreign policy approach of the Bush Administration not only limited North 
and South Koreas’ ability to take a leading role in resolving Korean peninsula issues, but also 
damaged the improved relations between the Unite States and North Korea that had begun to 
emerge at the end of the Clinton Administration (Il-whan 2002). 
Since the release of the US policy review on North Korea in June 2001, the Bush 
Administration has linked meetings with Pyongyang to discuss missiles and nuclear weapons and 
other issues, including conventional forces and the country’s human rights record (Conachy 
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2001; Gross 2001; Kerr 2003; Koppel and Labbot 2001; Perry 2001; LaMontagne 2002).  
Pyongyang reacted violently to these proposed agenda, alleging that Washington officials were 
only trying to set a unilateral agenda for the talks, and declared that none of Bush’s proposals 
were acceptable (Lea 2001). 
On May 2002, Bush submitted to the Senate the additional protocol to the US-IAEA 
nuclear safeguards agreement.  In his message to the senate, Bush urged early and favorable 
consideration of the agreement (Pickett and Purnell 2004), and stressed that the central goal of 
his nuclear proliferation policy is its universal adoption (Kucia 2003).  While the original 
protocol was signed in 1998, the new protocol allows the IAEA to conduct short-notice or 
immediate inspections, and employ new environmental-sampling and satellite-monitoring 
techniques at any suspect site. Furthermore, the protocol required states to provide the IAEA 
with any additional information about aspects of their civilian nuclear programs, such as fuel-
cycle activity and nuclear-related exports. In actuality, the US ratification of the protocol 
primarily served to set a good example for those states that have yet to sign or ratify it. In March 
2002, China notified the IAEA that it had completed its ratification of the protocol, thus 
becoming the only NPT nuclear-weapon state whose agreement has entered into force (Kucia 
2003). 
Meanwhile, a year after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Bush 
Administration adopted a new National Security Strategy in September 2002, which included the 
government’s new and continuing policy on preemptive action (Diehl 2002; Fein 2003). The 
unprecedented strategy stresses the necessity of preemptively attacking countries developing 
weapons of mass destruction, and in articulating its meaning, explicitly states North Korea as an 
example (Heginbotham 2003; Carlson 2003; Kerr 2003).  In October 16, 2002, matters took a 
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turn for the worse, when the United States announced that Pyongyang indirectly acknowledged 
its nuclear weapons development program (Lee 2002). James Kelly, assistant secretary of state 
for East Asian and Pacific affairs, who visited Pyongyang said that the admission was made the 
day after he informed the DPRK that the United States knew of the clandestine program. In 
response to the acknowledgment, to which the DPRK denied subsequently, the United States 
decided to stop supplying heavy oil to North Korea in November.  In retaliation, North Korea 
refused to allow the KEDO delegation to enter the country to inspect the use of heavy oil (Lee 
2002), and subsequently proclaimed the resumption of the construction and operation of all its 
nuclear facilities (Kim and Song 2002).  
In November 2002, the IAEA adopted a resolution requesting North Korea clarify its 
reported uranium-enrichment program. Pyongyang rejected the resolution, alleging that the 
IAEA’s position was biased in favor of American interests. The DPRK announced that it was 
reactivating the nuclear facilities it had frozen under the Agreed Framework since 1994, and 
ordered international monitors to leave the country. On January 6, 2003, the IAEA Board of 
Governors adopted another resolution, this time condemning North Korea’s decision to restart its 
nuclear reactor and related facilities in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and calling on 
North Korean representatives to meet immediately, as a first step, with IAEA officials. 
Furthermore, it ordered North Korea to reestablish the monitoring equipment Pyongyang had 
dismantled, to comply fully with agency safeguards, to clarify details about its reported uranium-
enrichment program, and to allow the agency to verify that all its nuclear material was declared 
and subject to safeguards. On January 10, 2003, North Korea announced that it was immediately 
withdrawing from the nuclear NPT, and condemned the second IAEA resolution because it 
infringed upon sovereignty. The main reasons for the withdrawal included: (1) the Korean 
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Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) decision that it would suspend fuel oil 
deliveries to North Korea, and (2) the fact that Bush had labeled North Korea part of an axis of 
evil during his State of Union address.32  
Bush Administration’s Policy Shift33 
 
Largely in response to the developments mentioned above, the Bush administration’s 
policy started to shift. In the beginning, the Unite States maintained that it would not engage in 
formal talks or negotiate with North Korea until it agreed to give up its prohibited nuclear 
programs. However, a meeting of the TCOG changed Washington’s stance, and produced a 
statement saying that the United States was now willing to talk to Pyongyang about how it would 
meet its obligations to the international community. Table 5 summarizes the chronology of 
events that led to the Bush administration to adopt multilateral approach in resolving the North 
Korean nuclear threat.34 
                                                 
32 Paul Kerr has written numerous articles on North Korea and the Bush Administration’s behaviors on the nuclear 
crisis. Kerr’s articles used in this study appeared online in the Arms Control Today, which can be accessed at 
www.armscontrol.org.  
 
33 The following articles and books were used to examine the Bush Administration’s policy Shift regarding the 
North Korean nuclear crisis: Boese (2004), Choi (2003), Daalder and Lindsay (2003), Dong-A Ilbo Daily (April 
2000), George W. Bush Administration Policy Toward North Korea (2004), Hwang and Kim (2003), Kim (2003), 
Koh (2004), Korea Herald (April 24, 2003), Kucia (2003), Lee (2002), Lee and Feffer (2004), Niksch (2001), Seo 
(2003), and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2004). 
 
34 The sources used to construct the table on the timeline of the North Korean nuclear crisis were: Atomic Archive. 
2005. “A timeline on nuclear weapons development in North Korea.” 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Reports/Northkorea/Timeline.shtml (August 1, 2005). 
BBC News. 2005. “Timeline: N Korea nuclear standoff.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2604437.stm 
(August 1, 2005). 
 
Global Security. 2005. “Korea Crisis Countdown Timeline.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-
timeline.htm (August 1, 2005). 
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Table 5: The Road to the Six-Party Talks in Beijing 
Date Nuclear Standoff 
October 4, 2002 NK reportedly acknowledged its nuclear weapons 
development program when James Kelly visited Pyongyang 
October 25, 2002 NK proposed a non-aggression pact with the US 
November 14, 2002 KEDO announced the discontinuance of heavy oil supply to NK 
December 12, 2002 The US declared the nullification of the Geneva Agreed Framework with NK 
 
December 16, 2002 
Colin Powell assured North Korea that the US has no intention of attacking that 
country. But he rejected the idea of a non-aggression treaty, which Pyongyang 
is demanding to settle the crisis over its nuclear weapons program. 
December 27, 2002 NK purged the IAEA inspectors from its territory 
December 29, 2002 The US adopted a 'tailored containment' policy against NK 
January 6, 2003 Bush allowed the IAEA to take the lead on North Korea, and call for a meeting 
of the UN Security Council to discuss the crisis. 
 
January 7-10, 2003 
A trilateral meeting between South Korea, the US and Japan in Washington 
was held as part of the allies' regular forum for coordinating policy toward the 
DPRK. 
January 10, 2003 NK withdrew from NPT and announced they would not let UN nuclear 
inspectors back into the country. 
February 5, 2003 North Korea says it has restarted its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, adding to 
the controversy over the country's nuclear ambitions. 
March 17, 2003 
 
The US Ambassador to South Korea clarified that US policy  
toward NK would be different from the case of Iraq 
 
April 07, 2003 
NK dropped its demand for a non-aggression treaty with the US, stating that 
"The Iraqi war shows that to allow disarming through inspection does not help 
avert a war but rather sparks it... This suggests that even the signing of a non-
aggression treaty with the U.S. would not help avert a war." 
April 14, 2003 
 
NK announced its acceptance of new multilateral talks for  
resolution of nuclear problem 
April, 23, 2003 Trilateral Talks (DPRK, USA and China) in Beijing, China 
May 05, 2003 Bush denied shifting its policy on North Korea's nuclear program to focus on 
preventing that country from exporting nuclear weapons or material. 
July 12, 2003 Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo visited NK 
July 17, 2003 Dai Bingguo visited Washington 
August 1, 2003 NK agreed to participate in six-party talks 
August 27-29, 2003 First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China 
February 25-28, 2004 Second Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China 
June 23-26, 2004 Third Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China 
July 26-Agust 6, 2005 Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China 
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Bush’s Multilateral Strategy: Six-Party Talks 
 
Following Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT, the United States began promoting 
multilateral negotiations among the most concerned parties aimed at reaching a settlement 
through diplomatic means (George W. Bush Administration Policy Toward North Korea 2004). 
Initially, North Korea opposed multilateral talks, firm on its stand that the nuclear crisis was 
purely a bilateral matter between the United States and the DPRK. However, due to the 
increasing pressure from major powers, especially the United States and China, the DPRK 
agreed to three-party talks with China and the United States, in Beijing, on April 23, 2003.  
North Korea eventually cooperated to sit in the negotiation table with the United States 
and China after the United States threatened to take the issue to the UN Security Council for 
economic sanctions if North Korea persisted in its refusal to participate in a multilateral talks 
with the United States and others. Also, prior to the trilateral talks, China had expressed its 
dissatisfaction with North Korea for its continuing provocations by favoring vote in the IAEA on 
reporting the nuclear issue to the UN Security Council on February 12, 2003. This was a clear 
message to North Korea that Beijing would consider forsaking its policy of support for 
Pyongyang if it went too far (Liu 2003: 353). Furthermore, in February 18, Chinese Vice Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi warned North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam-sun that any renewed 
provocation by the DPRK would harm its relations with the PRC (French 2003: A6). Also, for 
three days in early March 2003, China cut off crucial oil supplies to Pyongyang, sending 
Pyongyang a signal of Chinese determination to get some cooperation from the DPRK (Liu 
2003).  
The Bush Administration was also successful  in arranging a multilateral forum when 
North Korea announced its intention to participate in six-party talks with the United States, 
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China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia on its nuclear program in August 2003. For months, 
Washington had insisted that Pyongyang's illicit activities were a regional issue best resolved in 
a multilateral setting which also includes South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia (Daalder and 
Lindsay 2003: 15). US administration officials warned that North Korean nuclear capabilities 
included WMD production, which in turn could be made available to rogue organizations such as 
Al Qaeda (Niksch 2004). In a June 2004 report by the US National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States revealed that al-Qaeda was still pursuing its strategic objective of 
obtaining nuclear weapon.   
Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker told the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva February 13 that, in the post-Cold War era, multilateralism is 
more important than ever. Later, at a briefing in Beijing on February 24, 2003, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell said that the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is not just a 
bilateral United States-North Korean issue, but must be dealt with through a multilateral effort 
by interested countries. According to Powell: 
The United States feels strongly that North Korea's actions pose a threat to 
regional stability and to the global non-proliferation regime…And we are 
prepared to address these with North Korea in a multilateral context in which 
China and other nations can participate. It is a matter for China, it's a matter for 
South Korea, it's a matter for Japan, it's a matter for Russia, it's a matter for the 
United Nations, the IAEA, and it is a matter for the United States (Office of 
International Information Programs, US Department of State February 24, 2003). 
  
 Prior to his trip to South Korea, Japan and China on February 21-25, 2003, Powell said in 
an interview in February 19 that the United States would continue to communicate to North 
Korea that the United States had no intention of invading it, instead, it was interested in helping 
North Koreans who were starving. Powell also said that direct talks with North Korea would 
only happen if they started with multilateral negotiations:  
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[U]ltimately, we know that we will have conversations with the DPRK. We 
believe those conversations would be more effective and would provide a more 
lasting solution to the problem if they began in a multilateral framework and they 
included other nations (Office of International Information Programs, US 
Department of State February 19, 2003). 
 
Starting April 2003, the United States and North Korea resumed contacts to ease the 
standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. The first instance of contact 
occurred during the trilateral talks between China, the United States and United States, held in 
Beijing on April 23, 2003 (Korea Herald April 24, 2003). James Kelly, the US assistant 
Secretary of State, and Wang Yi, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, attempted to persuade 
Pyongyang to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program, but North Korea, through its 
representative Ri Gun, did not change position, and instead restated calls for a legally binding 
non-aggression pact with the United States, in exchange for its nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the 
incompatibility of the United States and North Korea, coupled with the absence of South Korea, 
severely restricted any positive outcome from the trilateral talks. However, and despite this lack 
of positive attendance, the countries that did attend the talks agreed to establish an extended 
multinational cooperative framework, with a view to resolving the North Korean nuclear 
problem in a more peaceful and systematic manner (Korea Herald April 23, 2003). Such an 
envisaged framework was eventually linked with the first round of six-party talks in August of 
2003.  
On August 27, 2003, six nations—China, the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea 
and North Korea—gathered at a hexagonal table in Beijing for a three-day meeting to discuss the 
issue of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. The meeting served as a forum for 
clarifying the positions between North Korea and the United States, though during the talks their 
mutually irreconcilable positions were further reconfirmed (Hwang and Kim 2003). For North 
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Korea, the objective was to construct a new level of relations that would eventually lead to the 
normalization of ties with the United States, and more importantly to obtain economic rewards 
for giving up its nuclear program. Their demands included: (1) confirmation that the United 
States would shift away from its hostile policy; (2) a secure non-aggression treaty that would 
strictly and legally guarantee that neither of the two sides would resort to attacking one another 
by conventional means; and (3) that the United States agree to abandon its antagonistic position 
toward North Korea (Anti-Imperialist News Service 2003). The United States, however, was 
deliberately vague on what rewards it might bestow upon North Korea if it agreed to dismantle 
its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner (Seo 2003: 3).  
During the first round of the Talks, Pyongyang agreed to the eventual elimination of its 
nuclear program on the condition that the United States should willingly sign a bilateral 
nonaggression treaty and meet various other conditions, including the provision of substantial 
amounts of aid and a normalization of diplomatic relations. However, the United States rejected 
this proposal, insisting on a multilateral resolution to the issue, and refused to provide any 
benefits or incentives for North Korea to abide by its previous international obligations (George 
W. Bush Administration Policy toward North Korea 2004). Bush said he would be willing to 
consider a North Korean multilateral written security guarantee, if North Korea would accept 
complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of its nuclear weapons program. On November 
13, 2003, senior North Korean diplomats, Kim Yong-ho and Kim Song-sol said that the DPRK 
was prepared to give up its nuclear programs. In exchange, the DPRK expected written security 
guarantees and compensation for economic losses suffered by a decision to halt construction of 
two light water nuclear reactors by KEDO in the North (Zarocostas 2003). 
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At the talks, while Russia offered joint assurance with China to Pyongyang, and showed 
its intention to intervene as a principal actor in resolving the nuclear crisis (Koh 2004), Japan's 
main concern was to solve the kidnapping of the Japanese by North Korea, as well as to maintain 
its security from the suspected nuclear weapons and missiles of North Korea (The Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs of Japan 2004). Kim Jong-Il admitted that his government agents abducted 13  
 
Japanese nationals, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, eight of whom reportedly died. Five  
 
survivors have been allowed to return to Japan. The abduction issue almost overshadowed the  
 
nuclear crisis issue (Hanson 2004). Finally, South Korea reconfirmed its position as the most  
 
important counterpart of North Korea, and hoped to enforce a non-nuclear Korean peninsula plan  
 
(Seo 2003: 3). South Korea hoped that the success of the multilateral talks would translate into a  
 
more permanent peace regime between the two Koreas.                                                                                           
 
The first round of the six-party talks failed in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, 
as the participating nations were unable to adopt a joint statement or to make any significant  
breakthroughs. However, the six-party talks did open the gate for further meetings, and proposed  
 
the following objectives: (1) the resolution of the nuclear issue through peaceful means and  
 
dialogue; (2) addressing security concerns of the DPRK; (3) refrain from taking any action that  
 
may aggravate the situation while the process of negotiations is under way; (4) taking a parallel  
 
or simultaneous step in resolving the standoff; and (5) the continuation of the six-party talks, and  
 
the specific date and venue should be decided through diplomatic channels as soon as possible  
 
(People’s Daily 2003).  
 
On February 25-28, 2004, the second round of the six-party talks was held in Diaoyutai, 
Beijing. In this round, North Korea maintained that it was disappointed over the United States’ 
stand because it did not show any stand to co-exist with North Korea; instead, the U.S. was 
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determined to pursue their policy of isolating and stifling the DPRK, according to a 
spokesperson of the DPRK's Foreign Ministry (Korean Central News Agency February 29, 
2004). The spokesperson added that North Korea showed willingness to scrap its nuclear 
program in accordance with a proposal for a simultaneous package solution aiming to 
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The United States, however, was adamant on its previous 
stand that unless the DPRK first abandons the nuclear program completely, verifiably and 
irreversibly, the US would not discuss the issues concerned by North Korea. 
The second round of the six-party talks resulted to the reaffirmation of all the parties of 
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as their common goal. They also agreed to address 
the nuclear issue in the form of coordinated steps. However, because of individual differences in 
the position of the six parties, the following issues remained outstanding, leaving the future 
development unpredictable: Japan, the United States and the ROK called for the CVID of all 
nuclear programs by the DPRK, but the DPRK claimed that peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
should be allowed and that dismantling should be limited to the nuclear weapons development 
program: Japan, the United States and the ROK emphasized that the DPRK should admit the 
presence of the uranium enrichment program, but the DPRK denied the existence of such a 
program.  
The six parties held the third round of the Talks in Beijing on June 23-26, 2004 at 
Diaoyutai in Beijing. In this round, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue remained a 
difficult task for the six parties, especially for the Bush Administration. At the end of the Talks, 
the DPRK’s position was strengthened and the United States position weakened despite their 
settlement proposal of June 23, 2004 (Niksch 2005). The United States demanded to North 
Korea to dismantle all its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible way; to 
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place under international control all its missile materials; and to return IAEA inspectors to the 
country. In return, the United States would agree to the resumption of heavy fuel oil deliveries to 
North Korea by Japan and South Korea and offer provisional security guarantees. However, 
North Korea wanted to see those moves in return for a freeze of its nuclear programs, before 
dismantling them. North Korean negotiators also demanded that the United States lift all 
sanctions against the country and remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism. 
According to Larry A. Niksch, a specialist in Asian affairs, the United States’ proposal 
did not weaken the DPRK’s position because, in reaction to the June 23 proposal, South Korea, 
Japan, China, and Russia encouraged the DPRK to adopt tactics not in accordance with the US 
position: the other parties supported the DPRK’s reward for freeze proposal and its denials that it 
had a secret uranium enrichment nuclear program. 
For one, Colin Powell’s visit in late October 2004 drove Chinese and South Korean 
foreign ministers to make statements that implied their criticism of the June 23 proposal of the 
U.S.  Moreover, as regard for the reward for the proposal for freezing nuclear facilities, the 
ROK, Japan, China, and Russia were skeptical about the claim of the US that North Korea was 
having a clandestine uranium enrichment program. With these, it can be argued that North Korea 
continued to refuse to participate in the fourth round of the talks because it believed that it can 
receive benefits from other parties’ payoff, especially from China which has continued to give 
money, food, and oil to get the DPRK on the Talks chair (Niksch 2005). The problem with the 
Bush administration, according to Niksch, was that it did not have an effective post-June 23 
follow-up strategy to promote its proposal into a position of a basis for negotiations in the talks. 
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Niksch has identified five major issues that the US faces regarding the future of the talks 
and policy toward the DPRK: (1) whether North Korea will agree to another meeting; (2) the 
issue of the price of getting North Korea to attend another meeting; (3) whether North Korea will 
admit it has a uranium enrichment program and will continue to demand acceptance of its 
“reward for freeze” proposal; (4) how to treat North Korea’s demand that the six party talks take 
up the South Korean nuclear activities, which the IAEA is investigating; and (5) US policy 
decisions if there were no further six party meetings or if future meetings produce no movement 
toward a satisfactory settlement.  
The outcomes of the three rounds of the Six-Party Talks nevertheless showed that China 
gained the most, as it was outstanding as a host, and tried diligently to facilitate unofficial 
bilateral contacts between North Korea and the United States. China also attempted to forge a 
consensus among the participants, which resulted to China as emerging as the more assertive 
diplomatic power. The United States partially obtained the basic objectives that it had desired. 
The primary goal of the United States was to settle the North Korean nuclear issue within the 
multilateral frame (Kim 2003). A multilateral channel could also be an efficient measure for the 
United States' policy towards China. For Japan and Russia, the opportunity to participate in the 
multilateral negotiations was beneficial, and may also be viewed as an accomplishment in its 
own right (Koh 2004). South Korea confirmed its position as a main counterpart of North Korea. 
In general, however, North Korea was not satisfied with the outcome of the talks. It was 
supposedly disappointed with China and Russia, and its proposal to exchange an expression of 
its goodwill to the United States was refused (Koh 2004). 
Supporters of multilateralism assert that gains can accrue to the United States through 
cooperating with other states. The United States is indeed better off achieving international 
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objectives when possible through cooperative means, and situations that offer win-win payoffs 
should always be pursued. Moreover, the codification of cooperative practices in international 
treaties and institutions oftentimes can lock into place mutually beneficial arrangements, and 
indeed, American national security is best served when United States leaders are active in 
shaping the agenda of multilateral institutions. Finally, the multilateral perspective helps analysts 
and policymakers understand some state-to-state interactions.  
Rewards, Sanctions and Diplomacy 
 
While announcing support of engagement policy, the Bush administration has clearly 
shown that it wants “more quo for its quid” (Lee and Feffer 2004: parag. 8). North Korea’s 
compliance with the Bush administration’s aggressive strategies may yield rewards, perhaps 
substantial ones such as the normalization of relations and a large aid package.  
Despite continued doubts concerning feasibility, cost, and adherence to the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Bush Administration continues to make missile defense its strategic 
priority. The American stance on this issue was opposed by Russia and China. However, South 
Korea is clearly concerned that the United States defense policy might endanger engagement 
with the DPRK. While the unification of North and South Korea has been the focus of South 
Korean foreign policy, for the Bush administration peninsular reconciliation ranks rather low on 
the scale of US national interests. Recognizing that North Korea is in bad economic shape, Kim 
Dae Jung has not insisted on the “strict mutualism” and reciprocity that Bush is seeking, as some 
South Koreans fear that the Bush administration’s approach will hinder their own efforts toward 
reconciliation (Lee and Feffer 2004).   
In attempting to address the North Korean nuclear problem, the Bush Administration and 
its allies have discussed the possibility of imposing a number of economic and trade sanctions. 
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However, economic sanctions may not be successful, nor would they cause the DPRK to change 
its political behavior. Indeed, North Korea is now less likely to be adversely effected by 
economic sanctions to be imposed by the Bush administration because it has alternative trading 
partners, a command economy, and is less dependent on foreign trade than other countries. 
Although commonly perceived as an economic hermit, North Korea actually has engaged in 
substantial trade with the rest of the world. In fact, North Korea engages in trade with most 
major nations, including China and Japan and most industrialized European countries (Kim, 
2004). The continued and extensive trade of North Korea with China and Japan has thus relieved 
a great deal of the pressure applied by the United States sanctions and undercut their 
effectiveness. The Bush administration’s stick strategy is further diluted by the status of North 
Korea as a command economy. In North Korea, the state controls the means of production and 
sets the priorities and emphases in economic development. Yi (2002) explains that because most 
of the transactions in North Korea occur between state-owned enterprises, this leaves the state 
the opportunity to perform its economic guidance function, including systematic distribution, 
thereby guaranteeing state control of the economy.   
The result of any economic sanction is that although the general population feels the 
ensuing shortages, most citizens are unable to observe the direct link between sanctions and any 
hardships induced by them. Moreover, North Korea’s population is less dependent on foreign 
trade. The North Korean philosophy of juche, or self-reliance, seeks to maintain neutrality, and 
demands complete independence in foreign relations. Against this background, the Bush 
Administration’s imposition of economic sanctions is less likely to be effective because North 
Korea has prepared for economic isolation over several decades and there is not a great demand 
for foreign commodities by the general population. However, there have been significant 
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changes in the characteristics of the North Korean economy since the announcement of July 1, 
2002 economic reform measures by the Kim Jong Il government. Thus, contrary to the initial 
thinking, the DPRK may yield to economic sanctions imposed upon by the United nations, the 
United States, and its allies. The vulnerability of North Korea to economic sanction is reflected 
by the repeated warning of the Kim Jong-Il regime that the imposition of economic sanctions 
will be regarded as "the declaration of war." 
Considering the complexity of the North Korean situation, some observers have 
advocated the use of both carrots and sticks in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem: for 
carrots without sticks would end up as an appeasement policy associated by many with the 
Clinton Administration’s policy, while sticks without carrots would result into unnecessary loss 
of lives. A right combination of such strategies would be more effective than any other 
multilateral measures pursued by the Bush administration (Choi 2003). 
International Regime 
 
From April 28 to May 9, 2003, more than 100 state-parties included in the NPT 
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) met to confront the myriad of nuclear threats.  In this 
meeting, they upheld the nuclear NPT as “the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime 
and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament” (Kucia 2003: parag. 1). The 
PrepCom proceedings for the 2005 NPT Review Conference were dominated by proliferation 
concerns, with countries stressing ongoing problems with Iraq, newfound allegations of an 
extensive nuclear program in Iran, and North Korea’s destabilizing withdrawal from the treaty. 
The discussion on North Korea’s withdrawal could not be helped at the gathering, despite 
attempts by PrepCom Chairman László Molnár of Hungary to minimize its impact on the 
meeting. Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US were unable to agree on how to handle North 
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 127
Korea’s status upon its January 10, 2003 withdrawal date and, therefore, the UN could not 
address the issue prior to convening the PrepCom. Moreover, divisions between the member 
parties themselves occurred, as they debated on whether to even acknowledge North Korea’s 
withdrawal or to overlook it. Delegates were obviously dismayed at North Korea’s 
announcement, and they stressed the need for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the crisis on 
the Korean Peninsula. Hubert de la Fortelle, the French permanent representative to the 
Conference on Disarmament, went a step further, remarking on April 28, 2003 that, “naturally, a 
clear commitment is also needed from the UN Security Council with a view to contributing to a 
peaceful resolution to the crisis” (Kucia 2003: parag. 7). Delegates underlined their concerns 
about US actions, which suggested that nuclear weapons development might be at hand, and that 
the administration was considering revoking its “negative security assurances” or nuclear non-
use pledges, made in the context of the NPT (Kucis 2003). The United States first formally made 
“negative security assurances” in 1978. Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced a 
somewhat revised policy on April 5, 1995, which was repeated on February 22, 2002 by State 
Department spokesman Richard Boucher (Kimball 2002).  
On March 15-18, 2004, Bush and top officials from the CIA and the Departments of 
Energy and State, and members of the Congress met to discuss possible proposals for remedying 
the ailing nonproliferation regime. Probable revisions discussed at the meetings included 
cleaning up and securing weapons-usable material worldwide, strengthening export controls, and 
denying uranium-enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies to states that do not have 
them (Boese 2004).  From April 26 to May 7, 2004, PrepCom convened again, in order to come 
up with necessary actions to be taken to fine-tune the NPT.   
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 128
The Effects of Domestic and Systemic Constraints on Bush Policy 
Domestic Constraints 
Table 6 summarizes the domestic constraints—the US Congress and the Senate, 
American culture and public opinion, and the bureaucratic government.35  
Table 6. Domestic Constraints (Bush Administration) 
 
Variables 
 
 
Impacts on Bush’s Policy 
US Congress and US 
Senate 
 
• Despite the great divide between Republicans and Democrats, 
the Congress and the Senate have generally supported Bush’s 
policy 
• Republicans prioritized the bolstering of US deterrence and 
military capabilities, particularly nuclear weapons 
• Democrats advocated diplomatic solutions and decreasing US 
reliance on nuclear weapons. 
• Democrats stressed multilateral and bilateral negotiations, 
including “direct and immediate talks with North Korea”  
• Democrats feared military actions may provoke other 
countries 
American Public Opinion 
• The American public supported Bush’s policy on NK 
• The public began to see terrorism and nuclear proliferation as 
a direct and imminent threat 
• The general public agreed that it would be best for the future 
of the US to take an active part in world affairs 
Bureaucracy 
• There has been a debate within the Bush administration 
regarding its policy toward NK 
• Pentagon hawks viewed regime change as the most ideal, 
effective, and enduring solution 
• The moderates argued that talks with NK would result to a 
negotiated settlement and would build a coalition among 
concerned countries for taking action if engagement fails 
United States Congress 
One of the most important factors that has influenced the Bush Administration’s policy 
toward North Korea, is the apparent support given by the US Congress. As discussed earlier, the 
Clinton administration had experienced challenges and criticisms especially from the Congress 
                                                 
35 The discussion of the influence of the domestic constraints on the Bush Administration is derived from the 
following: Bock (2002), Boese (2003), Cha (2004), Cossa (2001), Lindsay (2003), McFaul, (2002), and Reiss 
(2004). 
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(Elder 2003), which forced them to conduct extensive bargaining especially with Congress to 
solicit support. These domestic challenges almost vanished during the Bush administration 
(Cossa 2001; Reiss 2004) as, first, the Congress supported his choice of strategies in different 
foreign policy issues, and second, the Congress allowed Bush to wage two foreign conventional 
wars, one on terrorism, and the other against Iraq (Bock 2002; Newsmax.com Wires, 2002). 
Moreover, it supported the decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM), in order to develop an expensive new missile defense (McLaughlin & Associates, 2001).   
However, in March and April 2003, Republican and Democratic legislators started to 
reveal severely different visions on how best to prevent the continuing proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons (Boese 2003). Republicans put priority on the bolstering of US 
deterrence and military capabilities, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. The Democrats, 
on the other hand, stressed the importance of seeking diplomatic solutions and decreasing US 
reliance on nuclear weapons. A House Republican Policy Committee report released on February 
13, 2003, the committee declared that nuclear weapons and deterrence continued to be just as 
relevant in the present as they had been during the height of the Cold War. The report argued that 
for nuclear weapons to retain their role as a credible deterrent, American nuclear capabilities 
should be overhauled, by reducing the time needed to conduct a nuclear test explosion by half. 
The report called for further research in to new types of nuclear weapons in part of discover and 
destroy deeply buried targets, as well as modernizing and preserving the American nuclear 
stockpile, and recommended that the US tackle different types of nuclear weapons in toder to 
enable it to threaten a variety of targets.  
Senate Democrats, however, had a different view. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle 
(D-SD) submitted a resolution, dated March 5, 2003, and on behalf of himself and 30 fellow 
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Democratic Senators, plus independent Senator Jim Jeffords, recommending the United States to 
move away from the increased reliance on the importance of nuclear weapons. The resolution 
called on the Bush administration to develop a strategy that stressed multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations, including direct and immediate talks with North Korea, in order to strengthen 
international controls and nonproliferation norms (Boese, 2003: 1). Democrats disputed the 
notion that other countries might become more motivated to acquire nuclear weapons if they 
perceived the United States as assigning expanded roles to nuclear weapons or increasing its 
willingness to use them. In general, Republicans sought a foreign policy that was reliant on 
internal intelligence and technological capabilities, in order to “overtly and covertly” disrupt 
proliferation activities, while the Democrats recommended negotiating a protocol to block 
shipments of such weapons and delivery systems (Boese, 2003: 1) 
American Public Opinion 
Similar to the Congress, the American public showed support of the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy programs, including the war on terrorism and the drive against 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The American public had been critical of the 
Clinton administration for being inexperienced and having misguided policy priorities. More 
importantly, the public criticized Clinton for the weakening US defense through budget cuts and 
re-deployments, and for making the United States appear weak against North Korea and for 
giving in to the latter’s demands. The shift in the public’s attention, from local issues to global 
and foreign concerns, as well as with regard to the Congress, interest groups, and other domestic 
institutions, can be largely attributed to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Indeed, following this 
single event, foreign policy concerns became the top priority for the public. While the public had 
been more concerned with domestic issues, such as health and livelihood programs and defense 
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spending, prior to the attacks, they now began to apprehend the serious threat posed from the 
outside. They began to see terrorism and nuclear proliferation as a direct and imminent threat, 
and not just a foreign policy concern of the President, and they shifted their priorities and began 
seeing foreign policy as their concern too. Bush’s axis of evil speech, with the help of the mass 
media, especially cable news (CNN, Fox) changed the public’s perception about terrorism and 
nuclear proliferation and they began supporting President Bush and his administration. 
Following the attacks, and to illustrate the extent to which public opinion had been 
affected, President Bush gained a 90% approval rating, higher than any president achieved 
before, and public opinion centered around supporting Bush and his War on Terror. One year 
after the attack, his approval stood at 70% (Lindsay 2003: 539). A November 2001 poll resulted 
in 81 percent of the polling population agreeing that it would be best for the future of the country 
to take an active part in world affairs (Lindsay 2003: 539). Instead of calling for isolation from 
world affairs, the public began supporting engagement to the world. More than 77% of 
Americans see the current government in North Korea as a great or moderate danger to Asia. 
American public concern has risen by 12 percentage points since November 2002 (The Pew 
Global Attitudes Project 2003). 
Bureaucratic Politics 
There has been a debate within the Bush administration regarding its policy toward North 
Korea. At one end of the debate are the Pentagon hawks who advocate regime change as the 
most ideal, effective, and enduring solution. Maureen Dowd of the New York Times identified 
US Vice President Dick Cheney, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the Defense 
Policy Board, and the US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton as members of 
the hawkish camp led by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Cha 2004). On the other 
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side of the debate are the moderates who include Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass, 
most of the US Foreign Service, US Senator Joeseph Biden, political journalist Bob Woodward, 
and many in the liberal media and academic elite. This group can be viewed as being led by 
Colin Powell, who believes that the disarmament of North Korea is best achieved through 
continued diplomacy. Moreover, the moderates do not believe that US engagement will change 
North Korean intentions, yet they argue that talks with Pyongyang will result in a negotiated 
settlement, and help build a coalition among concerned countries for taking action if engagement 
fails (Cha 2004: 75). The debate started during the trilateral talks as discussed earlier involving 
the United States, China, and North Korea. Pyongyang's 11th-hour threat to reprocess plutonium 
led to vigorous internal debates about possible countermeasures. Whereas the moderates 
advocated a continuation of the talks, the hawks opposed US attendance (Cha 2004: 76).  
Although both groups agreed that North Korea's blackmail attempts were intolerable, and that 
Pyongyang needed to come clean on its nuclear weapons programs before any form of 
engagement can be considered, they differed in their definitions of coming clean. That is, while 
the hawkish group demands total disarmament before serious engagement, the moderates 
consider more flexible requirements for negotiations to start. 
Realist ideology, when applied to the making of Bush policy towards NK, must preserve 
the status quo, and avoid active engagement in the domestic affairs of other states. However, this 
prescription cannot be adopted by the United States, as, instead of maintaining the current world 
order, American foreign policymakers have been revising the current international system and 
the states that constitute it. This is because the current order is not safe for the United States, and 
pragmatic inaction will allow the current order to become even more threatening to the United 
States  and its allies (McFaul 2002). From this perspective, the Bush administration's much-
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maligned emphasis on multilaterally approaching North Korea may make sense. If Kim wants 
both bilateral negotiations and a nuclear arsenal, the only way of dashing his hopes is for 
interested regional parties to tell him that he simply cannot have both. The multilateral approach 
has been the United States preference, and it now appears to be Russia's as well, given recent 
statements by Moscow that a nuclear North Korea would prompt reconsideration of its policy 
opposing sanctions against the nation. It also appears to be the preference of both Japan and 
China, given the residual outrage among Japanese citizens over the abduction of Japanese 
nationals by North Korean operatives during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as Beijing's growing 
frustration at their communist ally's insolence and incompetence (Cha 2004: 75). It is clear that 
the above domestic factors have significant contributions to the Bush Administration’s policy on 
North Korea. Figure 5 is a simplification of the domestic constraints and their effects on Bush 
administration’s policy towards North Korea. 
In summarizing the impacts of domestic factors on the Bush administration policy, the 
support given by the US Congress, as well as the US Senate and other domestic institutions, on 
the Bush administration’s policy toward the DPRK, has strengthened the United States’ stand on 
the North Korean nuclear crisis. Based on this, it is likely that the current multilateral approach 
will shift to a combination of multilateralism and bilateralism during the end of the Bush’s 
second term. In addition to the multilateral agreements in the continuing Six-Party Talks, it is 
expected that the United States will enter into a bilateral negotiation with North Korea.  
Moreover, the American public has generally advocated the Bush administration’s stance 
on the DPRK, as they perceive North Korea to be a serious threat to Asia, as well as a potential 
one to the United States. This may further boost the administration’s current stand of employing 
military forces and economic sanctions. Finally, bureaucratic problems, as illustrated by the 
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ongoing debate between the Pentagon hawks and the Powell group, may change Bush’s policy 
toward the end of his administration. The multilateral approach, the stick strategy, and the 
exclusion of the international regime will remain the same. However, the expected changes will 
be influenced by systemic pressures, especially from North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, 
and Russia. 
Figure 5. Impact of Domestic Constraints on Bush’s Policy 
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South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. The differences have been in the policy orientation within 
countries themselves, the program for action, and the inability of the countries to cooperate. All 
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political and military approaches could work best only if these allies cooperated with the Bush 
Administration. Table 7 summarizes the systemic constraints faced by the Bush Administration. 
Table 7. Systemic Constraints (Bush Administration) 
 
Variables 
 
 
Impacts on Bush’s Policy 
Inconsistencies between US and 
other foreign policies on NK 
 
• In terms of economic sanctions, China’s policy does not 
support Bush’s hard approach  
• China will fight for, not against NK should a war broke 
out between US and NK 
• Bush’s policy is irreconcilable with South Korea’s 
Sunshine Policy 
• Roh-Moo Hyun will be the greatest challenge in pursuing 
Bush’s “hostile” policy  
• Russia prefers less confrontational approach 
• Russia does not support economic sanctions yet 
• Japan generally supports Bush’s policy 
• Japan considers unilateral economic sanctions 
The Kim Regime 
• The Kim regime views the Bush administration policy as 
flawed 
• NK has repeatedly cited Bush’s “hostile policy” as 
justification to its nuclear program 
After the tragedy of the September 11 attacks, Bush has taken the pledge of protecting the 
world from grave threats of terrorism. North Korea’s confession that it was currently conducting 
nuclear-related activities prompted the Bush Administration to publicly revile North Korea as a 
threat to the world’s safety. Bush’s consideration of North Korea as one of the axis of evil was 
taken by North Korea as a “little short of a declaration of war” and warned it was undertaking the 
necessary defensive preparations (Conachy 2002: parag. 4). In this vein, Bush also faces what 
has been the gravest challenge of Clinton’s struggle to negotiate with Pyongyang. The Bush 
administration has been in no better position than the Clinton administration in beseeching the 
impeccable support of China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia over its policy on North Korea.  
It is expected that with the confirmation of support from these countries, the 
implementation of Bush’s economic, political, and military policies and programs for North 
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 136
Korea are likely to succeed. All of these countries support US feats to minimize, if not totally 
stamped out, threats against mankind’s security. But these countries still remain reserved over 
the issue of whether to accept Bush hard line policies against North Korea. Years ago, Clinton’s 
much softer approaches also beget the same coldness, which was largely condemned as the main 
reason for its failure (Eichensehr 2001: 11-12). The United States attempts to dismantle the 
nuclear program in North Korea will not succeed unless supported by major powers in East Asia. 
For instance, in order to implement its economic sanctions on the country, the United States 
would need the support of China, as North Korea remains heavily reliant on China economically 
(The Economist May 1, 2003). Should the trading activities continue between these two 
countries, any effort to impose economic pressure on North Korea is not likely to lead to the 
decision to stop North Korea from pursuing its nuclear-related interests.  Furthermore, without 
China’s support to the US, North Korea could still rely on its trading partner for its supply of 
basic necessities and fuel. Thus, it is a must for US to get China on its side.  
Overall, things are going well in favor of the Bush Administration. In line with the 
consensus on the opinion that the development of nuclear activities and programs in North Korea 
which is an imminent danger not only to neighboring countries but to the world at large, Bush 
administration‘s struggle to launch a multilateral support on dismantling these nuclear activities 
in the country proves to be advantageous to all concerned countries. This is despite the fact that 
target partners in East Asia are still reluctant to some of the Bush administration’s hard line 
policies on NK (Tkacik 2003). Lately, however, with the progress of the six-party talks and the 
softening of the Bush policy on the DPRK, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia are beginning 
to fully cooperate with the United States. 
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Before, the Bush Administration was having a hard time in enlisting the support of 
countries involved in the six-party talks because each of these countries tended to have its own 
remedy to address the issue. China, being the closest ally of the country refused to accept the 
principle of war or economic sanction as the sturdy solution to the problem (Ji 2001: 396). In the 
same fashion, Russia opposed the use of military or economic policy to resolve the issue. 
Meanwhile, South Koreans viewed with alarm the Bush Administration’s hard line policies of 
confrontation that were in contrast to the principles of Sunshine Policy (Rowen 2003).  
It seemed, however, after the third round of the Talks, that the Bush administration was 
beginning to take the long and patient process of resolving these differences. With this strategy, 
it is now more likely that the major East Asian powers will adhere to the United States’ policy 
principles toward the DPRK. Essentially, Bush implements policies that are generally unilateral 
in orientation. This approach complements the needs for a multilateral consensus that Bush is 
espousing.  
One thing is clear. South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia are in agreement with the 
United States regarding the goal of maintaining nuclear-free Korean peninsula. As such all of 
them are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the DPRK in Korea. Even China 
and Russia want North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Also, these superpowers 
support the six-party talks to settle the North Korean nuclear weapons issue. This is why all of 
them urge North Korea to return to the Talks as soon as possible. It is true that South Korea, 
China, and Russia do not want any coercive actions to be taken by the United States to resolve 
the crisis.
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Consensus-Building with South Korea 
South Korea poses a problem to the United States by putting an essential restraint to any 
potential multilateral strategy by the Bush administration for the South Korea’s role in the US 
policy implementation in NK. However, one of the several drawbacks of Bush Administration’s 
formulation of foreign policy has been its failure to consider how its own policy would fit 
relative to the policies of other states. The Bush team failed to account how the deterioration of 
the Agreed Framework would influence the North and South Korean governments. Contrary to 
what the Bush team has estimated, North Korea did not as much as flinched with the collapse of 
the Agreed Framework. The Bush Administration had earlier assumed that North Korea would 
comply with its desires after its supply of fuel halted. However, North Korea took a methodical 
response of reviving its nuclear reactor to sustain its needs leaving the administration to bellow 
on its own cause. Soon after the United States proposed its hard line policies on North Korea, the 
country pull out from the NPT as a retort. 
Furthermore, the United States had difficulty taking South Korea on its side. It was 
believed that President Roh-Moo Hyun would be the greatest challenge of the Bush 
administration in pursuing its hostile policy against North Korea. Roh joined the effort of the 
former two South Korean leaders in their campaign to oppose any military or economic sanction 
against NK. Roh was a renowned advocate of the Sunshine Policy, and South Korea perceived 
that the hard line policies of Bush were complete contrasts of the principles of Sunshine Policy 
(Rowen 2003).  
Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea assured North Korea against the possibility of 
the former absorbing the latter. Furthermore, the agreement facilitated North-South contact and 
cooperation. Kim Dae Jung strongly urged the United States to support this policy (Rowen 
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2003). Indeed, United States had difficulty convincing South Korea to modify its own policy 
(Quinones 2003: 198-199; Chung 2001: 4; Kim 2001).  
Initially, Bush turned a cold shoulder towards the Sunshine Policy. But later on, he 
periodically released statements of support for the Sunshine Policy (Kim 2001: 9-20; Chung 
2001: 4). He supported South Korea’s proposals to build a railroad and road across the 
demilitarized zone, assist North Korea in flood-control of Imjin River, investment guarantees for 
South Korean firms investing in North Korea and reuniting separated Korean families. The 
relationship between the US and South Korea regarding the North Korean nuclear problem 
improved since the two countries entered the multilateral process in August 2003. 
Consensus-Building with China 
If Bush successfully solicits the unsullied support of China, Bush foreign policy on North 
Korea would be more likely to progress. This assumption gained support from the fact that North 
Korea is one of the known economic recipients of China (Pomfret 2003: A16), and the Bush 
Administration has assumed this, as well as China’s close political, economic, and security ties 
with Pyongyang.  
John J. Tkacik, Jr., a research fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at 
The Heritage Foundation, advised that US negotiators must have a clear-eyed view of China's 
role in the North Korean nuclear crisis: (1) China will act in its own self-interest, and China's 
interests diverge from America's and (2) China clearly wants the United States to support North 
Korea economically to ease the costs on China and urges United States diplomatic recognition 
and a nonaggression pact to legitimate the existence of China's client state--the world's most 
terrifying dictatorship (Tkacik 2003).  
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China made its position over the matter even more apparent during the US-China-DPRK 
talks on April 23, 2003. Despite China’s promise of neutrality, the US was aware that Beijing 
was not neutral in the North Korean nuclear problem (Tkacik 2003). While the US insisted on 
multilateral talks, preferably in the United Nations, the PRC wanted direct bilateral talks between 
Washington and Pyongyang. Although China declared it was for the denuclearization of North 
Korea, China's consistent position remained (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2003): it 
had no information that the DPRK was actually developing nuclear weapons; it would not 
criticize North Korea's statements that it was not developing nuclear weapons; and the United 
States must accommodate North Korea's needs. Hence there was low probability that China 
would do anything to impede North Korea’s future in the international arena.  
In reality, however, China has taken neutral stance on the issue, which is doing the 
Chinese economy a favor. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China had assumed the 
top position as the North Korean’s leading economic benefactor (Tkacik 2002). Thus China has 
taken a soft approach toward North Korea and its economy, refusing any kind of economic 
curtailment in the country. According to some analysts, China would want to prevent war to 
escape the exodus of North Koreans casualties and the responsibility to cater to the needs of the 
war times (Hayes 2003).  
Before, China was reluctant to align its policies with US and other East Asian countries; 
however, it was using its own channels of communication to discourage nuclear programs in 
North Korea. In general, China wanted the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK. In fact, in a 
bilateral meeting with Russia, China expressed the importance of maintaining "the non-nuclear 
status of the Korean peninsula and the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction" (Laney and Shaplen 2003: 21). China then was hanging on the possibility that the 
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United States may keep its doors open for any diplomatic consultations from other East Asians 
countries. Conditions improved between China and the United States and other East Asian 
countries with the undertaking of the six-party talks. 
Consensus-Building with Russia 
Russia takes a similar position to China over the North Korean issue. This is because, like 
China, Russia is a major training partner with, and provider of foreign aid to North Korea. Thus 
the United States is also calling for Russia to exert more pressure towards North Korea. 
However, like China, Russia has expressed a preference for a less confrontational approach, and 
has announced that it would not support sanctions yet (Zaks 2002). One of the reasons is that 
Russia and North Korea regained confidence in each other, soon after President Valdimir Putin’s 
election. Russia, like China, wants nothing but peaceful ties with Pyongyang. Recently, it has 
been rumored that North Korea has solicited technical assistance from Moscow for the 
development of a nuclear reactor for the nation. As of May 2002, Russia reportedly was 
discussing possible avenues of military technical cooperation with the DPRK (Zaks, 2002). 
Russia from the very beginning has been vocal about the counter proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Russian president Vladimir Putin has voiced out the country’s 
denunciation of North Korea's nuclear program. In a bilateral meeting with Japanese Prime 
Minister Koizumi in January 2003, Putin exhibited a disappointment and profound concern 
regarding Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the NPT. Furthermore, Putin and the other 
leaders attending the June 2003 G-8 Summit, in Evian France, declared that, “North Korea's 
uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure to comply with its IAEA 
safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North 
Korea's international obligations,” and strongly urged North Korea "to visibly, verifiably and 
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irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs" (see Declaration on the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 2003). 
 Russia’s stance on the nuclear crisis is made evident in its participation in the three 
rounds of the multilateral process involving the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, 
China, and Russia. After the first round, Russia urged the DPRK to end provocative measures 
that might worsen the crisis. In the second round, Russia proposed a comprehensive package deal 
to address the nuclear crisis: Pyongyang should abandon its military nuclear program in 
exchange for security guarantees and assurances of noninterference by Washington. 
 While the United States demanded that the DPRK eliminate its nuclear programs all at 
once, Russia believed that it was more effective to dismantle nuclear programs gradually while at 
the same time exercising active control (Kirillov, Morozov, and Pavlov 2004). Moreover, Russia, 
China, and South Korea offered energy aid, provided that the DPRK froze all its nuclear 
activities and allowed entry of international inspections in the third round of the Xix-Party Talks 
in June 2004.   
 There are, however, hot debates between Russia and the United States and South Korea 
regarding the DPRK’s demand that it be allowed to keep a civilian nuclear program. The United 
States and South Korea dismissed the demand because it might make it easier for North Korea to 
resume an arms program (Kahn 2004). Although Russia affirmed its interest to eliminate North 
Korea’s nuclear arms program, it maintained that that civilian nuclear research was a complicated 
affair because the DPRK was not liable to IAEA rules (Zyuzin and Morozov 2004).  
It seemed at first that Russia's entry to the Proliferation Security Initiative and support for 
the Sea Island summit statement would lead to a closer tie with the United States. However, in 
the third round of the Talks, differences between Russia and the US policies became more 
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apparent. For one, Russia strongly supports North Korea’s demand to keep a nuclear program for 
peaceful purposes, provided that it rejoins the NPT and allows IAEA inspections. 
Consensus-Building with Japan 
Ever since the inauguration of the Bush administration, hope for United States was 
largely in the hands of Japan, which had continuously expressed its support over the North 
Korean policy by Bush administration. Japan gave a high priority to the North Korean nuclear 
threat, especially after the Taepo Dong missile launch over Japanese islands in 1998. For 
Japanese, North Korean missile activities pose a direct threat for the country. Unlike South 
Korea, Japan urged the Bush administration not to drop the DPRK from its terrorism list. Japan 
suspected North Korea of providing sanctuary to members of the Japanese Red Army. Moreover, 
the admission by Kim Jong-II of kidnapping 13 Japanese raised new concerns for the Japanese 
government.  
In the second round of the Talks, Japan and the United States were unyielding and 
demanded that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program in a complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible manner (Takeda 2004). Japanese media praised the result of the second round of the 
Six-Party Talks. They said that Japan was facing two tasks: to continue to stick to the principle 
of the de-nuclearlization of the Korean peninsula by joining hands with the United States and 
South Korea to pressure North Korea to eliminate its nuclear program totally; and to seize 
opportunity, realize the next round of governmental talks with DPRK as soon as possible so as to 
let families of the kidnapped Japanese return home (Participants Comment on Second Round 
Six-Party Talks 2004). 
 Just before the second round of the Talks, Japan’s House of Representatives approved a 
bill amending the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, which was aimed at halting 
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trade and blocking cash remittances to the DPRK.  This was a unilateral act enabling the 
Japanese government to impose economic sanctions on any country considered a threat to 
Japan's security. The threat represented crucial political leverage for Japan against the DPRK in 
the context of the current nuclear crisis and abduction issue. Naturally, the DPRK criticized 
Japan for this one-sided action (Takeda 2004).  
 The sanction threat would force Pyongyang to stay in the Six-Party Talks.  Japan is the 
DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea.  In addition, remittances from 
pro-Pyongyang Koreans and Japanese in Japan are a major source of income for North Korea. 
Therefore, only Japan, in addition to China, could have a serious economic impact on North 
Korea (Takeda 2004). 
 During the third round of the six-party talks, Japan noted common ground in the parties 
“understandings and proposals in the sense that focus is given to first steps towards nuclear 
dismantlement” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, General Evaluation 2004: parag 
2).Japan identified an approach that, “while the DPRK aims for an agreement on freezing of its 
nuclear programs and compensatory measures, Japan, the United States and South Korea seek an 
agreement on a framework towards 'dismantlement' of nuclear programs” (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, General Evaluation 2004: parag 3). 
 Japan also stated at the third round of the Six-Party Talks in June 2004 that if the 
proposed nuclear freezing by North Korea was defined as a first step towards dismantlement of 
its nuclear programs, it would be willing to join in energy assistance through the Talks based on 
the following conditions: (1) the scope of nuclear freeze would cover all nuclear programs, 
including the uranium enrichment program; (2) North Korea would declare all unclear programs; 
and (3) freezing would be adequately verified (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s 
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Position 2004: parag. 1).Additionally, the Japanese delegation indicated that economic 
cooperation with the DPRK could only be provided if its additional concerns about missile and 
abduction issues had been comprehensively resolved (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
Japan’s Position 2004: parag. 3). 
 From a diplomatic perspective, Japan could serve a vital role in US implementation of its 
policy on North Korea. First, it has a large leverage over the DPRK. Second, Japan is equipped 
with an excellent intelligence reporting capacity. Third, the position taken by Japan was closest 
to that of the US. The Koizumi government has been very supportive of the Bush 
administration's North Korea policy from the very beginning (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan). 
The Kim Regime 
One of the systemic constraints that has continued to challenge the Bush administration is 
the firm stand of the Kim regime that the United States is employing hard policies and that the 
United States position in the nonproliferation regime is flawed, thus casting a doubt on the US 
intention of resolving the North Korean nuclear threat. On May 12, 2003, North Korea cited 
Bush’s 2001 termination of negotiations over North Korea’s missile programs, his inclusion of 
North Korea in his axis of evil, the administration’s policy on preemption, and the US attack on 
Iraq as evidence that the US poses a threat to the DPRK. The United States, on the other hand, 
has argued for months that North Korea violated the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration of 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by pursuing a clandestine uranium-enrichment 
program. 
In June 2003, the Bush Administration emphasized the effectiveness of putting pressure 
on North Korea by persuading other governments to bar shipments of items such as weapons 
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components and illegal drugs, which are sources of hard currency for North Korea. John Bolton, 
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security condemned the idea of 
negotiating with Pyongyang.  He declared that giving in to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s 
“extortionist demands” would only encourage the dictator and other “would-be tyrants” around 
the world (Kerr 2003: parag. 24).  For National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, North 
Korea’s April 2003 proposal was nothing but “blackmail” (Kerr 2003: parag. 24). Nevertheless, 
an indication of US flexibility was shown through the agreement to solve the nuclear issue 
through synchronous and parallel implementation in the third Round of the Six-Party Talks in 
June 2004.   
Prior to October 2003, the major conflicts between United States and North Korea 
concerned simultaneous actions and a non-aggression treaty. Although Washington promised 
that it could provide Pyongyang with written security assurances that have less formal 
congressional backing, North Korea insisted on a treaty to guarantee the reversal of United 
States’ “hostile policy” North Korea had repeatedly cited Washington’s “hostile policy” as 
justification to its nuclear program.36 Currently, however, the non-aggression treaty is no longer 
a major issue in Washington-Pyongyang relations, with the latter showing willingness to accept a 
written guarantee of the Bush government.  
The Bush administration, on its part, has continuously made clear that the US does not 
intend to attack North Korea. Several joint statements, including the Agreed Framework, 
explicitly state this policy. Pyongyang, nevertheless, argues that the US National Security 
Strategy—which explicitly mentions North Korea —and the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review 
                                                 
36 North Korea expressed fear that the US might attack the country in the same way that US-led coalition forces 
attacked Iraq in March 2003.  It also cited the US policy on preemptive action as described in the September 2002 
National Security Strategy formulated by the Bush II administration. 
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indicate that the administration is preparing to attack it (Kerr 2003).37  
This dissertation predicts that the Bush administration will make major changes regarding 
its policy on North Korea towards the end of Bush’s second term. As discussed earlier, the 
generally strong support from the US domestic institutions and from the American public has 
only strengthened Bush’s current policy. However, outside pressure from major players such as 
South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, in addition to the political behavior of the Kim regime, 
will eventually change Bush’s policy from strictly multilateralism and stick strategy to bi-
multilateralism and carrot strategy. The international regime will maintain its minor role in the 
Bush administration.   
The major drivers for the shift from the current multilateral approach to bi-multilateral 
approach have been China, which consistently puts pressures on the Bush administration to have 
a one-on-one talk with the DPRK, and the Kim regime which has been demanding a bilateral talk 
since the start of the administration. However, six-party talks have contributed to the most 
important development for the adoption of the bi-multilateral framework. The United States and 
North Korea held several bilateral talks in Beijing in the context of the six-party talks. In the 
fourth round of the multilateral talks, held on July 26, 2005 to August 6, 2005 in Beijing, 
individual bilateral talks, along with the primary meetings of the chief delegates, were 
continually held among all parties. In the most important one-on-one sessions, the United States 
and North Korea met at least ten times. Thus, already, bi-multilateral approach is being used by 
the Bush administration, instead of strictly a multilateral approach. 
The results of the recently-concluded fourth round of the six-party talks produced a 
measure of cautious optimism among some participants and observers. This is brought about by 
                                                 
37 There was once a leakage of the Bush administration’s January 2002 classified Nuclear Posture Review and it lists 
Norht Korea as a country against which the US should be prepared to use nuclear weapons for (Kerr, 2003). 
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a more productive atmosphere than at the previous rounds of talks, allowing participants to 
concentrate on searching for a comprehensive solution to the problem. Also, both Washington 
and Pyongyang are serious about working out a package deal which can resolve the North 
Korean nuclear problem peacefully. In this latest round, North Korea was confronted by a 
softened US approach. It seems that North Korea is responding positively to these proposals by 
offering to freeze its military nuclear program and to start negotiations on dismantling equipment 
related to this program in return for assistance in energy supplies, lifting of economic sanctions 
and security guarantees from the United States. In addition, other parties are encouraging the 
United States to assume more diplomatic approaches to prevent war in the region. 
 Thus, carrots instead of sticks are used to cajole Pyongyang to agree to the demand of 
the United States and other powers on dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons program. 
Figure 6. Impact of Systemic Constraints on Bush’s Policy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above is an oversimplification of systemic constraints faced by the Bush 
administration in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem, and their impact on the 
implementation of Clinton’s policy. 
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Synthesis 
 
 Critics describe the Bush administration’s policy towards North Korea as “bipolar.” For 
example, in his article, “Bush's Bipolar Disorder and the Looming Failure of Multilateral Talks 
With North Korea,” Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, predicted that until 
America is indicates what it is willing to do for North Korea and when, and what Pyongyang 
must do in mutually dependent fashion, the multilateral effort will not achieve Bush's objective 
of resolving the nuclear crisis; indeed, what is lacking is political will on the part of the Bush 
administration (Hayes 2003).  
 Arguably out of indifference, Bush has adopted an aggressive stance towards North 
Korea, threatening economic and military sanctions for non-compliance, and has created an 
appearance of willingness to initiate military attacks to destroy North Korea’s nuclear 
capabilities. Despite denials from the administration that the United States has designs to attack 
North Korea, reports of possible attacks have increased apprehension for North Korea. 
Moreover, Pyongyang’s distrust of American intentions has been further exacerbated by the US 
attack of Iraq. Table 8 below outlines the likely shift of the Bush Administration’s policy on 
North Korea. 
Table 8. Possible Changes in Bush’s North Korean Nuclear Policy 
Variables Beginning End 
Type of Negotiation Multilateral Bi-multilateral 
Sanctions/Rewards Stick Approach Carrot Approach 
Role of International Regime Minor Minor 
Another example of inconsistency within the Bush Administration is evidenced by its 
reactions to South Korea’s Sunshine Policy. Despite initially turning a cold shoulder towards 
South Korea’s policy, the Bush Administration later issued statements supporting the policy. 
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 150
However, as Larry A. Niksch observed, the “administration’s response to the sunshine policy 
indicates a mixed reaction” (Niksch 2003: 12). That is, while it supports some components of the 
policy, such as building roads and railroads along demilitarized zone and reunification of divided 
Korean families, the administration has also expressed disagreement over other components, 
especially the issue of dropping North Korea from the US terrorist list. Even Kim Dae Jung, a 
strong proponent of the sunshine policy, expressed some doubts on the Bush administration’s 
sincerity in supporting the sunshine policy. This inconsistency stems from the disagreements 
inside the administration regarding the proper North Korean approach, as well as from 
contending views of the North Korean political-economic processes. Hard-liners in the Bush 
administration doubt the possibility of North Korea relinquishing its nuclear capabilities in 
exchange for benefits, and, for them, the only option is force and pressure by building an 
international coalition.  
Despite these inconsistencies, the Bush administration has continued in refusing to enter 
into bilateral negotiations with the North. Bush has insisted that his diplomatic approach toward 
the North Korean issue will be limited to the formation of a regional coalition involving the 
DPRK’s neighbors. He has refused to back down to North Korea’s demands, and has insisted 
that there will be no bilateral engagement until Pyongyang relinquishes its nuclear program. This 
approach, however, has received criticism from other countries, most notably China, who 
insisted that the United States engage North Korea directly, in a bilateral agreement. Despite 
pressure from China, Russia and other countries as well as some US officials, Bush has held firm 
on his decision to stick to multilateral efforts instead of engaging North Korea in bilateral 
negotiations. Peter M. Beck argues that the inability to engage North Korea in meaningful 
negotiations can be viewed as failure on the part of the Bush Administration (Beck 2004). He 
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reiterated China’s worries that such malign neglect by the Bush administration would only lead 
to war. The United States is willing to talk not negotiate with North Korea, though only in the 
context of a multilateral forum.  To be sure, President Bush has made it known that he also 
rejects the notion of bilateral talks within a multilateral forum (Kristoff 2003).  
The inconsistency within the Bush administration can be regarded as one of the factors in 
the failure of the United States to resolve the North Korean issue. The Bush Administration’s 
inability to resolve the internal divide between hard liners and pragmatists within the 
administration has been creating an atmosphere of contradiction in the administration. Moreover, 
the United States participation in the Six-Party Talks by the Bush Administration has been strung 
with a division within the government, particularly that of the inconsistency in the 
pronouncements of the administration.  
The administration’s erratic swings, from limited diplomatic engagement one day to 
“personal” statements by John Bolton prefiguring the collapse of North Korea the next, and then 
back to engagement the day after, reveals a real lack of strategic coherence on the Bush 
administration’s part. However, recent trends favor engagement—partly because the hard-liners 
have been forced to pull in their horns by the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Nonetheless, it is 
evident that the Bush administration is not yet ready to accept any answer from North Korea. 
Despite achieving relative success in making other countries put pressure on the DPRK, 
the reluctance of Russia, China, and South Korea to cut off trade with North Korea completely 
has pushed the United States to consider imposing more tailored sanctions that will focus on 
banned activities on North Korea. Although Japan has been compliant in supporting the Bush 
administration policy, Washington has found it very difficult to convince either China or Russia 
to support its policy on North Korea, as neither of them support sanctions or a hawkish policy 
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from Washington, despite understanding the seriousness of the threat that a nuclear-armed 
DPRK poses to regional stability.  
Russia abstained on the IAEA vote to send the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN 
Security Council in 2003. China rebuked North Korea, by voting to send the issue to the Security 
Council, though it has not gone beyond that. South Korea, China, and Russia, and even Australia 
have all publicly urged the US to negotiate bilaterally with North Korea, and both Beijing and 
Seoul did so publicly when Powell swung through East Asia to build support for US policy of 
multilateral negotiations. Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea have all tried to mediate 
between North Korea and the US and even Fidel Castro has offered to mediate, though the US 
rejected all these offers until 2004.    
China has been urging North Korea for almost a decade to take reforms similar to those 
China itself has taken.  It has even been rumored that Kim Jong Il would not take calls from the 
Chinese leadership if he thought they were going to ask him to do something he doesn’t want to 
do (Sorensen 2003). Chinese influence over North Korea, in fact, is much more limited than 
most people often think (Sorensen 2003).  Because of this limited influence, the Chinese are very 
wary of taking responsibility for North Korean behavior. And South Korea, as mentioned above, 
because of their fears of a North Korean collapse, does not want to put any more economic 
pressure on the DPRK. In any case, the expectation that China will enforce the US foreign policy 
displays willful ignorance of the contribution of US foreign policy to the current impasse, as well 
as ignorance of many of China’s foreign policy concerns. For North Korea, the Bush 
administration’s decision not negotiate with them resulted to the breakdown of the Agreed 
Framework and the subsequent revival of their nuclear reactors. The fact of the matter, however, 
is that North Korea’s violation of existing agreements with the United States and others by 
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carrying out a clandestine uranium-based nuclear weapons program led to the breakdown of the 
Agreed Framework. The Chinese have no particular responsibility for that breakdown, but 
because they are unhappy with the North Korean actions, they have made efforts to mediate and 
to bring the US and the North Koreans together. 
The Bush policy towards North Korea has been antagonistic from the start. The 
administration reversed the diplomatic advancements to reestablish normalized relations with 
Pyongyang that had been made during the Clinton Administration and, in particular, refused to 
affirm the October 10, 2000, pledge from President Clinton, stipulating that the US and North 
Korea held no hostile intent towards each other. The US policy towards North Korea has become 
further clouded with the administration’s doctrine of preemption. The National Security Strategy 
specifically mentions North Korea as “the world’s principal purveyor of ballistic missiles” and 
states: “We [the United States] cannot let our enemies strike first.” The United States has 
discussed the North Korean situation with regional allies such as Japan and South Korea, and 
other interested regional players, such as Russia and China (Sigal 2002). Indeed, none of North 
Korea’s regional neighbors has actually committed to imposing pressure on North Korea in the 
form of sanctions or trade restrictions, as the United States has advocated, and China currently 
supplies 70% of North Korea’s imported fuel oil, and has refused United States pressures to 
cease fuel exports to North Korea. While the United States seemingly continues to hope that the 
DPRK regime will fall if fuel shipments cease, this result does not seem to be in line with 
China’s wishes and policy direction. Rather, China’s apparent concern is with a possible North 
Korean refugee crisis if conditions in North Korea continue to worsen, not to mention the 
political instability of Northeast Asia that would follow any political disintegration. Other 
neighboring countries, including South Korea, share these concerns (Kessler 2003).  Japan and 
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South Korea have resisted development of their own nuclear weapons program, claiming that 
retaliatory action by the United States would serve as enough of a deterrent. However, that 
policy has recently been seen to be shifting. Japan, like South Korea, has talked about developing 
a nuclear weapons program in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear development and military 
posturing (Nishihara 2003).
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CHAPTER V: STRUCTURED FOCUSED COMPARISON WITH CONCLUSION  
 So far, this study has illustrated the complexities of the North Korean nuclear crisis, and 
analyzed how the Clinton and Bush administrations have attempted and are attempting to resolve 
this global threat. Moreover, the previous chapters have discussed the domestic and systemic 
factors that Clinton and Bush have faced in their quest to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
problem, and how these factors have influenced the course of their policies. Using a structured 
focused comparison, this chapter attempts to show that the policies under both Clinton and Bush, 
while differing initially, will eventually follow a similar policy path, due to the similar features 
of domestic and systemic constraints that had/have impacted the two administrations’ policy. 
Comparing Initial U.S. Administration Policies 
Since the Korean War, North Korea has been a headache for the United States. At the 
beginning of their terms, Clinton and Bush tried to ignore the brewing problems in North 
Korea.38 However, due to the alarming threat North Korea has posed, especially when it became 
known that it had been cultivating its own nuclear program, the two administrations were forced 
to engage the country early on in their respective administrations, a task that would help define 
their early reputations on policy making (Reiss 2004). However, their circumstances for being 
drawn into the affairs of North Korea were remarkably different. That is, while Clinton was 
driven by the threat of the potential nuclear capabilities of North Korea, Bush was, and is, using 
the threat of terrorism as a basis for action. As such, it is also the case that each of their 
approaches to the North Korean situation was also different. Despite these differences, however, 
many similarities have also been apparent between how Clinton and Bush initially dealt with 
North Korea (Reiss 2004).  
                                                 
38 During his first presidential campaign, Clinton never made any mention of North Korea. The case was the same 
with Bush.  
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 156
Through the years, North Korea has developed and built additional nuclear facilities that 
are now capable of constructing nuclear weapons. The discovery of the secret nuclear facility, 
discrepancies in the reported nuclear materials and nuclear wastes, as well as its subsequent 
refusal to allow IAEA inspections, aroused fear and suspicion that North Korea was trying to 
develop nuclear weapons. The danger of having a nuclear-armed North Korea, and the 
possibility that North Korea would export weapons and raw materials for making nuclear bombs 
to other countries forced Clinton to stop ignoring North Korea. Bush, on the other hand, put 
pressure on North Korea as part of his war on terrorism. Indeed, the cost of the September 11, 
2001 attacks for the US, both financially and emotionally, was great. Suddenly the country did 
not feel safe anymore. Both the administration and the public felt an urgent need to act against 
terrorists to replace US’ sense of security. As one of the countries with a hostile record, North 
Korea was viewed by the Bush administration as posing an international threat, and thus deemed 
appropriate to be included in Bush’s formulation. Not surprisingly, the DPRK took offense to 
this, and admitted that it had an active nuclear program (Sanger 2002), thus prompting the Bush 
administration to halt oil shipments in December. However, South Korea and Japan pressured 
the Bush administration to allow the November shipment, which was already en-route, to 
proceed to the DPRK (Dao 2002).  
In summary, the Bush administration initially deviated from the containment and 
engagement policy under Clinton, and instead of continuing with a liberal internationalist 
approach, employed the conservative internationalist approach. Moreover, Bush demanded that 
Pyongyang destroy its nuclear weapons before allowing diplomatic negotiations; Bush used a 
multilateral approach, used economic sanctions and military sanctions instead of carrot strategy 
utilized by Clinton; Bush ended Clinton’s Agreed Framework and started a six-party talk with 
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China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. 
Table 9 below outlines the initial policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations in 
attempting to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
Table 9. Initial Policies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations 
Initial Policy Clinton Administration Bush Administration 
Bilateralism and 
Multilateralism Bilateral diplomacy Multilateral diplomacy 
Carrot and Stick 
Strategy 
Economic rewards and stoppage 
of military training exercises 
Economic sanctions and 
intensification of military activities 
Inclusion and 
Exclusion of the 
International Regime 
Major role of the international regime Minor role of the international regime 
 
Multilateralism versus Bilateralism 
 
The events that transpired between the United States and North Korea early in Clinton 
and Bush administrations are rich in Foreign Policy decision-making (Reiss 2004). Clinton 
decided to use diplomacy in addressing North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, whereas Bush 
refused to maintain diplomatic relations. Clinton preferred bilateral negotiations while Bush 
adopted a more multilateral brand. After realizing that sanctions would not work, Clinton began 
engaging North Korea in high-level talks, which eventually resulted in the framing of the Agreed 
Framework. According to Glenn P. Hastedt, bilateral diplomacy can be defined as "[a] form of 
diplomacy in which two states interact directly with one another" (Hastedt 2003: 291).  
From the above definition, it becomes apparent that much of the dealings with the DPRK 
during the Clinton administration were of a bilateral-diplomatic form. The Clinton administration 
successfully negotiated a direct diplomatic deal with the DPRK, whereby Pyongyang confirmed 
its willingness to freeze its nuclear weapons program, and agreed to resume high-level talks with 
the US (with the exclusion of South Korea, Japan, China and Russia). The product of this 
bilateral negotiation was the Agreed Framework, which called for the freezing of North Korea 
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nuclear activities, and the eventual elimination of its nuclear facilities. Clinton’s bilateralism was 
comprised of high-level talks that discussed the issues and concerns between the two countries, 
ranging from nuclear program issues, economics, politics and conventional military use (Juster 
2000; Mearsheimer 1990: Pilat 1994; Sigal 2000). Observers suggest that through this bilateral 
approach, the US was able to moderate rogue states’ behavior, and, as such, Clinton’s bilateral 
strategy was characterized as aiming to contain North Korean aggressions with stability.  
While the Clinton administration advocated bilateral diplomacy, Bush administration has 
employed multilateralism. Bush went out of his way to make it known that he prefers to have 
multilateral talks (Kristensen 2002). The Bush administration made it clear from the start that the 
United States wanted to work with Japan and South Korea, and called for a Unified Front (Dao 
2002). In the words of Powell, “It is a matter for China, it's a matter for South Korea, it's a matter 
for Japan, it's a matter for Russia, it's a matter for the United Nations, the IAEA, and it is a 
matter for the United States” (Office of International Information Programs, US Department of 
State. February 24, 2003). In other words, the Bush Administration recognizes that the problem 
is not only between the United and North Korea; rather it is a global problem. South Korea and 
Japan, as well as China and Russia have a particular interest in dealing with South Korea because 
they are so close to the DPRK. South Korea and Japan have been adamant about maintaining 
open lines of communications with the DPRK, contending that "engagement is the best way to 
change its behavior" (Dao 2002: 1). 
North Korea’s actions showed its preference for bilateral negotiations with United States. 
After withdrawing from the NPT and rejecting IAEA inspectors, the DPRK resumed the 
operation of its nuclear facilities, frozen under the Agreed Framework. It further announced that 
it had almost finished reprocessing enough plutonium-grade materials that could create a nuclear 
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bomb and threatened exporting these to other countries. These actions could be an attempt by 
North Korea to force the US to engage it in bilateral negotiations. However, Bush insisted on his 
more isolationist policy by refusing to send negotiators in the peninsula. Although Bush agreed 
to stage a talk with North Korea, he wanted Japan, South Korea, China and Russia to be included 
in the forum. Other countries viewed Bush’s refusal to engage in a bilateral negotiation as more 
of a policy of neglect, and they feared that this would lead to miscommunication problems and 
potentially spark all-out war.  
When North Korea withdrew from the NPT, the Bush administration proposed 
multilateral negotiations to South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, in an attempt to come up with 
a diplomatic settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem. Initially, the DPRK believed that 
the crisis was purely a bilateral matter between the US and the DPRK. In the end, however, 
North Korea eventually agreed to three-party talks with China and the US. The outcome of the 
trilateral talks was restricted by the Bush administration’s failure to get South Korea to attend the 
talks. 
The framework established by the trilateral talks was eventually liNorth Koreaed with the 
Six-Party Talks involving the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, 
as the Bush administration insisted that the North Korean nuclear threat was a global issue best 
resolved through a multilateral negotiation (Daalder and Lindsay 2003). During the first round of 
the talks, the DPRK agreed to eliminate its nuclear activities, provided that the United States be 
willing to sign a bilateral non-aggression treaty and meet various other conditions, including the 
provision of substantial amounts of aid and the normalization of diplomatic relations.  
Initially, the Bush Administration was unyielding on its position, insisting on a 
multilateral resolution to the issue, and refusing to provide incentives for North Korea to abide 
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by its previous international obligations. Current developments, however, show that the United 
States is now willing to provide material "incentives" to North Korea in the event the DPRK 
agrees to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. A package deal is in the making starting from 
the third round of the six-party talks in June 2004. Some significant progress was also made at 
the fourth round of the six-party talks. The United States and North Korea held ten bilateral talks 
throughout the fourth round of the six-party talks. Thus the Bush Administration is now using bi-
multilateral approach in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem.  
Rewards versus Sanctions 
 
The Clinton administration’s policy toward the DPRK had been grounded on the 
engagement policy. As such, the Clinton administration worked on kittens economic rewards for 
the DPRK, and bargained bilaterally through diplomatic means. The bilateral negotiations 
resulting to the Agreed Framework promised economic support and favorable trade provisions 
for the DPRK provided that North Korea shall freeze its production of nuclear weapons. On the 
other hand, while initially announcing support of the Clinton administration’s engagement 
policy, the Bush administration has indicated that it wants a hard line policy. This means that the 
DPRK’s compliance with the Bush administration’s requirements will yield rewards, such as the 
normalization of relations and a larger aid package. Indeed, the banner that the Bush 
administration used in its policy on North Korea is “bigger carrot, bigger stick.” 
After abandoning the policy of indifference towards North Korea, the Clinton and Bush 
administrations chose to use sticks instead of carrots. Clinton employed military coercion when 
the US started military training exercises in South Korea, labeled as Team Spirit. These military 
training exercises were meant to intimidate the DPRK to force it to comply with US 
requirements. In addition, the Clinton administration threatened to employ economic and trade 
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sanctions against North Korea. However, the North Korean response of threatening to withdraw 
from the NPT made Clinton realize that a coercive approach would not work. This threat showed 
the Clinton administration that a show of aggression might only provoke the DPRK to do 
something drastic and erratic, and hence the military threat was not an effective policy option 
(Henriksen 1996: 48), thus forcing the US to turn to different approaches aimed at rewarding 
North Korea. Moreover, after negotiating with the US, South Korea, and Japan, the DPRK 
agreed to stay in the NPT. The US feared that the DPRK would carry out desperate actions and 
worsen the nuclear threat if they continue military training exercises in South Korea. With this, 
Clinton provided an economic reward to North Korea, and did not impose any trade sanctions or 
military actions against the country.  
Clinton began dangling carrots to tempt North Korea from withdrawing from the NPT 
and to comply with US requirements. North Korea’s agreement to remain in the treaty was 
rewarded by Clinton’s apparent willingness to negotiate the removal of trade sanctions as a 
policy approach. Despite the ongoing tension between USA and North Korea, largely due to Kim 
II Sung barring IAEA inspectors from North Korea’s nuclear reactors, the two countries were 
able to lay down an agreement that became embodied in the Agreed Framework of 1994. 
Furthermore, the US assisted in giving and receiving economic and energy aid, such as food aid 
for North Korea. This approach of rewarding good behavior was again employed when the 
Clinton administration persuaded the DPRK to enter the Agreed Framework treaty. Here, the US 
built new reactors and shipped oil to the DPRK in return for Pyongyang’s decision to turn off 
their old nuclear reactors. However, analysts debated if it was really a reward or just to appease 
the DPRK (Reiss 2004). The reactors that the US agreed to help build were to compensate the 
DPRK for closing their older reactors, and the oil would not be shipped until the reactors were up 
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and working. In short, this would appear to be more of compensation rather than reward 
(Henriksen 1996).  
The Bush administration, in addition to some scholars and critics, criticized Clinton’s 
policy as a show of weakness, and argued that Clinton was giving away carrots without getting 
anything in return. They believed that North Korea was just using its nuclear capabilities as a 
bargaining chip against US, in order to achieve stability and economic incentives. Bush, on the 
other hand, had chosen to lay a firmer hand to North Korea, and adopted a strategy that took a 
much different approach than Clinton had. Clearly, the Bush administration has taken the stick 
side of the carrot-stick spectrum. Evidence includes the characterization of Kim Jong Il as a 
dictator, US’ increased Cold War sensibility, and a strong support for missile defense. Moreover, 
the Bush administration has made missile defense its strategic priority. However, Bush’s stick 
strategy has been opposed by South Korea, China and Russia, who are concerned that increased 
military activities might endanger diplomatic engagement with the DPRK.  
From the beginning of his policy, Bush chose to impose economic and trade sanctions. 
The first punishment came after the DPRK admitted that it had an active nuclear program, in 
violation of the agreed framework, Bush decided to halt oil shipments to the DPRK. He also 
expressed the desire to stop the construction of water-light reactors. Bush policy was to bully 
North Korea to back down and yield to the US requirements. These sanctions would surely hurt 
the already weak economy of the DPRK. North Korea was largely depending on the oil 
shipments from the US for its energy needs, and the building of the reactors was giving jobs to 
many North Koreans. A US decision to cut funding for the reactor and to cut off the oil 
shipments, could be disastrous for the DPRK. 
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Initially, the Bush Administration’s use of economic sanctions was deemed as an 
unsuccessful attempt to change North Korea’s political behavior. North Korea was not likely to 
be adversely affected by any economic sanctions because it had alternative trading partners, 
possesses a command economy, was not dependent on foreign trade, and had become 
accustomed to economic isolation over many generations (S. Kim 1996: 69-80). However, major 
changes have happened since the Kim Jong Il Government’s July 1, 2002 announcement of the 
countries economic reform measures. This suggests that the DPRK may yield to economic 
sanctions imposed upon by the United Nations, the United States, and its allies.  
International pressure, coupled with the lack of a productive response from North Korea, 
has created a softening in the Bush administration’s position towards North Korea. However, this 
softening has not extended to an all-out dangling of economic rewards, as had happened under 
the Clinton administration. Rather, Bush has expressed the willingness to “consider” giving 
North Korea economic, military and political incentives, provided that North Korea takes the 
first action and conduct an irreversible and verifiable dismantling of its nuclear program. North 
Korea, however, has its own demands—that US resume oil shipments, and enter into a bilateral 
negotiation with them. Only after their demand is fulfilled will they be willing to freeze, though 
not dismantle, its nuclear program.  
Yet, unlike Clinton’s Agreed Framework, the outcome of the first round of the Six-Party 
Talks promised little economic reward for the DPRK. Moreover, the Bush administration was 
vague on what rewards it might bestow upon North Korea if it agreed to dismantle its nuclear 
weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner. In the same vein, while the Clinton 
administration’s Agreed Framework yielded concrete outcomes, while the Six-Party Talks failed 
as the participating nations were unable to come up with a joint statement or to make significant 
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breakthroughs.  
Though Clinton could brag that his approach of using carrots instead of sticks were able 
to make North Korea comply with the American nonproliferation policy, by freezing its North 
Korean program, the Agreed Framework and the use of carrots were not a long-term solution to 
the North Korean nuclear proliferation problem. What Clinton’s policy really did was simply 
suspend the problem in North Korea, until something eventually caused it to resurface such as 
the September 11th terrorist attacks. The two countries once again returned to the state where no 
agreements would be made and tensions were escalating. In addition, North Korea’s tendency to 
utilize brinkmanship tactics with its nuclear capabilities as a bargaining chip certainly does not 
appear to be helpful toward the achievement of US goals. Indeed, the US just appeared to be 
rewarding North Korea for nothing. As North Korea’s nuclear program remained a looming 
threat for the US for which reason the US could not stop giving economic incentives, the 
condition began to resemble blackmail, in which the US is the one in a disadvantaged position. 
In summary, there are clear differences between the Clinton and Bush administrations 
policies towards the DPRK. Clinton supported carrots, enticing North Korea to comply with the 
US by offering economic rewards. On the other hand, the Bush administration, is attempting to 
bully the DPRK into complying with economic threats. It is difficult, however, to examine the 
comparative effectiveness of the two administrations’ respective policies, as we do not exactly 
know how Bush’s policy will fare at the end of his second term. What we can critique though is 
Clinton’s policy. According to some observers, Clinton tended to provide economic rewards to 
the DPRK for breaking agreements. For instance, Henriksen (1996) has observed that, "For 
simply returning to the status quo, the North Koreans gained concessions" (31), thus potentially 
giving the DPRK the idea that it could get what it wanted by breaking treaties and agreements. 
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Moreover, some analysts viewed Clinton’s policy as furthering the North Korean nuclear crisis: 
the building of a new light water nuclear reactor, under the Agreed Framework, could actually 
produce just as much plutonium as the older reactors do (Henriksen 1999). With these apparent 
flaws in the Clinton administration’s policy, it becomes easier to understand why the Bush 
administration would want to break away from the Agreed Framework (Reiss 2004).  
Overall, the Clinton administration’s tendency to use economic rewards, and the Bush 
administration’s use of economic and trade sanctions, have generated debates among scholars. 
That is, Conservatives tend to favor the stick strategy, whereas more liberal realists contend that 
carrot should be the dominant approach. In the same line, some observers advocate utilizing both 
carrots and sticks, especially with regard to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. Indeed, 
it is argued that while carrots without sticks would end up as an appeasement policy, sticks 
without carrots would result into unnecessary loss of lives. There are some scholars who 
surmised that the use of economic rewards and sanctions are actually complimentary, and not 
contradictory (O’Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003), and the right combination of such strategies 
would be more effective than any other strategies pursued by the Bush administration (Choi 
2003) as well as with previous administrations.  
According to this line of thinking, the US and its allies should not give Pyongyang 
substantial aid and other benefits simply to appease Kim Jong-Il. But if the Kim regime agreed to 
freeze and eventually eliminate all its nuclear programs, transform the broader security situation 
on the peninsula, reform its economy, and even begin to change its own society, the US and its 
allies can and should be generous in providing economic aids. This does not mean weakness, but 
a promising way to truly resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, if the DPRK remains 
tough and does not verifiably cooperate with this effort, the US and its partners could then get 
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tougher and employ punishment strategies. 
Containment and Engagement 
 
 Both administrations initially attempted to isolate North Korea through an international 
effort to impose sanctions. However, both administrations were, at some point, forced to directly 
engage North Korea at very different levels. Clinton underwent a higher level of engagement by 
directly engaging North Korea in bilateral negotiations, and acquiring and providing North 
Korea with economic and energy aid. Bush, on the other hand, maintained considerable distance 
from North Korea. Moreover, it limited its engagement with North Korea to multilateral talks 
and refused direct negotiations by not sending negotiators to the country. 
 The main similarity in both administrations has been the presence of divergent policy 
preferences among other actors. While both administrations initially relied on an isolationist, 
aggressive and unilateral policy, oppositions from other countries, such as China and Russia, 
forced them to temper their approach toward North Korea. Moreover, debates within the 
administration complicated policy-making. That is, with the Bush administration, hard-liners 
were constantly in debate with the less aggressive faction, and both of them had their own idea of 
which policy would best address the North Korean problem. The case is not different with 
Clinton’s. These policy debates affected the two administrations policy positions and created for 
them an appearance of inconsistency. 
Although the Clinton and the Bush policies towards North Korea are remarkably 
different, there are some similarities, most notably with avoidance. Both administrations 
attempted to employ isolationism, but both were ultimately forced to engage the DPRK. The 
Clinton and Bush administrations then decided to give the appearance of action, and then 
operated on different background to push the North Korean nuclear problem aside. While 
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Clinton used the cover of negotiations and agreements, Bush used the war in Iraq to shift 
attention away from the ongoing problem in the DPRK. 
Analysts also observe that the Bush administration has been applying a policy more 
characteristic of neglect than engagement (Reiss 2004). Much of the events in North Korea have 
been overshadowed by other world events, such as the war on Iraq. While Iraq has gotten the full 
burden of the war on terrorism noting especially the consistent talk of war and regime change, 
the DPRK has only received strong words without action. This neglect to the North Korean 
problem is manifested when North Korean officials wanted to set up negotiations over their 
nuclear weapons program. But the Bush administration, concentrating on the Iraqi problem, 
refused to meet (Shenon 2002). This further complicates the problem and may result in serious 
miscommunication, as lines of communications between two states in disagreement become 
closed. 
The International Regime: NPT and IAEA 
 In the beginning, both the Clinton and the Bush administrations were supportive of the 
international nonproliferation regime composed of treaties, international organizations, 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, and unilateral actions aimed at preventing further 
proliferation. The NPT, IAEA and other actors, such as the international export control regimes, 
played a very crucial role in the detection of nuclear weapons and in containing Pyongyang’s 
nuclear program at the outset of the Clinton administration. As the inclusion of the international 
regime has been a part of their strategy to gain the support of the international community, the 
Clinton administration closely coordinated with the IAEA in its military intelligence, and used 
the legitimacy of the NPT to muster cooperation from countries and demand that North Korea 
freeze its nuclear programs. Similarly, the international regime presents one of the more 
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significant sources of measurement in enforcing the initial policies of the Bush administration, 
although its role during the time had been diminished, when compared to its major role at the 
start of the Clinton administration.  
  In both the Clinton and Bush administrations, however, the international regime has 
failed to implement actions in accordance with the US requirements. As we know, during the 
Clinton administration the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT, and, worse, no longer 
allowed the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities. Moreover, in the following administration, 
Bush was dismayed by the eventual withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT. Thus, the two 
administrations, later in their respective administrations, did not rely heavily on the international 
regime, but rather started developing their own strategies and approaches in dealing with the 
North Korean nuclear crisis. 
Initially, the NPT had proved to be successful in mitigating the nuclear regime, though it 
failed to curtail the North Korean nuclear threat as the DPRK violated its provisions particularly 
when it removed the monitoring equipment the IAEA installed and expelled the inspectors, and 
announced it would resume its nuclear activities. The Clinton administration based its decision to 
abandon the international regime on the view that without the intelligence that would be 
provided by the IAEA and the NPT, the US would no longer benefit from the international 
regime. It should also be noted that the crime-and-punishment approach by the IAEA did not suit 
the policy of engagement by the US. Moreover, the relationship between the IAEA and North 
Korea during the first few months of the Clinton administration was deteriorating. Thus, it can be 
assumed that the Clinton administration proceeded with the bilateral talks with the exclusion of 
the NPT and the IAEA.  
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As for the Bush administration, the international regime has taken only a minor role in its 
overall goal towards the DPRK. This is, in part, because of the perception that the NPT has been 
under assault by North Korea. Moreover, the Bush administration deems it difficult to come up 
with an agreement with other member-states in the NPT. In an NPT PrepCom meeting, the UK, 
the US and Russia were unable to come up with an agreement on how to handle North Korea’s 
status upon its withdrawal date. A division between the state-parties themselves occurred as they 
debated on whether to acknowledge North Korea’s withdrawal, or to overlook it. 
Table 10. Comparing Clinton’s and Bush’s Policy Towards North Korea 
Strategy Clinton Administration Bush Administration 
Bilateralism and 
Multilateralism 
• Preferred bilateralism all 
throughout Clinton’s two terms 
• The bilateral diplomacy with 
North Korea produced the Agreed 
Framework 
• Supporters noted the success of 
the bilateral diplomacy as North 
Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear 
activities 
• Critics viewed the Clinton 
administration’s policy as giving 
in to North Korea’s blackmail. 
• Consistent in its advocacy for 
multilateralism 
• Bush’s multilateral framework 
produced the Three-Party Talks 
and the Six-Party Talks 
• Supporters highlighted the 
promise of continuous 
negotiations as the success of 
multilateral efforts 
• Critics viewed Bush multilateral 
initiatives as lacking of clear 
conclusions 
Carrot and Stick 
Strategies 
• Briefly employed stick strategies 
but shifted to carrot due to the 
latter’s ineffectiveness of 
soliciting good behavior from 
North Korea 
• Economic rewards include oil 
shipment and the construction of 
new reactors  
• Supporters noted the reduced 
tension between the US and North 
Korea 
• Critics debated that the 
administration was rewarding 
North Korea for nothing 
• Consistent in employing stick 
strategies, denouncing Clinton’s 
reward policy 
• Economic sanctions include the 
stoppage of oil shipment and 
funding of reactors 
• The administration labeled North 
Korea as part of Axis of Evil and 
intensified its military activities 
• Supporters cited the heightened 
fear of North Korea that the US is 
indeed serious in its efforts 
• Critics argued that economic 
sanctions will not be effective in 
North Korea’s case 
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Inclusion and 
Exclusion of the 
International 
Regime 
• At the outset, the administration 
considered the major role of the 
international regime 
• The administration abandoned the 
NPT and IAEA as they failed the 
US’ expectations 
• The Bush administration 
considered the international 
regime as having a minor role in 
its policy towards North Korea 
• The administration does not rely 
on the international regime as it is 
difficult to build consensus with 
other countries within he NPT 
Table 10 above summarizes the similarities and differences between the Clinton and 
Bush administrations in terms of bilateralism and multilateralism, carrot and stick strategy, and 
inclusion and exclusion of the international regime. 
Constraints on U.S. Policies towards North Korea 
 
The Role of Domestic Constraints  
 
The issue of how to best deal with North Korea’s nuclear program has been a subject of 
numerous policy experiments (Wit 2001).  US policies have yielded mixed results and the view 
of the vast majority lie somewhere in between (Wit 2001). With any multilateral enterprise, 
members’ interests overlap but are not necessarily identical, and they often diverge in important 
ways, whether due to shaky parliamentary coalitions, domestic public opinion, financial 
constraints, or bilateral pressures (National Intelligence Council Conference Report, 2001). With 
regard to Clinton’s and Bush’s approaches, their continuous policy and strategy shifts had largely 
been a product of the domestic constraints each had encountered from the US Congress, 
American culture and public opinion and bureaucratic politics (Amini 2002; Axelrod and 
Keohane 1985: 225-254; Behrens 2000; Okazaki 2001).  Indeed, it was only after former 
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry became North Korea’s Policy Coordinator, in November 
1998, that the Clinton administration was able to overcome what one critic termed its policy of 
strategic incoherence towards the North (National Intelligence Council Conference Report 
2003). Moreover, it was only after the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and 
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Washington that the Bush administration got nods of favor from the congress, public opinion, 
and the bureaucracy. 
The constraints and influences on options to resolve the North Korean crisis are diverse, 
and are firmly based on both the domestic politics in the US and the intentions of the North 
Korean regime. Domestically, legislators in the US—during both the Clinton and Bush 
administrations—were at odds with one another on whether the North Korean nuclear program 
should be used for deterrence, or for the mere accumulation of power (Gross 2001). North 
Korea’s intentions could be aimed at: (1) achieving nuclear deterrence to reduce the economic 
burden of maintaining a credible conventional military force; (2) achieving nuclear deterrence to 
narrow the increasingly advanced technology gap between US and DPRK conventional forces; 
(3) achieving credibility as an equal dialogue partner in negotiations for economic concessions, 
or; (4) seeking regime security by achieving economic concessions and maintaining a minimal 
level of nuclear deterrence (Rowen 2003).  Not surprisingly, this haziness has led to policy 
formulation problems (Gross 2001).  Since the Clinton and Bush administration have both been 
unclear on the real intentions of North Korea, the policies that were formulated were also 
uncertain (Litwak 2000). Clinton confronted North Korea in 1993 while Bush, in 2001. 
The US Congress has been one of the foremost drivers in the Clinton’s and Bush’s 
policies on the DPRK. In the case of the former, that administration consistently found difficulty 
in gaining Congressional support, while the Bush administration has been enjoying its general 
support. Aside from the legislation made by the Congress that significantly limited the Clinton 
administration’s power to create a policy approach and strategy to resolve the DPRK problem, 
another key issue for Congress was the implementation of the agreement and the extent of the 
US contribution. While some senators and representatives opposed using US funds, most were 
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not prepared to block implementation of the agreement. (See CRS Issue Brief 91141 and CRS 
Report 95853). The conflict between the Clinton administration and the US Congress regarding 
the North Korean policy resulted in the critiquing of the administration’s management of 
American foreign policy (Dewar 1994: A1). In large part, this is due to the fact that the Clinton 
administration worked with a different, more independent, centralized, partisan and homogenous 
Congress, thus leading to a constant struggle. The difficulty of gaining Congressional support 
pushed Clinton to adopt a strategy of “going public”. That is, the President approached the public 
to lobby sufficient support in order to pressure Congress to support his programs. However, the 
Clinton administration never seemed to win its way with Congress. Even during those 
circumstances when it was able to get Congressional support, Clinton had to exert considerable 
effort.  
Under the Clinton administration, the Congress was noted for its apparent isolationism. 
Despite this, many scholars believed that the Congress did not completely reject 
internationalism, but rather they rejected Clinton’s liberal, globalist brand of internationalism. 
Another angle regarding congressional constraints in the Clinton administration involved 
parochial, selfish political interests. Furthermore, the Clinton administration had to face a 
Congress dominated by Republicans who constantly challenged the administration’s policy on 
North Korea. 
As such, the implementation of the deal between the Clinton administration and North 
Korea was constrained by the US Congress. Together with Japan, the US had secured an 
agreement with North Korea, wherein the North would allow UN inspectors and cameras into the 
Yongbyon complex and would cease work on a nuclear plant that could make weapons-grade 
nuclear material, on the condition that the US and Japan would provide Pyongyang with food aid 
Clinton-Bush North Korea Policy 173
and oil to run its power plants, and that they would help it construct two commercial-grade 
nuclear power plants to generate electricity (Tomchick 2003). Clinton had a hard time selling 
this deal, and Congress approved the fuel oil but refused the two commercial nuclear plants.  It is 
possible that Clinton already knew that he would not be able to gain the votes of the majority in 
the Congress, and that he may have agreed to commit with North Korea just for the sake of 
convenience (Tomchick 2003). Yet getting the North to the negotiating table was not sufficient 
to satisfy the critics of the Clinton administration, especially those in Congress. In addition, 
“bribing” the North to attend meetings with food aid sent the wrong signal to North Korea – that 
once the North merely showed up, aid would flow and its primary policy objective was achieved. 
In contrast with the Clinton administration, the Bush administration has had only minor 
conflicts with Congress. The domestic challenges that the Clinton administration was confronted 
with almost vanished during the Bush administration (Cossa 2001; Reiss 2004). The Congress 
supported the Bush administration’s choice of strategies in different foreign policy issues, and 
allowed Bush to wage two wars on terrorism, one of them being a preemptive strike against Iraq 
(Bock 2002; Newsmax.com Wires 2002), and supported the decision to withdraw from the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM).  Unlike Clinton, Bush can carry the Congress with him 
(Power 2003), has had broad Congressional support that has allowed it to reach a series of 
agreements with Pyongyang on security and economic issues – something that eluded the 
Clinton administration during its entire tenure (Gross 2001).   
However, this is not to ignore the presence of some members of the Congress who argue 
that the Bush administration offers little guidance as to how to interpret the behavior of North 
Korean President Kim Jong-Il’s government (Katz 2003). Indeed, some legislators have gone as 
far as North Korea itself in order to find solution to the issue, and their actions show that some 
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congressional leaders remain committed to diplomacy (Katz 2003). Moreover, the Bush 
administration’s options in dealing with the nuclear crisis remain constrained and influenced by a 
variety of factors which include, but are not limited to, post-conflict Iraq and domestic US 
policies (Rowen 2003).  Observers (Wit 2001) assert that Bush, in continuing the path of 
engagement, will allow the administration an easier time in building a domestic consensus for its 
approach than Clinton did. Maintaining a strong domestic consensus could also serve the 
administration well in coping with political pressures and other issues (Wit, 2001). 
For more than ten years, the US domestic debate about how to deal with North Korea has 
boiled down to an argument between engagement and confrontation (Huntley 2003). The Clinton 
administration attempted to do two things simultaneously (National Intelligence Council 
Conference Report 2001). First, it wanted to deflect charges of appeasement from its domestic 
critics, who viewed food assistance as providing comfort to the enemy (Marshall 2003).  Second, 
it wanted to promote diplomatic movement with North Korea. Unfortunately, neither ended up 
going so well. The Bush administration, on the other hand, has been bullying North Korea into 
complying with economic threats (Reiss 2004) and military actions (Kerr 2003).  
However in the first quarter of 2003, Republican and Democratic legislators revealed 
severely different visions on how best to prevent North Korean nuclear proliferation. 
Republicans prioritized the bolstering of conventional military capabilities, while Democrats 
called for a more diplomatic solution, similar to the Clinton policy. The Republican leadership 
recommended that the US should consider using different types of nuclear weapons to threaten 
the DPRK, but the Democrats recommended that the US should reduce its reliance on the 
importance of nuclear weapons. Moreover, they pressured Bush a to develop a strategy stressing 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations, and including direct and immediate talks with North 
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Korea, in order to strengthen international controls and nonproliferation norms. Table 11 
compares the Clinton and Bush administrations policies towards the DPRK in terms of domestic 
constraints. 
Table 11. Clinton, Bush and the US Congress 
Constraint Clinton Administration Bush Administration 
US Congress 
• Clinton had to deal with a 
different, more independent, 
centralized, partisan and 
homogenous Congress  
• The Congress limited US 
funds in dealing with the 
North Korean nuclear threat 
• Apparently, the Congress 
was isolationist  
• The US congress were 
divided between carrots and 
sticks strategies, and bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations 
• The Congress generally 
supported Bush’s policy 
towards North Korea 
• Republicans advocated 
bolstering of military 
capabilities 
• Democrats advocated 
diplomatic solutions and 
decreasing US reliance on 
nuclear weapons. 
• Democrats stressed 
multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations 
  
Aside from the Congress, another domestic constraint faced by the Bush and Clinton 
administrations in their policy implementation on the North Korea crisis was public opinion and 
American political culture. Clinton approached the public to rally and push Congress to support 
his programs.  
Following the 9/11 attacks, foreign policy concerns again became the top priority of the 
American public. They began to see terrorism and nuclear proliferation as a direct and imminent 
threat to national security, and not just a foreign policy concern of the President. The general 
public in the Bush administration showed support for military involvement to curtail the DPRK. 
After the attack, Bush gained a 90% approval rating, higher than any president had achieved 
before, and public opinion became geared towards supporting Bush and his War on Terror. One 
year after 9/11, his approval stood at 70%.  A November 2001 poll found that 81% of the polling 
population agreed that it would be best for the future of the country to take an active part in 
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world affairs. Instead of calling for isolation from world affairs, which the American public felt 
prior 9/11, the public began patronizing engagement to the world. Indeed, this is in stark contrast 
to the public's approval ratings of Clinton's performance during his first term, which stood at a 
very low 40%.  And while the public's perception of his work on some foreign policy issues was 
positive, Clinton's overall foreign policy rating was a low 34%. Similar to the public opinion 
during Bush’s term, Americans in the Clinton administration were in favor of using US troops in 
intervening in foreign affairs. However, the Clinton administration was not keen on using force 
because of its responsibility to ensure the safety and protect the lives of every American. Thus, 
the central thrust of the Clinton strategy was diplomatic negotiations, in order to create 
cooperative security measures around the globe. However, a part of the American public in 
Clinton’s administration was advocating for a sticks strategy, similar to the approach used by the 
Bush administration.  See table 12 for the comparison of Clinton’s and Bush’s policies in relation 
to American public opinion. 
Table 12. Clinton, Bush, and the American Public 
 
Constraint Clinton Administration Bush Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Opinion 
 
• The public was divided 
regarding Clinton’s foreign 
policy 
• Some Americans advocated 
diplomatic approach rather 
than military force  
• Others pushed for a policy of 
force and coercion rather 
than diplomacy 
• Preference to strengthen 
America’s defense, instead of 
spending money for foreign 
aid and diplomacy 
• The American public 
supported Bush’s stick 
strategy on North Korea 
• The public began to see 
terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation as a direct and 
imminent threat 
• The general public agreed 
that it would be best for the 
future of the US to take an 
active part in world affairs 
 
Bureaucratic politics, which include the discrepancies in the actions of different agencies 
and institutions within the US government, have also provided significant policy constraints. The 
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differences in the actions, particularly with the Defense Department and various intelligence 
agencies, have lead to inconsistency, which further aggravates the problems with the 
implementation process. Aside from the differences, the personality of Clinton and Bush can be 
cited as one factor in the failure to resolve the North Korean issue (Cha 2002; Cronin 1994). 
While Clinton can be criticized for his lack of leadership will, Bush’s personality can also be 
said to be overly aggressive, as with his labeling North Korea as part of an axis of evil.  
Bureaucratic problems had become evident from the outset of the Clinton administration. 
Instead of redefining ends and means, for most of its first year in office, the administration tried 
to avoid making tough choices. For instance, nuclear diplomacy was the subject of only three 
Principals' Committee meetings during 1993. Observations indicated a gaping void at the top of 
the bureaucracy (Berry 1995), and thus, with no one at the top in charge, American diplomatic 
strategy was one of drift, punctuated by spasms of zigzagging. State Department officials 
commented that the lack of regard to the field troops was reflective of a broader problem in the 
implementation strategy of Clinton’s policy, thus making the policy appear as a series of ad hoc 
improvisations without any organizing concept (Cronin 1994). Indeed, this was illustrated in the 
reluctance of then National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to construct a diplomatic deal that 
North Korea might find acceptable.  Lake saw himself more as a policy broker than a policy 
entrepreneur in this case. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was acutely sensitive to 
hawkish pressures, also steered clear of seizing the diplomatic initiative (Sigal 1998).  
The conflict during the beginning of the Clinton administration reflected the problem in 
the coordination among the implementing arm of the North Korean policy, a problem that 
continued throughout Clinton’s second term. Predominantly, the reluctance of senior officials to 
take charge of dealing with North Korea, or to promote deal-making in public was perhaps the 
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most telling evidence of the politics of the problem (Sigal 1998). The organizational interests, the 
primary motive in bureaucratic politics explanations, also predisposed most government agencies 
against a deal with North Korea (Sagan and Waltz 1995; Lake 1994). The armed services were a 
partial, though critically important, exception. For instance, the State Department has an interest 
in maintaining good relations by cooperating with other governments. Further, it also has an 
interest in negotiating with other governments. That interest leads it to insist on conducting 
negotiations on behalf of the United States. It does not necessarily incline the department to 
favor negotiations, especially when officials believe that talks will be fruitless, or worse, when 
they feel the other side will take advantage of talks to pursue its nuclear ambitions (Lake 1994).  
To nonproliferation specialists within the State Department, and especially in Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), preventing proliferation is seen as being 
synonymous with preserving and protecting the prerogatives of the IAEA. Nonproliferation 
specialists in the Pentagon have defined their interests differently. Rather than pursuing 
diplomatic solutions, they have been preoccupied with preventing North Korea from producing 
any more plutonium or diverting what it had to bomb making. The difference in outlook led them 
to take opposing stands at interagency meetings (Sagan and Waltz 1995; Sanger 1994).  
In the meantime, there is still an existing and a well-recognized split in the Bush 
administration over its North Korea policy (Rowen 2003).  The first policy faction, consisting of 
Vice-President Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Undersecretary of 
State, John Bolton, advocate economic and political isolation, enforced compliance and eventual 
regime change as the preferred solution to the nuclear crisis.  This group is strongly opposed to 
considering diplomatic negotiations before Pyongyang has fulfilled its obligations, as dictated 
under previous agreements. The second policy faction, led by Secretary of State Colin Powell 
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and much of the State Department, supports the commencement of negotiations towards a 
comprehensive solution. This includes greater cooperation with both allies and partners in the 
region, as well as a greater commitment to reforming the North Korean regime through placing it 
firmly within the international community. Despite gaining strong support from experts and 
scholars of North Korea, the approach has been greatly weakened by the failure of diplomacy in 
the build-up to the Iraq conflict (Rowen 2003). Table 13 outlines the debate within the 
bureaucracy in relation to the US policies in the DPRK. 
Table 13. Clinton, Bush and the Bureaucracy 
Constraint Clinton Administration Bush Administration 
Bureaucracy 
• Disagreements and the lack 
of cooperation between US 
agencies  
• Reluctance of senior officials 
to take charge in dealing with 
North Korea 
• Defense budget cut 
• Avoidance by top officials to 
make tough choices 
• Lack of good sources of 
political intelligence on 
North Korea 
• Government agencies are 
divided regarding Bush 
administration’s policy 
towards North Korea 
• Pentagon hawks call for 
regime change  
• The moderates argued that 
talks with North Korea 
would result to a negotiated 
settlement and would build a 
coalition among concerned 
countries for taking action if 
engagement fails 
 
International Systemic Constraints 
 
 With regard to their policies towards the North Korean nuclear program, the Bush and 
Clinton administrations have largely been faced with the same set of systemic constraints. These 
include the lack of cooperation, the failure of consensus-building between major powers – 
including Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia, and, lastly, policy inconsistencies within the 
countries themselves. Moreover, the two US administrations were continually hounded by the 
difficulty of dealing with the Kim regime. 
 During his term, the Clinton administration made painstaking efforts to solicit viable 
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support from its supposed partners, which included Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia. 
Clinton had been very confident that the task at hand would be easy, since it was universally 
acknowledged that a nuclear weapon constitutes a global threat. Nonetheless, each country has 
expressed its hesitation to fully cooperate in sanctioning North Korea economically. Japan, 
Russia, South Korea, and China agree that the situation calls for a peaceful negotiations as 
opposed to what US is offering at that time—economic sanctions for North Korea so that it 
would drop all of its nuclear activities (Korea Times June 15, 2002). At the time, each country 
was actively engaged in maintaining its good relationships with North Korea, and protecting 
their own vested interests. While Japan declined the American proposal, it shares the same 
concerns with the US over North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Japan is known as 
one of the strong advocates of nuclear disarmament, despite signing the US-Japan Security 
Treaty, which states that only US troops are admitted on Japanese soil, and stipulates that an 
attack on one force will be considered an attack on both, and that US would be prepared to use 
nuclear weapons.  
Nonetheless, soon after the Second World War, Japan has been in constant effort to 
maintain peace with other countries. Hence, it has advocated several foreign policies which 
highly stress the necessity for continued peace and international stability. But during the Clinton 
administration, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party started to contemplate about the 
effectiveness of the NPT. Worse, Japan’s Foreign Minister Kabun Muto harshly expressed its 
decision to develop its own nuclear weapons if necessary in July 1993 (Washington Post July, 
1993; Japan Times Weekly, January 31-February 6, 1994: 5), a decision that is not impossible to 
materialize at the appropriate time. Arguably, this pronouncement only meant that the US had 
yet to gain the full confidence and cooperation of Japan, in its aim to resolve the North Korean 
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nuclear threat. Given Japan’s limited defensive capabilities, it appears that it cannot possibly 
launch its own nuclear weapons program. However, due to Japan’s lack of natural resources, the 
country has learned to depend largely on nuclear energy for its domestic needs, and presently, 
the country has already acquired fifty one atomic plants. Thus, Japan could indeed develop 
nuclear weapons if need be – they have all the raw materials, all the technology, and the 
necessary capital to produce a functional nuclear weapon (Japan-Nuclear Energy March 10, 
2000). This further proved that indeed North Korea is a threat to the world’s security. In short, 
other may intensify their nuclear programs for defense and security purposes. 
 Japan has been serious in its attempt to normalize relationship with North Korea (H. N. 
Kim 2004). This seriousness was materialized in September 2002 when Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro took a bold initiative of visiting Pyongyang to hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong-
Il. Although the first Japan-North Korea summit meeting did not result in an immediate 
normalization of diplomatic ties, partly because of the disputes over the abduction issue and 
partly because of the North Korean nuclear weapons program (H. N. Kim 2004), Koizumi 
continued his effort to normalize relationship with North Korea. Again, he took a second visit to 
Pyongyang to hold talks with Kim Jong-Il on May 22, 2004.  This move by Koizumi has given 
rise to speculations that Japan is aiming to normalize diplomatic relations with the DPRK before 
his tenure as the Prime Minister expires in September 2006. According to H. N. Kim (2004), 
unless and until North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program, it is unlikely that Japan will 
normalize diplomatic ties with North Korea.  
Thus, the hope for US to pressure the DPRK to stop all its nuclear activities is still in the 
hands of Japan, since earlier it had expressed its support to Bush administration. Japan prioritized 
the North Korean nuclear threat, especially after the Taepo Dong missile launch over Japanese 
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islands. For the Japanese, North Korean missile activities pose a direct threat for the country. 
From a diplomatic point of view, Japan could serve a vital role in the implementation of US 
policy on North Korea, as it is highly equipped with an excellent intelligence reporting capacity.  
The Bush administration, like Clinton’s, had received China’s criticism over its plans to 
sanction North Korea economically (Ji 2001: 396). China declined support on the detachment of 
the US military presence. Moreover, China also adheres to its beliefs that the South will play a 
large part in the unification efforts, and thus it strongly promotes the development of excellent 
relationships on behalf of North Korea. Furthermore, China cannot just simply take apart its 
economic interests over North Korea, as North Korea serves as the China’s conduit for global 
superiority. As in the case with Clinton, China stands firm on its decision not to be held 
responsible for bringing about the collapse of North Korea, and a chaotic North Korea would be 
more than China could bear, as it would mean influx of war casualties from the country, and 
obligations to supply the country with foods, oil, and other goods. In addition, China fears that its 
support for the US would aggravate the political turmoil in the country, which falls beyond the 
best interests of Beijing. China’s best interest lies in its goal to be the recognized regional 
hegemony in the East Asian region, which would be threatened if the US were to interfere. For 
China, it would be unsurpassed victory if North Korea would remain as a modestly potent nation, 
able to daunt an attack by the South and the US, yet sufficiently not armed so that its strength 
would limit China’s ability to forcefully negotiate with the country.  
 The Bush administration’s policy over North Korea is lucidly inconsistent with the 
country’s Sunshine policy, which was advocated by former South Korean president Kim Dae 
Jung. This policy is largely fueled by his vision to improve ties between the North and South via 
extensive business collaborations and investing. Although there exist only a few conclusive 
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findings about the impacts of the Sunshine Policy on the relationship between the two kin 
nations, analysts presuppose that South Korea will remain its vigor to develop peaceful ties with 
North Korea. South Korea sturdily upholds engagement as the best way of settling the issue, 
which it believes is the key instrument in persuading North Korea into the international 
community, and diminishing the menace posed by North Korea’s nuclear programs. Moreover, 
South Korea fears that the hard-line American policy, and Bush’s constant reference to North 
Korea as part of an axis of evil may annoy North Korea to the point of refusal to engage in any 
peaceful talks. As such, it is clear that both Clinton and Bush have failed to consider the national 
interests in designing their policy frameworks to address the North Korean nuclear programs. 
Although South Korean leaders accept that North Korea’s nuclear programs pose imminent 
threats for global security and stability, there is still the fact that South Korea is a kin country, 
and, as such, remains distant in approving economic sanctions and military attacks against North 
Korea. Thus, it constantly pursues the conduct of continued negotiations between North Korea 
and United States.  
 Similarly, Russia’s ability to support both the Clinton and Bush administrations has been 
hindered by its own national interests. This was especially evident during Clinton’s 
administration. The hesitation is spurred by two things, the first being that Russia aspires to 
benefit economically from the Sunshine Policy sponsored by the South Korea, and second, that 
the country stands as the “main mover” behind North Korea’s decision to approve the plan to 
restore the inter-Korean railway, which will connect North Korea to the borderline of China. 
Russia is bound to be the primary recipient of the benefits of the proposed rail plan, since the 
railway is deemed indispensable in developing their Trans-Siberian railway, which would serve 
as the major channel for products between East Asia and Europe. Indeed, Russia shares the belief 
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about the necessity for peaceful engagements to reconcile the nuclear issues between US and 
North Korea. 
 In summary, a major difficulty for both the Clinton and Bush administrations has been 
their inability to build that sufficient domestic and international confidence that is necessary to 
implement their initiatives. The refusal of US allies to support the Clinton administrations efforts 
to isolate North Korea was embarrassing for the Clinton administration, and raised serious 
questions about its ability to play a leadership role in international affairs. If, and only if, the 
Bush administration is willing to undertake the long and patient process of resolving these 
differences, will these countries consider adhering to its principles.  
Table 14 shows the similarities and differences between the Clinton and Bush 
administration policies, in terms of the responses from South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. 
Table 14. Clinton, Bush, and Concerned Countries 
Constraint Clinton Administration Bush Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inconsistencies 
between US and 
other foreign 
policies on North 
Korea 
• Clinton failed to get the full 
confidence of South Korea, 
Japan, China and Russia 
• South Korea called the 
Clinton administration to 
avoid unilateral concessions 
to North Korea 
• South Korea appeared to seek 
a softer line 
• Japan was reluctant to go 
along with the US threats to 
impose economic sanctions 
on North Korea 
• Japan strongly preferred an 
approach emphasizing 
diplomacy 
• China opposed the 
introduction of harsh 
measures against the DPRK  
• Russia preferred to prevent 
any unilateral American 
move 
• China does not support 
Bush’s hard approach  
• China will fight for North 
Korea should a war broke out 
between US and North Korea 
• Bush’s policy is inconsistent 
with the Sunshine Policy 
• Roh-Moo Hyun poses a great 
challenge in pursuing Bush’s 
policy  
• Russia prefers less 
confrontational approach 
• Russia does not support 
economic sanctions yet 
• Japan generally supports 
Bush’s policy, but scholars 
fear that US policies would 
cause harm for the whole 
Eastern Asian countries 
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The Kim Regime 
 
One of the systemic constraints that challenged the Clinton administration, and has 
continued to challenge the Bush administration, is the firm stand of the Kim regime that the US 
is employing hard line policies, and that the US position in the nonproliferation regime is flawed, 
thus casting a doubt on the US intentions of resolving the North Korean nuclear threat. 
Differences in philosophies have constrained Clinton’s and Bush’s attempts to resolve the North 
Korean nuclear problem, and though the US has repeatedly made it clear that it is not aiming to 
attack the DPRK, the latter has begun insisting that their nuclear weapons development is now 
partially borne as a measure to counter any US aggression. 
Under the Clinton administration, it was concluded that the regime was not about to 
collapse, and that Clinton would have to deal with Kim Jong-il. According to the Task Force on 
Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare (TFTUW), leadership in North Korea would not give up 
nuclear weapons, no matter how many agreements it entered into with the US. It was viewed that 
the nuclear weapons provided the ultimate insurance policy of the ruling elite in the DPRK 
(Wheeler, 2003), and that Kim Jong-il was a dictator struggling for regime survival by 
controlling the state security apparatus and occupying all key party, military and government 
leadership positions (International Crisis Group 2003: 2). Similarly, in the case of the Bush 
administration, there was mutual distrust between the US and the DPRK. This was heightened 
when the DPRK was provoked by Bush’s 2001 termination of negotiations over North Korea’s 
missile programs, his inclusion of North Korea in his axis of evil labeling, the administration’s 
policy on preemption, and the US attack on Iraq, as evidence that the US poses a viable threat to 
the DPRK. In turn, the US has accused the DPRK of violating the 1992 agreement by pursuing 
an underground uranium-enrichment program. Moreover, the administration has contended that 
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appeasing Kim Jong-Il’s demands would only encourage other would-be tyrants around the 
world to do what the DPRK is doing in terms of nuclear activities, and Washington has viewed 
North Korea’s April 2003 proposal as nothing but blackmail (Kerr 2003). The Bush 
administration has also continuously reiterated that it has no intention of attacking the DPRK. 
Despite this assurance, Pyongyang strongly believes that the US National Security Strategy and 
the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review indicate that the Bush administration is preparing to attack it. 
The table below outlines the constraints posed by the Kim regime to the Clinton and Bush 
administrations. 
Table 15. Clinton, Bush, and the Kim Regime 
Constraint Clinton Administration Bush Administration 
Kim Regime 
• US viewed North Korean 
nuclear program as a 
bargaining chip 
• North Korea viewed its 
nuclear program as a means 
to defend itself from foreign 
adversaries 
• There is a mutual distrust 
between the us and North 
Korea 
• The Kim regime views the 
Bush administration policy 
as flawed 
• North Korea has repeatedly 
cited Bush’s “hostile policy” 
as justification to its nuclear 
program 
• There is a mutual distrust 
between the US and North 
Korea 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
Bush and Clinton team shares the same sets of statecraft tools to confront foreign issues, 
positioning themselves as threats to the US national interests namely; military, economic, 
diplomatic, and informational. Another parallelism between the two leaders’ approaches is their 
initial policy stance. Both chose to adopt a policy of indifference concerning North Korea’s 
nuclear activities, as, for instance, the issue was not even included in their campaign initiatives. 
Concerns surfaced within several months of their proclamations. Nonetheless, both preliminary 
approaches had been aimed toward the development of diplomatic negotiations over the issue 
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diplomacy being considered since it is the most logical step in promoting the political agenda of 
both nations and is one that is most cost-effective as opposed to other economic and military 
actions. Both however proved to be fruitless efforts.  
Moreover, both Clinton and Bush relied on similar strategies, which included the 
utilization of sticks rather than carrots. Clinton launched an extensive military exercise in South 
Korea merely to pressure North Korea into following US instructions, and, like Bush, also used 
economic and trade sanctions as threats for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs. 
However, none of these worked in the US’s favor, and, as in the case of Clinton administration, 
such feats threatened only to exaggerate things. The approach incited the same stubborn response 
from North Korea, and Clinton’s economic and military threats only drove North Korea to the 
point of pulling itself away from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Bush, pursuing the same policies, 
faced the risks of exacerbating the nuclear threat of North Korea, and he received no luck with 
his own sticks. North Korea had merely turned a cold shoulder when Bush halted oil shipments 
to the country (Dao 2002; Shenon 2002). 
Soon afterward, Bush, from the initial plan to offer North Korea nothing but sticks, 
started to lay a softer hand over the matter. After harshly criticizing the Clinton administration 
for its initiative to give away carrots to North Korea without getting anything in return, Bush 
adopted the same mechanism soon after its sticks did not spawn positive outcomes.  
Furthermore, Bush had foreseen the necessity to withdraw its firm hand against North Korea 
after it had generated only dwindling support among countries such as Japan, South Korea, 
China and Russia. Nonetheless, both administrations had nothing to brag with regards to 
lessening the intimidation caused by nuclear activities in North Korea, and indeed, North Korea 
continues to be a major threat to global security and stability. Moreover, both leaders, at least in 
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the early part of their administrations, were determined to separate North Korea from the rest of 
the world, via sanctions and though an international effort. When this did not yield sustainable 
results, both bent to engage North Korea at various levels.  
 Though the goals of the two leaders may be well admirable, their means on advancing 
them have been rather foreboding. As analyzed, Bush and Clinton both exhibited several 
inconsistencies with regards to their policy approaches. Each consistently shifted from being 
aggressive to diplomatic in the ways they attempted to settle the issue. Contributing to such 
inconsistencies has been the presence of the conflicting policy stances of other powers. Both 
leaders had to sway back from their original policy preferences, which included isolating North 
Korea, because they failed to solicit general support from China and Russia. The politics inherent 
in US policy-making did not help, but only worsened the problem. Both administrations received 
arduous criticism, and endured extended debates over their policy preferences. Furthermore, both 
administrations have paid considerable attention to the significant roles of other countries, 
especially major Asian countries, in realizing their objectives (Hastedt 2003). This is largely 
because gaining their innumerable support provides the US likely success in implementing its 
economic sanctions and diplomatic talks with North Korea. Without the support of its major 
trading partners—Russia, Japan, China, and South Korea, it is hoped that North Korea will have 
no choice but to agree with US instructions. This is also the predicted consequence if North 
Korea proves unable to collect military assistance from at least one of these countries lest the 
military aggression will fail.  
 Another similarity has been the heedful effort of both administrations in soliciting 
worldwide support for their own foreign policies. Both the Clinton and Bush teams have 
received uneven approval and nasty criticisms over their way of handling their international 
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affairs. Clinton’s soft policy towards North Korea did not garner substantial appraisal from other 
countries, which was also the case with Bush’s hard-line policies (Henirksen 2003). Both 
administrations had viewed North Korea, to some extent, in the same light. For them, North 
Korea’s nuclear capability placed high risks upon the country’s corporeal safety. Through its 
Taepo-Dong 1 missile, North Korea has made it clearly evident that it possesses the facility to 
aim its nuclear activities to virtually any target. Another reason is related to the raging 
aggressions in Asia that poses a threat to US economic stability. Hence, both administrations 
focused their policies towards eliminating the nuclear programs in the country, stopping the 
development and export of missile technology and hardware, and reconciling North Korea and 
South Korea (Henirksen 2003). Despite many similarities, overall approaches in settling the issue 
of North Korean crisis differ strikingly from each leader. Given the same dilemma under 
different circumstances, both Clinton and Bush fell into the parody that the choices that they had 
made were the most appealing ones to be implemented at that time. Nonetheless, closer scrutiny 
of situation would give rise to other much better options that could have been realized (Renshon 
1995).  
 The aforementioned discussion reveals that while the two administrations possess several 
divergences in strategy, they also share several parallelisms. One remarkable similarity is their 
failure to consider North Korea’s circumstances (Hastedt 2003). For instance, both 
administrations had constantly assumed that economic sanctions could inevitably drive North 
Korea to its knees, and get it to dismantle its nuclear programs. But, much to the dismay of both 
parties, North Korea had other options open to it. Ultimately, there exists the same token that has 
brought for each administrative effort to take apart North Korea’s nuclear programs, which is 
their lack of consideration to North Korea’s capabilities as a nation. For instance, both leaders 
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are accused of having unsatisfactory information capabilities. While Clinton is said to have relied 
heavily on guessing about the prime motivators behind the development of North Korea’s 
nuclear program (Renshon 1995), Bush’s analysis of North Korea’s capability to manage its 
resources to survive any forms of sanctions from the United States was also deemed faulty 
(Woodward 2003).  
 In formulating their policies, similarities between both administrations can be traced to 
the lucid interests of both Clinton and Bush. From this discussion, it is also a valid statement to 
conclude that perhaps Bush has been somewhat influenced by Clinton’s policy directions 
(Woodward 2003). The aspirations of the Clinton and the Bush administrations to resolve the 
North Korean nuclear threat is manifested in their policy goals. While they share the same policy 
goals, their strategies have differed significantly from the outset of each administration. 
However, it is my argument that the domestic and systemic constraints experienced by both 
administrations will ultimately lead to their adoption of the same policies. So far, the study has 
showed that due to the domestic and systemic pressures, the Bush administration is likely to 
adopt a policy similar to that of the Clinton administration, despite holding a hard line policy 
approach in which the following elements are already apparent: the use of multilateral-bilateral 
approach the use of multilateralism and bilateralism at the same time, the predominant use of 
carrots with the occasional employment of sanctions, the use of economic and diplomatic means 
as statecraft instruments. Second, the study has shown that the domestic constraints faced by 
both the Clinton and Bush administrations have consisted of the US Congress, the American 
Political Culture, including Public Opinion and Bureaucratic Politics, and the systemic 
constraints, consisting mainly of the difference in the policy goals and implementation strategies 
of South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. Finally, this study concludes that like the Clinton 
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administration, the Bush administration is headed towards a stand-off with North Korea.  
This dissertation strongly believes that the Bush administration will make major changes 
with regard to its policy on North Korea towards the end of its time in office. As discussed 
earlier, the generally strong support from the US domestic institutions as well as the American 
public has only strengthened Bush’s current policy objectives. Yet despite this, changes 
particularly a policy shift from a multilateral stick strategy to a bilateral carrot one will 
eventually be brought about by systemic pressures, coming primarily from major US allies such 
as South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, in addition to the political behavior of the Kim regime, 
while, the international regime will maintain its minor role in the Bush administration. Moreover, 
this study has shown that the major driver for the Bush administration’s policy shift will be 
China, which consistently puts pressure on the Bush administration to hold one-on-one talks with 
the DPRK, which is something the Kim regime has been demanding since the administration 
came to power. In terms of shifting from economic punishment and intensified military 
activities, to economic and trade rewards and reduced military action, it has been known that 
South Korea, China, Japan and Russia all oppose the Bush administration’s economic sanctions 
and its aggressive military posturing. These countries want diplomatic approaches to prevent war 
in the region, and, as such, Bush may opt to employ carrot strategy at the end of his 
administration. The table below summarizes the policy shift in the Clinton and Bush 
administrations. 
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Table 16. Policy Shift 
Variables Clinton (Beginning) Bush (Beginning) Clinton (End) 
Bush 
(Prediction) 
Bilateralism and 
Multilateralism Bilateralism Multilateralism Bilateralism 
Bi-
multilateralism 
Carrot and Stick 
Approach Carrots Sticks Carrots Carrots 
Inclusion and 
exclusion of the 
international 
regime 
Major Minor Minor Minor 
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CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This dissertation has attempted to compare and evaluate the conduct of US foreign policy 
towards North Korea, in order to address the North Korean nuclear threat under both the Clinton 
(1993-2000) and the Bush (2001-2004) administrations. The capabilities of these two 
administrations to carry out their preferred policies have been evaluated, in lieu with the 
systemic and domestic constraints that largely influence their policies. The systemic and 
domestic constraints faced by both administrations were deemed as the primary factors in their 
inclination towards the middle ground in dealing with North Korea, hence becoming similar 
towards the end of the Bush administration. This study sought to identify the domestic and 
systemic constraints in the US foreign policy towards North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, 
particularly with regard to the policy approach and implementation strategies used by the Clinton 
and the Bush administration in terms of multilateralism and bilateralism, carrots and sticks, and 
the use of economic, diplomatic and military means and the utilization of the international 
regime. Finally, three domestic factors were identified in this dissertation: (1) the US Congress, 
(2) the American public opinion, and (3) the bureaucracy, and the systemic factors identified 
included (1) the inconsistencies of foreign policies among the US, North Korea, South Korea, 
China, Japan, and Russia, and (2) the difficulty of dealing with the Kim regime. These domestic 
and systemic constraints in US policy toward North Korea provide the reason for the lack of a 
viable resolution to the North Korean crisis. As such, this study sought to identify the domestic 
and systemic constraints, so that the present and future US administrations can resolve the 
constraints before embarking on a policy approach.  
This dissertation used the structured focused comparison in comparing the major areas 
evaluated for the study. The comparison was conducted through applying the same research 
questions to both cases, choosing the same variables to study such as the use of bilateralism or 
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multilateralism, rewards or sanctions, or the inclusion/exclusion of the international regime, and 
in evaluating the same domestic US Congress, American political culture and public opinion and 
Bureaucratic politics and systemic the lack of coordination and difference in policy frameworks 
of South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, and the difficulty of negotiating with the Kim regime 
constraints. The two administrations under analysis were chosen for the study because of both 
the remarkable differences and interesting similarities in their foreign policies and approaches to 
the North Korean nuclear problem. The approach taken by the current administration rested on a 
realist perspective that rogue states, and those who engaged in proliferating weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), must be dealt with in a firmer way such as with the use of military strategies 
to stop their operations. On the other hand, the Clinton administration favored the use of 
diplomatic approaches and negotiations, with a leaning towards economic sanctions in resolving 
Pyongyang’s nuclear threat. Similarities between the two administrations include their initial 
isolationist stand regarding the North Korean problem. 
Overall, this dissertation found that the policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations 
were largely affected by domestic and systemic constraints. This study also found that compared 
to the Clinton administration, the Bush administration is more likely to be affected by these 
factors. As such, this study expects that towards the end of Bush’s term, a major shift in his 
policy towards the DPRK is likely to happen. In the end, we are expecting to see a Bush policy 
that is primarily directed towards the implementation of carrot and multi-bilateral approaches. 
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Summary Overview 
 Chapter 1 has provided an overview of the North Korean issue, specifically the 
challenges to US Foreign Policy of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, its recent withdrawal 
from the NPT and the characteristics of North Korean regime, its ideology, goals, strategies, and 
regional relations particularly in East Asia. It has also introduced the Clinton and Bush strategy 
in terms of their initial policy position, the domestic and systemic constraints they encountered 
and the prediction of the study.  
 Chapter 2 has provided a chronological discussion of the American/North Korean crisis 
from the 1990s to the present. A narrative of American Policy towards North Korea specifying 
exactly the actions the US has taken across Clinton and Bush administrations has been discussed. 
Moreover, this chapter has provided a historical narrative of the North Korean nuclear program 
and the US nuclear non-proliferation policy towards North Korea since the Clinton 
administration, described policy decision such as the Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks 
including all policy options considered in each administration.  
 In Chapter 3, the Clinton administration’s policy on North Korea was examined 
extensively. This chapter has illustrated the overall logic of Clinton liberal internationalism 
foreign policy and the actions on the place of nuclear proliferation/North Korea and Clinton 
administration original/ opening posture towards North Korea shall be illustrated. In addition, 
this chapter has charted the implementation of Clinton policies in interaction with North Korea, 
other East Asian states including South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia, and US domestic and 
bureaucratic politics/decision making. Finally, his chapter has assessed the domestic and 
systemic constraints coping mechanism of the Clinton administration in terms of its policy 
approach and implementation strategy.  
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 Chapter 4 has evaluated the Bush administration’s administration policy. This chapter has 
provided an overview of the overall logic of Bush conservative internationalism foreign policy 
and the place of nuclear proliferation/North Korea and Bush administration original/opening 
posture towards North Korea. Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter charted the 
implementation of Bush policies in interaction with North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, 
and Russia. In addition, the fourth chapter has examined how the Bush administration coped and 
is coping with domestic factors that have affected his policy towards the resolution of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis.  
 In Chapter 5, the policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations were compared using 
the structured focus comparison. In particular, their policies were examined and compared on the 
grounds of bilateralism and multilateralism, carrot and stick strategies, and the inclusion and 
exclusion of the international regime. Furthermore, the pressures put forth by domestic and 
systemic factors on the two administrations and to what extent they have affected Clinton’s and 
Bush’s policies were compared. It was found that these constraints have largely shaped US 
policies towards North Korea. 
General Findings 
Motivations for the North Korean Nuclear Program 
 This study found that power, prestige and fear are the major motivations for developing 
nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons provide a potent source of military and political power which 
is needed for regional dominance, and also equalize situations of military inferiority to a regional 
adversary, and may give significant power to sub-national groups struggling for independence, as 
well as to terrorist groups and nuclear blackmailers. Thus, status competition is a major 
motivation in the search for identity. In the North Korean case, nuclear weapons may be 
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perceived as a way to avoid becoming marginalized, as the DPRK perceives itself as being 
overshadowed by its adversaries. Nuclear weapons can also mean technological prowess and 
elite status of the declared nuclear weapons states. While others, mostly developing nations, 
perceive a liNorth Korea between the declared possession of nuclear weapons and a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council.  
 The rationale for the North Korean nuclear program is contested. On one hand, it is 
argued that it serves as a defense mechanism for the regime. On the other hand, it is argued that 
the nuclear build-up is for the accumulation of power, and, in turn, to threaten other countries. 
This study found that the most dominant motivators for North Korea in developing a nuclear 
program are concerned with economic survival and security defense. In the North Korean case, 
observers view that the country uses its nuclear program as a bargaining chip for economic 
assistance from other countries, especially the US. The reason for this is that the DPRK’s 
economy has been in a continuous slump, and immediate regime survival largely depends upon 
its capacity to maintain a functioning economy. North Korea has experienced a major food crisis 
for more than a decade, and has failed to provide the basic necessities for existence, thus causing 
an increase in the black market economy, the spread of foreign currency, a surge in refugee flows 
across the Chinese border, widespread electricity shortages, and inadequate infrastructure 
undermining modernization attempts. However, despite North Korea’s falling economy, political 
instability has been remarkably avoided, in large part because South Korea, China, Japan, and 
Russia continue to provide Pyongyang economic assistance. This is also one of the reasons why 
North Korea is bargaining for economic rewards from the US, China, Japan and South Korea. 
 To preserve the regime, North Korea must not only be able to maintain a functioning 
economy, but it must also be able to defend itself. As such, North Korea has attempted to justify 
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its nuclear weapons program by claiming that its security is threatened by the increasing 
superiority of the US military. Specifically, North Korea claims that it needs nuclear weapons to: 
(1) provide a countervailing deterrent against US nuclear threats; (2) counter any future South 
Korean bomb; (3) deter SK’s overwhelming conventional military superiority; (4) compensate 
for the loss of Russia; and (5) ensure that North Korea is taken seriously as a major player in the 
region. Moreover, the DPRK perceives the nuclear deterrent as essential to its defense. However, 
this deterrence differs from the rationale of the US, which uses deterrence as a stabilizing factor 
to maintain a balance of power.  
US Policies on North Korea 
 It has been shown in this dissertation that North Korea continues to be a headache in the 
nonproliferation regime, especially for the US. Since the 1950s, American presidents have tried 
to resolve the North Korean problems by employing different approach strategies. Despite these 
serious efforts, the North Korean regime has been giving the US, as well as other countries and 
the nonproliferation regime a hard time in dealing with the nuclear crisis. Throughout this study, 
the policies of the two recent US presidents toward the DPRK have been presented, and the 
grounds for comparison include bilateralism versus multilateralism, carrot versus stick, and 
inclusion and exclusion of the international regime. Furthermore, this dissertation presented three 
domestic constraints and two systemic constraints that significantly influenced the two 
administrations’ policies. The Clinton and Bush administration’ similarity lies on their initial 
policy positions during their term. That is, they both started with a policy of indifference towards 
North Korea. During his first presidential campaign, Clinton never made any mention of North 
Korea. The case was the same with Bush. However, subsequent events forced both the Clinton 
and Bush administration to address the North Korean threat. While Clinton was driven by the 
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threat of nuclear capabilities of North Korea, Bush was and is using the threat of terrorism as his 
background for his actions in North Korea.  
 Their approaches to the North Korean, nuclear crisis have also been different. The Bush 
administration deviated from the Clinton administration’s policy of containment and engagement 
from the outset, by employing a conservative internationalist approach instead of Clinton’s 
liberal internationalist approach; Bush demanded that North Korea destroy its nuclear weapons 
before engaging or entertaining any diplomatic means; Bush used a multilateral approach, used 
economic and military sanctions instead of bilateral diplomacy and the carrot strategy utilized by 
Clinton; Bush ended Clinton’s Agreed Framework Clinton and started the Six-Party Talks with 
China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, North Korea. 
Bilateralism and multilateralism 
Both the Bush and Clinton administrations eventually decided to use diplomacy 
conditional, in Bush’s case in addressing North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. However, Clinton 
preferred bilateral diplomacy while Bush adopted a more multilateral brand. North Korea, for its 
part, prefers bilateral negotiations in dealing with the US. When Clinton realized that sanctions 
would not work, he engaged the DPRK into high-level talks, which resulted in the creation of the 
Agreed Framework. Clinton’s bilateralism was comprised of high-level talks, ranging from 
nuclear program issues to economics, politics and military use. Through a bilateral approach, the 
Clinton administration moderated rogue states’ behavior, while also aiming to contain aggression 
and achieve stability. On the other hand, the Bush administration has been an advocate of 
multilateralism, and has made it clear from the beginning that it intends to work with other 
countries, such as South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, and called for a Unified Front. The 
DPRK has been making attempts to engage the US in bilateral negotiations, but Bush has 
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continued to insist on his more isolationist policy, and has refused to send negotiators to 
Pyongyang. Despite its belief that the crisis needs a bilateral solution from the US and the 
DPRK, North Korea eventually agreed to the Three-Party Talks with China and the US, followed 
by the Six-Party Talks with the US, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia.  
Rewards and Sanctions 
Clinton’s policy towards the DPRK operated under the philosophy of his engagement 
policy, which was reliant on economic rewards and bargaining through bilateral diplomacy. On 
the other hand, Bush deviated from this reward policy, and instead employed a policy geared 
towards punishment. Initially, Clinton and Bush chose to use sticks instead of carrots in dealing 
with the North Korean nuclear problem. However, when Clinton employed military coercion, the 
DPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT. This threat made the Clinton administration realize 
that military aggression would only provoke the DPRK to do something drastic. Because of this, 
Clinton provided economic rewards to North Korea, and agreed not to impose any trade 
sanctions or undertake military actions against the country. Through the Agreed Framework, 
Clinton promised the funding for the construction of two water-light reactors and oil shipments 
in exchange with North Korea’s compliance to freeze their reactors and submit to IAEA 
inspections. 
The Bush administration, as we have seen, criticized Clinton’s policy as being a show of 
weakness. Clinton was perceived to be giving away economic and trade rewards without getting 
anything in return, and the Bush administration believed that North Korea was just using its 
nuclear capabilities as bargaining chips against US to achieve stability and economic incentives. 
Thus, Bush had chosen to take a firmer stance toward North Korea by adopting a stick strategy. 
Evidence for this includes characterization of Kim Jong Il as a dictator, and a strong support for 
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missile defense. However, this approach was hounded by oppositions from South Korea, China 
and Russia. This dissertation has shown that the Bush administration’s stick strategy, despite 
Bush’s promise of inflicting severe damage on the North Korean economy, has not been 
successful and has not caused the DPRK to change its political behavior. The study found that 
stick strategies would not be adversely affected by economic sanctions because Pyongyang has 
alternative trading partners, a command economy, and is not dependent on foreign trade. 
Moreover, the DPRK has prepared for economic isolation over many generations. These, 
together with international pressure and the lack of a productive response from North Korea, 
may have created a softening in the Bush administration’s position towards the DPRK.  
This study has suggested that the Clinton administration’s policy seemed to give 
economic rewards to the DPRK for breaking agreements, thus giving the DPRK the idea that it 
could get what it wanted. With this apparent shortcoming in the Clinton administration’s policy, 
it is easy to see why the Bush administration would want to break away from its predecessor’s 
approach. In summary, this dissertation advocates the use of both carrots and sticks in resolving 
the North Korean nuclear problem, and views the use of carrots without sticks as being indicative 
of an appeasement policy. On the other hand, the employment of sticks without carrots is feared 
to cause severe economic destruction and the unnecessary loss of lives. 
The International Regimes 
From the outset, both the Clinton and the Bush administrations supported the 
international nonproliferation regime, and since then, the inclusion of the international regime 
has been a part of their strategies to gain the support of the international community. The Clinton 
administration maintained close ties with the IAEA in its military intelligence, and used the 
legitimacy of the NPT to muster cooperation from countries in order to demand that North Korea 
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freeze its nuclear programs. Likewise, the international regime began as being one of the more 
significant measurement sources in enforcing the initial policies of the Bush administration, 
though its role has been greatly reduced when compared to its major role at the start of the 
Clinton administration.   
However, the international regime has failed to live up to the US’ expectations. In 
Clinton’s term, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT and no longer allowed the 
IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities.  Moreover, during the Clinton administration, the crime-
and-punishment approach the IAEA attempted failed to suit the policy of engagement by the US. 
After Bush took office, North Korea formally withdrew from the NPT. During the Bush 
administration, the US was having difficulty to come up with an agreement with other member-
states in the NPT. Thus, for both administrations the role of the international regime was reduced 
in the latter part of their terms, as each began developing their own strategies. 
Domestic and Systemic Constraints 
 Both Clinton and Bush’s continuous shifts of policy and strategies have been a product of 
the domestic constraints each has encountered from the US Congress, American culture and 
public opinion and bureaucratic politics.  
The US Congress 
The US Congress is one of the foremost drivers in both the Clinton and Bush 
administrations’ policies on the DPRK. In the former’s case, the administration was having 
difficulty in gaining the support of the Congress, while on the other hand, the latter has been 
enjoying its general support. Clinton’s dilemma was largely due to the different, more 
independent, centralized, partisan and homogenous Congress. Unfortunately, the Clinton 
administration never seemed to win its way with Congress, which at the time was noted for its 
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isolationism. The difficulty of getting Congressional support – from a Congress dominated by 
Republicans who constantly challenged his North Korea policy – ultimately pushed him to “go to 
the public”. The Clinton administration also had to deal with parochial, selfish political interests. 
Furthermore, the Clinton administration had to face a Congress dominated by Republicans who 
constantly challenged the administration’s policy on North Korea. 
Unlike Clinton, Bush had only minor conflicts with the Congress. While the Clinton 
administration had to conduct extensive bargaining, especially with Congress to solicit support, 
the Bush administration faced very few domestic challenges. The Congress supported the Bush 
administration’s choice of strategies in different foreign policy issues, allowed Bush to wage two 
wars on terrorism, one of them against Iraq, and supported the decision to withdraw from the 
1972 ABM treaty.  Unlike Clinton, Bush’s ability to carry the Congress with him has helped the 
administration reach a series of agreements with North Korea on security and economic issues.  
Public opinion 
As a result of the increasing focus global and foreign events brought about by September 
11th, the American public showed support for Bush’s drive against the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. Americans began to see terrorism and nuclear proliferation as a direct and 
imminent threat. The general public began showing support for military involvement to curtail 
the DPRK’s nuclear development, and indeed, after the attack the Bush administration posted a 
very high approval rating, 90%, higher than any president had achieved before. While Bush was, 
and is enjoying the support of the American public for his North Korea policy, Clinton had to 
approach the public to rally and push Congress to support his programs. Unlike Bush, Clinton, in 
his first term, gained a very low public approval. And while the public's perception of his work 
on some foreign policy issues was positive, Clinton's overall foreign policy rating was a low, 
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40% according to the Program on International Policy Attitudes. However, similar to the public 
opinion in the Bush administration, Americans in the Clinton administration were also in favor 
of using US troops. But Clinton could not employ military coercion because of its concern and 
responsibility to ensure the safety of every American. This is amid the fact that some Americans 
called for a policy of force and aggression rather than diplomacy.  
South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia 
During his term, Clinton made painstaking efforts to solicit viable support from South 
Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. Each country has expressed its hesitation to fully cooperate in 
sanctioning North Korea economically, and have asserted that the North Korean nuclear problem 
needs peaceful negotiations. Moreover, they have been actively engaged in maintaining its good 
relationships with the DPRK due to some vested interests. 
South Korea’s Sunshine Policy, with a vision to improve ties between the North and 
South, is seemingly irreconcilable with the Bush administration’s policy. South Korea opposes 
Bush’s hard-line policy and his constant reference to North Korea as being part of an “axis of 
evil.” During both the Clinton and Bush administrations, South Korea has maintained that 
engagement is necessary to persuade the DPRK to join the international nonproliferation 
community and diminish the menace posed by its nuclear programs. South Korea disapproves 
economic sanctions and military attacks against North Korea, and constantly pursues the conduct 
of continued multilateral negotiations. 
China’s own policy towards the DPRK is also somewhat contradictory with Clinton’s and 
Bush’s policy. The country has consistently opposed the two administrations’ plans to impose 
economic and trade sanctions on the DPRK. Up to this day, China is pushing the development of 
improved relationships on behalf of the DPRK, though interest is perceived as becoming the 
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recognized regional hegemony in Asia. This may partly explain why the country has opposed 
many actions by the Clinton and Bush administrations. Yet despite all these, China’s effective 
role as mediator between the US and the DPRK during the Bush administration has been notable. 
As with Clinton’s term, China is persuading Bush to hold bilateral negotiations with the DPRK. 
Along with South Korea and China, Russia, shares the same beliefs about the necessity 
for peaceful engagements to reconcile the nuclear issues between the US and North Korea. Also 
similar to South Korea and China, analysts observe that Russia is reluctant to support American 
policies, because it is trying to preserve its own interests. During the Clinton administration, 
Russia was seeking to benefit economically from the Sunshine Policy, and recently, Russia has 
supported North Korea’s decision to approve the plan to restore the inter-Korean railway, 
because it would be a beneficiary of the said plan since. The situation between the US and Russia 
worsened after the third round of the Talks. Nevertheless, Russia is still willing to participate in 
the fourth round of the multilateral process. 
Another key player that has since affected US policies on the North Korean crisis is 
Japan. During the Clinton administration, Japan held inconsistent support for the US. At first, it 
advocated several foreign policies that highly stressed the necessity for continued peace and 
international stability, but it openly expressed that it would develop its own nuclear weapons if 
necessary. But overall, Japan supported the Clinton Administration's North Korea policy from 
1993 to 2000. For example, Japan approved the US-Japan defense cooperation guidelines and 
cooperative research in the Theater Missile Defense system with the United States, for which 
Japan was accused by North Korea of using the missile issue – the reported test-firing of a 
ballistic missile over Japanese territory on August 31, 1998 – to create favorable public opinion 
for the revised cooperation guidelines and cooperative research (Park 2000). In fact, South Korea 
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urged the Clinton Administration and the Japanese Government to take a softer stance toward 
North Korea (New York Times, August 17, 1998). 
Among countries involved in the six-party talks, Japan has been the most supportive of 
the Bush administration’s policies toward North Korea. Japan has proved itself as the best hope 
for the US, since earlier it had continuously expressed its support for the Bush administration. 
For one thing, unlike South Korea, Japan urged the Bush administration not to drop the DPRK 
from its terrorism list. Indeed, Japan has a vital role in US implementation of its policy on North 
Korea. 
The Kim Regime 
Another systemic constraint that has impeded US policies towards the DPRK is the 
difficulty of dealing with the Kim regime.  Fundamental philosophical differences had 
constrained both Clinton and Bush’s attempts to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. 
Although the US made it clear that it was not aiming to attack the DPRK, North Korea insisted 
that they were developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent against US aggression. Thus the North 
Korean nuclear problem will continue for a long time unless this major difference in thiNorth 
Koreaing is resolved. 
General Conclusions 
 
In terms of the motivations for US policy towards the North Korean nuclear crisis, this 
dissertation found that: 
• Clinton and Bush initially chose to adopt a policy of indifference concerning 
North Korea’s nuclear activities. 
  
• While Clinton’s motivation was nonproliferation, Bush used the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks as a cover for his foreign policy. 
 
Regarding the domestic and systemic constraints faced by the Clinton and Bush 
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administrations, this dissertation found that: 
• The US Congress and the bureaucracy generally supported the Bush 
administration, but not Clinton’s policy. 
 
• There was a fragmented public opinion during the Clinton administration; during 
the Bush administration, the American public supported Bush’s foreign policy. 
• South Korea, China, Japan and Russia called for diplomacy, engagement, and soft 
line policy towards North Korea. 
 
• North Korea demanded bilateral negotiations with the US. 
 Regarding the Clinton and Bush administrations’ initial policy, this dissertation found 
that: 
• Clinton was consistent in his bilateral diplomacy. This was supported by 
concerned countries like South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. This also 
appeased the Kim regime. 
 
• Bush, from the beginning, made it clear that he was employing multilateralism in 
dealing with the problem. Although his policy was favored domestically, major 
countries, most notably China, prefers bilateralism. 
• Clinton initially relied on stick strategy but domestic and systemic pressures 
prompted him to employ carrots. This continued to the end of his term. 
• Bush is firm on his position to impose economic and military sanctions. Although 
this action was favored domestically, major countries prefer soft line policy. 
• Clinton initially considered the major role of the international regime. Bush 
initially considered the minor role of the international regime. 
In terms of the policy shift towards North Korea in both the Clinton and Bush 
administrations, this dissertation found that: 
• Domestic and systemic constraints largely shaped Clinton’s and Bush’s policies 
towards North Korea. 
• Clinton carried on with his bilateral approach because of the support it gained from the 
international community. 
• Bush’s multilateral approach will change to bilateralism operating in a multilateral 
setting due to systemic pressures. 
• Clinton used carrot strategy when US allies denounced his aggressive policy. 
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• Bush’s policy is likely to shift from stick strategy to carrot strategy. This early, 
the Bush administration’s policy has softened after the third round of the six-party 
talks. 
• As with the Clinton administration, the Bush administration will continue 
operating its own policy with a minor help from the international regime. 
This dissertation concludes that towards the end of the Bush administration, a policy 
somewhat similar to the Clinton administration’s policy, except the employment of a multi-
bilateral approach is very likely. This change will be largely affected more by systemic factors 
rather than domestic factors.
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